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Abstract 
 
Understanding and anticipating the behavior and associated mental/emotional 
states of mind of others is crucial for successful social interactions. Typically 
developed (TD) humans rely on the processing and integration of social cues that 
accompany other’s actions to make, either implicitly or explicitly, inferences about 
others’ mental states. Interestingly, the attribution of affective or mental states to the 
agent can in turn (top down) induce distortions in the visual perception of those 
actions (Hudson, Liu, & Jellema, 2009; Hudson & Jellema, 2011; Jellema, 
Pecchinenda, Palumbo, & Tan, 2011). The aim of this thesis was to investigate 
bottom-up and top-down influences on distortions in the perception of dynamic facial 
expressions and to explore the role those biases may play in action/emotion 
understanding.  
In Chapter 2 a series of six experiments examined the roles played by basic 
perceptual processes such as contrast effects (Thayer, 1980; Russell & Fehr, 1987; 
Tanaka-Matsumi, Attivissimo, Nelson, & D’Urso, 1995; Suzuki & Cavanagh, 1998), 
adaptation (Fox & Barton, 2007; Hsu & Young, 2004; Rutherford, Chattha, & Krysko, 
2008; Webster Kaping, Mizokami, & Duhamel, 2004) and extrapolation or 
representational momentum (RM; Freyd & Finke, 1984; Freyd, 1987; Yoshikawa & 
Sato, 2008) and by ‘emotional anticipation’, i.e. the involuntary anticipation of the 
other’s emotional state based on the immediate perceptual history. 
In Experiment 1 video-clips were used showing a facial expression of joy or 
anger of which the emotional intensity gradually decreased until a neutral 
expression (or a 10% joy or anger expression) was reached. Participants’ task was 
to evaluate the last neutral frame of the video sequence using a 5-point scale 
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ranging from slightly angry via neutral to slightly happy. The results showed that the 
expression depicted in the last frame of the happy-to-neutral videos was judged as 
slightly angry, while the same neutral expression depicted at the end of the angry-to-
neutral videos was judged as slightly happy (‘overshoot’ response bias).  
In Experiment 2 the identity of the actors was changed in the last neutral frame. 
Therefore, the observer was requested to make a judgment about an identity that 
was new to the observer; i.e. someone for whom no immediate perceptual history 
was available. If the overshoot bias would reflect sequential contrast/context effects 
or RM on an underlying valence dimension, then a change in identity should not 
affect the bias. On the other hand, the emotional anticipation hypothesis would 
predict the absence of an overshoot bias as the observer cannot anticipate the 
emotional state of someone on the basis of a perceptual history that pertains to a 
different identity. The Identity change manipulation removed the overshoot, 
suggesting that neither sequential contrast/context effects nor RM played a major 
role. However, the results can be explained by the emotional anticipation account. 
The findings of Experiment 2 may also suggest that adaptation does not play a 
crucial role as aftereffects are transfered to different identity, although to a less 
extent.  
In Experiment 3 the starting expression of the video-clips was a neutral 
expression, which morphed via happy (or angry) back to the same neutral 
expression (joy or anger ‘loops’). In this ‘loop’ condition the contrast between the 
initial and last frames was absent as both showed identical neutral expressions. 
Results showed a response bias, which was opposite in direction (‘undershoot’ bias) 
to the bias in the control condition. These findings are not compatible with a 
sequential contrast hypothesis, as this hypothesis did not predict the presence of a 
bias, nor are they compatible with RM on an underlying positive-negative valence 
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dimension, as in this case an overshoot bias was expected. However, the 
‘undershoot’ effect may reflect an implicit attribution about the actor’s emotional 
disposition towards the observer based on the immediate perceptual history 
(positive disposition in the joy-loop and a negative disposition in the anger-loop). 
In Experiment 4 explanations based on RM effects, which effects are known to 
be positively correlated with the speed of the intensity change, were excluded as 
variations of the speed of the video-clips did not affect the overshoot bias.  
In Experiment 5 a mask (a textured object) was inserted to interrupt the flow of 
the sequence for 400 ms immediately before the last, neutral expression. The 
overshoot bias occurred also in this condition, suggesting that it did not depend on 
the uninterrupted flow of motion leading up to the last neutral frame of the video-
sequence.  
Finally, visual adaptation was further ruled out in Experiment 6 as the overshoot 
was not affected by doubling the duration of the first frame from 300 to 600 ms.  
Overall, the findings reported in Chapter 2 suggested that the overshoot bias 
cannot be explained by basic bottom-up visual processes. Alternatively, the direction 
of the bias is congruent with the emotional anticipation account, which would explain 
the overshoot as the consequence of top-down attributions made by the observer 
about what the emotional state of the agent would be in the immediate future, on the 
basis of the immediate perceptual history.  
 
In Chapter 3 four experiments focused to test the ‘emotional anticipation’ task 
on individuals with Asperger’s syndrome (AS). These individuals show impairments 
in communicative and social domains as well as limited empathy. They have been 
reported to fail to mentalize spontaneously and they are more inclined to understand 
human actions in a systemizing manner, representing them in terms of physical 
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characteristics and forces. Individuals with AS were tested on the emotional 
anticipation tasks to see whether they would anticipate changes in the other’s 
emotional state from the dynamic expressivity of the face, or whether they would not 
possess this emotional anticipation ability. In the latter case it might be that they 
would try and compensate for the lack of emotional anticipation.   
Experiment 7, consisting of short video-clips of facial expressions (100% joy or 
100% anger) that gradually morphed into a (nearly) neutral expression, revealed 
that AS participants showed an overshoot bias in their judgments of the final 
expression of the videos, which was very similar to that of the TD individuals. At first 
sight this might suggest that the AS individuals, just like the TD individuals, used 
emotional anticipation to solve the task. However, when applying the ‘Identity 
change’ manipulation in Experiment 8, the response bias was absent in the TD 
group, but remained present in the AS group. This finding argued against the AS 
individuals possessing an involuntary emotional anticipation ability. However, if they 
do not possess this ability, then what did cause them to show the overshoot bias in 
Experiment 7? 
 In Experiment 9, the overshoot response bias of the AS individuals was not 
affected by the Mask manipulation, similarly to the TD group. This suggests that 
direct extrapolation of the geometries from dynamic facial expressions did not play a 
major role in bringing about the perceptual distortion in the AS individuals.  
In Experiment 10, the ‘Loop’ manipulation, involving the Neutral-to-joy-to-
neutral and Neutral-to-anger-to-neutral sequences, showed that AS and TD groups 
again diverted, with AS individuals judging the last neutral frame as nearly neutral, 
whereas the TD showed an ‘undershoot’ bias. This suggested that the AS 
individuals could have relied on sequential contrast effects in their evaluations of the 
expressions. 
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On the whole, these findings suggest that in AS individuals the perceptual 
judgments of other’s facial expressions are not influenced by emotional anticipation. 
The results suggest that they compensated for their failure to spontaneously 
attribute/anticipate emotional states to others by relying on sequential contrast 
effects.  
 
In Chapter 4 the emotional anticipation hypothesis was further tested in TD 
individuals using deceptive, or ‘fake’, facial expressions in the Joy-to-neutral and 
Anger-to-neutral video-clips, displayed by professional actors. The rationale for 
using faked expressions was that as faked expressions reflect an emotional state 
that is incongruent with the literal facial features displayed, the emotional 
anticipation hypothesis would predict to find no, or a reduced, overshoot response 
bias compared to genuine dynamic expressions.  
 In Experiment 11 the typical overshoot response bias was confirmed using the 
set of genuine expressions of the new actors. In Experiment 12, TD participants 
showed a very similar overshoot response bias in the fake and genuine Joy-to-
neutral video-clips.  This result may have been due to a failure to implicitly recognize 
the difference between genuine and fake smiles. Therefore in Experiment 13 
participants were informed through superimposed labels whether the video-clip 
depicted a genuine or a fake expression (fake angry facial expressions were 
included as well). Participants were further instructed that the fake expressions were 
not linked to any specific emotional state of the actor. However, the overshoot 
biases in the fake and genuine conditions did again not differ from each other.  
Possibly, the absence of a difference between the faked and genuine facial 
expression experiments indicates that the mechanism responsible for emotional 
anticipation is not sensitive to explicit knowledge, but instead proceeds in an 
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involuntary manner on the basis of the literal/featural information contained in the 
immediate perceptual history.  
Experiment 14 consisted of an electromyographical study (reported in the 
Appendix) in which activity of the Zygomaticus Major (smile muscle) and the 
Corrugator Supercilii (frown muscle) was recorded from participants while they 
observed the Anger/Joy-to-neutral video clips and judged the final experessions. 
The results suggested that, at least for a subset of the participants (9/15), the 
overshoot response bias in the Joy-to-neutral condition was associated with 
increased activity in the Corrugator, while the overshoot bias in the Anger-to-neutral 
condition was associated with increased activity in the Zygomaticus. These results 
are preliminary, but so far seem compatible with an embodied simulation account of 
emotional anticipation. 
Overall, the findings presented in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 suggest that dynamic 
presentations of facial expressions generate in TD individuals an ‘emotional 
anticipation’, which can be seen as a low-level mindreading mechanism possibly 
involving a motor simulation through mirror mechanisms, that in turn shapes the 
perception of those expressions. In AS individuals the ‘emotional anticipation’ seems 
to be compromised and may in the current tasks have been compensated for by 
relying on sequential contrasts. Implications for the neural mechanisms underlying 
emotional anticipation, and its dysfunction in AS, are discussed within the theoretical 
frameworks of action understanding through (1) embodied simulation and ‘direct 
matching’ mirror mechanisms, and through (2) inferential reasoning. 
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Humans live in a complex social environment full of reciprocal interactions, which 
require sharing intentions, interests and beliefs, and communicating motivations and 
emotions. Especially non-verbal cues, such as body gestures, eye gaze direction 
and facial expressions are thought to be direct signal of other people’s inner states.  
The interpretation of others’ actions in terms of an ‘intentional stance’ is a 
pivotal component of social cognition because it enables intersubjective 
understanding (Dennett, 1987; Frith & Frith, 2003). Typically developed humans are 
equipped with a Theory of Mind (ToM), which is the ability to understand and predict 
a full range of mental states, such as beliefs, desires, motivations, and emotions 
(Baron-Cohen, 1995). Thus, in order to engage with others and respond 
appropriately to different social requests, people need to comprehend others’ mental 
life. Individuals who have difficulties in understanding the experience of others, as is 
often proposed to be the case in autism, find it much harder to face the demands of 
day-to-day social life (Baron-Cohen, 1995). 
The process with which humans come to understand their conspecifics and 
anticipate their behaviour is still much debated in distinctly different disciplines, such 
as psychology, social cognitive neuroscience and philosophy of mind. One of the 
challenging questions is whether social understanding basically derives from 
automatic, involuntary processing of social information, or whether more deliberate, 
controlled or reflective modules are responsible for the social understanding, or, 
whether these two components work in concert (Adolphs, 2009; Frith & Frith, 2008; 
Lieberman, 2007; Satpute & Lieberman, 2006).  
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1.1 Early development of the ability to anticipate other’s actions  
 
Several theories have been proposed to explain how people make sense of and 
anticipate others’ behaviour (see section 1.2). These can be broadly differentiated in 
those that employ the embodied mind thesis for explaining action understanding and 
those that refer to the use of a set of theories or concepts and additional cognitive 
resources to make inferences about other people’s mental states. These accounts 
base their positions on a prior differentiation between a mechanistic and mentalistic 
analysis of social events. 
While watching a scene in real life one of the major distinctions made by the 
visual system is between agentive, animate stimuli, whose behaviour is self-
propelled and initiated by goals and intentions, and inanimate, non-agentive stimuli, 
which lack inner mental processing. The motion of inanimate, non-agentive objects 
is processed in terms of physical laws, or input - output relationships, underlying 
mechanical causality, as is the case for collisions between billiard balls or moving 
geometrical shapes on a display (Michotte, 1963). However, a movement of an 
object which is self-propelled is perceived as agentive (Heider & Simmel, 1944; 
Premack, 1990). In other words, the observation of movements which are self-
initiated and goal directed (i.e. actions) leads to the attribution of agency and 
intentionality (Baron-Cohen, 1995, 2005). This is evident from experiments using 
moving point-lights located at the joints of the actor presented on a display, which 
are immediately perceived as a human action, e.g. walking or running. This 
phenomenon has been termed ‘biological motion’, referring to a self-initiated, 
intentional movement of objects (Johansson, 1973; Kozlowski & Cutting, 1977). It 
was replicated with different kinds of human actions, including social and 
instrumental actions (Dittrich, 1993). Further, bio-motion perception seems to 
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facilitate social judgments, such as those concerning the identity of actors (Lou & 
Baillargeon, 2005) or emotional expressions (Walk & Homan, 1984; Dittrich, 
Troscianko, Lea, & Morgan, 1996). Humans spontaneously allocate visual attention 
to biological stimuli, such as human bodies, compared to other stimuli (Downing, 
Bray, Rogers, & Childs, 2004; Thornton & Vuong, 2004). This preference seems to 
be present from birth (Simion, Regolin, & Bulf, 2008) and it may promote the 
development of higher-order social competencies. 
At early stages of the development infants are argued to perceive moving 
objects as agentive and having goals by teleological means, independently of 
whether they are self initiated or not (Csibra & Gergely, 1998). For instance, one-
year olds attribute goals not only to people or puppets but also to computer-
animated shapes (Gergely & Csibra, 2003). These findings led some to propose that 
estimations of an action’s goal are achieved by ‘teleological reasoning’. 
According to this model infants are more likely to predict the goal of an action 
(i.e. end-point of a moving ball) when the agent tries to achieve the goal in the most 
efficient way available and with the least loss of energy, also when this involves the 
use of impossible biological actions (Csibra, 2007).  The processing of the 
mechanical properties of objects, according to Leslie (1994a), is the first level of the 
architecture for the cognition of agency. By 18 months of age, infants’ interpretations 
about the actions of people are different from inferences made about the motions of 
mechanical devices (Meltzoff, 1995). Thus, this next step in the development refers 
to the formation of concepts about people as intentional agents (Woodward & 
Summerville, 2000), representing the goal of their actions as the content of their 
mental state.  
The real social environment is characterized by complex interactions between 
animate agents, and inferences and predictions about others’ intentions may derive 
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from salient social or behavioural cues (Grèzes, Frith, & Passingham, 2004; 
Pelphrey, Singerman, Allison, & McCarthy, 2003; Saxe, Xiao, Kovacs, Perrett, & 
Kanwisher, 2004), especially facial gestures and eye gaze direction which specify 
intentional/social contingency (Pelphrey, Morris, Michelich, Allison, & McCarthy, 
2005). Humans are required to identify and interpret those social signals in order to 
response appropriately to different social demands. 
 These inferences do not only concern the attribution of a goal to someone’s 
action (first order intentionality), but also concern the other person’s inner states 
which incorporate intentions, attitudes, beliefs, motivations and emotional states 
(second order intentionality).  
Thus, in the social scenario understanding why people do what they do and to 
anticipate their actions might represent a further step in the analysis, which is not 
only based on the visual description of the social events themselves (Jellema & 
Perrett, 2007). The detection of agency, based on movement and contingency, 
might support higher-order, inferential processes about inner mental states 
(Blakemore et al., 2003).  
 
 
1.1.1 The neural basis for biological motion and action anticipation 
 
Studies on humans and non-human primates revealed the existence of a 
specialized brain network that processes biological motion. This system includes 
cortical regions in the both the dorsal and ventral visual streams. The former deals 
with object location and motion (‘where’ region), while the latter is associated with 
object recognition (the ‘what’ region) (Goodale & Milner, 1992). It has been shown 
that two specific regions, the Fusiform Body Area (FBA) and the Extrastriate Body 
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Area (EBA) in the human posterior visual cortex, are selective to the sight of body 
parts (Downing, Chan, Peelen, Dodds, & Kanwisher, 2006; Peelen & Downing, 
2007) and are involved in the analysis of explicit low-level visual features of human 
bodies (Downing & Peelen, 2011).  
Specifically, the FBA, located ventrally in the fusiform gyrus (Peelen & 
Downing, 2005), is more responsive to the whole body as compared to individual 
body parts, while the EBA, in the posterior inferior temporal sulcus/middle temporal 
gyrus (Downing, Jiang, Shuman, & Kanwisher, 2001), is more sensitive to the 
amount of body presented (Taylor, Wiggett, & Downling, 2007). Importantly the EBA 
does not respond to the correct temporal sequence of frames, thus is more likely to 
process the form and the structure of the body rather than biological motion 
(Downing, Peelen, Wiggett, & Tew, 2006). Moreover, EBA does not distinguish 
between actions performed by others and those of oneself (Urgesi, Candidi, Ionta, & 
Aglioti, 2007; Astafied, Stanley, Shulman, & Corbetta, 2004). The EBA projects to 
the superior temporal sulcus (STS; Giese & Poggio, 2003), which is located in the 
lateral posterior temporal cortex of the human brain.  
The STS region is responsive to bodily postures presented in a coherent 
temporal order and is involved in the processing of causal contingencies (Blakemore 
& Decety, 2001). It is well documented that the STS plays a functional role in 
processing biological motion. The human STS showed activation for the perception 
of biological motion of various human body parts, such as hand actions (Grafton, 
Arbib, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti, 1996), eye gaze direction and mouth movements 
(Hoffman & Haxby, 2000; Puce, Allison, Bentin, Gore, & McCarthy, 1998), static 
faces (Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000), and meaningful actions (Decety & Grezes, 
1999, Decety et al., 1997; Saxe et al., 2004). Recent neuroimaging studies in 
humans have confirmed that the STS may play a role in representing goal-directed 
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or intentional actions (especially in the right hemisphere; Pelphrey et al., 2005; Saxe 
et al., 2004). However, the STS does not seem to account for any motivational 
inferences, such as desires, fears and beliefs that may motivate the action. 
Moreover, the STS has connections with the amygdala (Aggleton, Burton, & 
Passingham, 1980) and the orbitofrontal cortex (Barbas, 1988). These areas are 
involved in the processing of social and emotional stimuli in humans and non-human 
primates (see Brothers, 1990; Adolphs, 1999).  
Single cell studies in the Macaque monkey have found STS cell populations 
selectively responsive to specific bodily actions, eye gaze direction as well as head 
and torso orientation. These activations were reported either when those behaviours 
were performed in isolation or in specific combinations (Perrett, Hietanen, Oram, & 
Benson, 1992). Other STS cell populations were found to be involved in coding the 
end-point of an action sequence based on the immediately preceding movements 
(Jellema & Perrett, 2003). 
Importantly, in order to respond some STS cells required the additional 
presence of a bodily or environmental a cue (i.e. preceding movements or gaze 
direction or reaching for a cup; Jellema, Maassen, & Perrett, 2004). Such STS cells 
seem to code the action when it is embedded in context (Jellema, Baker, Wicker, & 
Perrett, 2000; Jellema et al., 2004; Perrett, 1999). All together the above findings 
suggest that the function of the STS may be to provide a description of a bodily 
action in terms of its causes, goals and consequences (Jellema & Perrett, 2007), 
and how it evolves in the immediate future (Perrett, Xiao, Jellema, Barraclough, & 
Oram, 2006; Perrett, Xiao, Barraclough, Keysers, & Oram, 2009). Therefore, the 
STS may be involved in the mechanistic, contextual and probabilistic aspects of 
goal-directed and intentional actions (Jellema & Perrett, 2005).  
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1.2 Social understanding: Theory Theories and Simulation Theories  
 
The main attempt of classical cognitivism was to establish how mental processes 
are generated and the causal relation between mental states and behaviour. 
According to the classical view of cognitivism, cognition is explained in terms of 
computational processes (TOTE: text, operate, text exit; Miller, Galanther, & 
Pribram, 1960), which generate symbolic representations in the mind (Fodor, 1981; 
Pylyshyn, 1987). In this scenario two different theoretical accounts tried to explain 
how people can understand the behaviour of others in terms of epistemic mental 
states. In line with the classic view of cognitivism, Theory Theory (TT) argues that 
common-sense terms for mental states, such as intentions, beliefs, desires, 
motivations and emotions, are part of a theoretical framework. In other words the 
way in which people grasp others’ mental states requires the use of a theory. Then, 
having a theory of mind or the ability to read someone else’s mind would invoke 
laws and inferences (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992; Leslie, 1994a). 
Simulation theories were inspired by experiments on visual imagery. For 
example, Shepard & Metzler (1971) found that rotating an object mentally takes 
roughly the same time as for the object to rotate in the reality. This indicated that 
there is much in common between pretended and real-generated states. During 
simulation the system is taken off-line so that the outcome is not actual behaviour 
but predictions and anticipations of the behaviour of others. Thus, according to 
Simulation Theory (ST) the basic idea is that mental states may be attributed to 
others by creating pretend states in oneself, or putting oneself into the other’s shoes 
(Goldman, 1989; Gordon, 1995; Heal, 1986). Advocates of ST claim that mental 
states concepts derive from experiencing and simulating such mental states when 
explaining and predicting the same mental states in other people. Therefore, in 
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contrast to TT accounts, simulation would immediately provide people with the 
meaning of others’ behaviour, without the need of inferential reasoning or the 
application of a theory. 
Both TT and ST share the assumption that mental states are unobservable and 
that the only information humans rely on to understand others’ minds is accessible 
by the observation of their behaviour (Herschbach, 2008). What is debated by the 
two theoretical models is whether such access is theory-driven, i.e. achieved by 
applying theoretical knowledge via explicit or implicit inferences (Leslie, 1994a; 
Fodor, 1968; Stich & Nichols, 1992), or whether it is process-driven (Goldman, 
1989). In the next paragraphs contributions and limitations of the two theoretical 
accounts (TT and ST) will be discussed in relation to the current debate on ToM.  
 
 
1.2.1 Theory Theory (TT) 
 
Advocates of TT argue that mindreading is a theorizing activity.  People understand 
other’s mental states by making attributions and utilizing folk psychological theories 
(Churchland, 1991), which are informative about the most probable causes of 
other’s people behaviour. Thus, understanding others would require adopting a 
theoretical stance and psychological laws, which define the link between inner 
mental states and behaviour. 
Alison Gopnik described the acquisition of these high-order cognitive activities 
in developing children using the example of a scientist acquiring knowledge, known 
as the ‘child-scientist-theory’. Gopnik argues that theories of mind are not innate but 
that the child acquires folk psychology by using the same causal reasoning 
mechanisms as those used by a scientist (Gopnik & Wellman 1994; Gopnik & 
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Meltzoff 1997). Thus, third-person attribution is purely inferential and the acquisition 
of mental-state concepts derives from causal relations between behaviour, 
environment and inner states, which relations are theoretically specified and 
constantly updated.  
In contrast, the innatist view suggests that humans are genetically predisposed 
to develop concepts such as belief and desire. This innatist view is related to the 
modularity theory proposed by Fodor (1978, 1983). The idea is that people hold a 
system of inferences and ‘representational relations’ (i.e. pretends, believes, desires 
that are involved in the causation of the agent’s behaviour), which together 
constitute a tacit, implicit and intuitive ToM (Leslie & Roth, 1993).   
According to this account the ToM mechanism relies on these innate concepts 
in combination with the predisposition to direct attentional resources to other 
people’s mental states (Scholl & Leslie, 1999).  
 
1.2.1.1 ToM tasks 
The traditional view of ToM as a domain-specific theory suggests that in order to 
explain and predict the behaviour of others one needs to posses mental states 
concepts. According to TT advocates the course of development is seen as a 
maturation of child’s ToM concepts which contribute to the formation of a folk-
psychology theory in adults. Empirical tests for ToM first focused on assessing 
whether and at which stage in the development children start to attribute false 
beliefs, i.e. the ability to recognize that others can have beliefs which are different 
from their own beliefs. In the ‘Sally-Anne’ task, developed by Wimmer & Perner 
(1983), children are told, or shown, a story about Sally and Anne. While Anne is 
watching, Sally puts a marble in her basket and leaves the room. While she is away, 
Anne takes the marble from the basket and puts it in a box.  When Sally returns, the 
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child is asked where Sally will look for the marble. Thus, the participant is asked to 
report the content of the actor’s belief. The right answer requires attribution of false 
belief to Sally which is different from one’s own mental representation of the 
situation. It was found that most children before age of four are unable to respond 
correctly.  
This finding was interpreted as a lack of a false belief concept (Gopnik & 
Wellman, 1992; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). In line with the child-scientist 
approach, correct belief attributions are instantiated by the development of 
theoretical reasoning, which promote the understanding of mental concepts. 
In a modification of the Sally-Anne task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985), 18 
months-old infants looked significantly longer when an agent’s behavior was 
incongruent than when it was congruent with the agent’s false belief. This result 
contradicts the view that theory of mind requires belief concepts at around 4 years of 
age (e.g., Gopnik & Wellman, 1992; Ruffman & Perner, 2005; Saxe, Carey, & 
Kanwisher, 2004).  
In the last three decades, it was long debated whether failures in the false-belief 
tasks with young children reveals conceptual deficits or information processing 
biases (Mitchell & Lacohee, 1991; Lewis, Freeman, Hagestadt, & Douglas, 1994). It 
was also suggested that the saliency of the information provided, i.e. the ‘true’ 
location of the toy at the beginning of the task, could have guided their response 
(Zaitchik, 1991), or that childrens’ failure of the false-belief tasks derives from a 
difficulty to inhibit their previous knowledge and update it accordingly to the other’s 
person desire-change (Moore et al., 1995). Other issues concerned the involvement 
of verbal reasoning in the standard tasks (Siegal & Beattie, 1991) or additional 
abilities other than understanding mental states (Bloom & German, 2000). It was 
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suggested, indeed, that the attribution of beliefs may follow an intuitive, automatic 
form of reasoning that may be independent of language (Friedman & Leslie, 2004). 
Notably, when advanced versions based on non-verbal tasks were employed, 
the development of false-belief attributions was found before four years of life. 
Onishi & Baillargeon (2005) combined a violation-of-expectation method with a 
preferential looking paradigm (Woodward, 1998). They showed an adult putting an 
object in one of two boxes to 15-months old infants. An occluder was inserted hiding 
the agent’s view of the two boxis. The object was then moved from one box to the 
other one. Once the occluder was removed, the agent could either reach the original 
box, accordingly to the agent’s false belief or the new location (incongruent choice to 
the agent’s false belief). The authors found that 15 months-old infants looked 
significantly longer in the latter condition, thus suggesting that infants before four 
years old already posses false belief concepts. These findings were further 
corroborated by Southgate, Senju & Csibra (2007) who found that two years old 
children could already anticipate someone else’s actions when the action’s 
prediction was only possible by attributing a false belief to the actor. 
According to those findings, it seems that children under four years old hold 
ToM concepts, and that the lack of correct answers on standard false belief task 
was due to the use of direct, explicit measures. However, having mental states 
concepts does not necessarily incorporate the ability to use them efficiently in 
mindreading (Apperly, Samson, & Humpreys, 2009; Samson & Apperly, 2010). This 
can explain why also adults make errors in ToM tasks, even though they already 
hold those concepts (Keysar, Lin & Barr, 2003).  
Thus, it is suggested that additional cognitive resources implicated in the 
inhibition of one’s own egocentric perspective and in the selection, monitoring and 
integration of salient cues to reason about the mental state of that particular person, 
Chapter 1 
Implicit, automatic and explicit inferential mechanisms in social understanding 
 
 
13 
 
are necessary to solve ToM tasks (Apperly et al., 2009; Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, 
Chiavarino, & Samson, 2006; Samson & Apperly, 2010).  Thus, the task may appear 
more demanding when subjects, children or adults, are required to overcome their 
own egocentric view and inhibit the self perspective to take the perspective of 
another. Interestingly, there is evidence that adults can implicitly process someone 
else’s visual experience even when they themselves hold a different point of view. 
However, this would only occur when there is no need to refrain from one’s own 
point of view (Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Scott, 2010). In the latter 
case the other person is not seen as a different entity than one self and therefore 
there is no need to inhibit one’s own perspective (Samson & Apperly, 2010). This 
may also explain why infants before four years of age were able to solve the 
‘implicit’ versions of the false belief tasks (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Southgate, 
Senju & Csibra 2007).   
The question is whether in every social interaction people would need to apply 
such cognitive computations to understand how the other person is feeling or which 
intention underlies her/his behaviour. If people would always need to recruit such 
effortful cognitive resource when engaging with others, then being successful in 
social interactions would be hard.  
The development of the ability to understand mental states other than belief 
and desires was also investigated by considering imitative skills and joint attention. 
For instance, Meltzoff (1995) tested the ability to replicate and complete unfinished 
goal-directed acts. He found that 18-month-olds can grasp the meaning of others’ 
goals even when the attempts to achieve those goals fail. The ability to imitate the 
intended action, as well as completed actions, at this age was confirmed by 
Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello (1998). Joint attention is considered a precursor to 
the development of ToM (Baron-Cohen, 1989; 1991a). By 14 months of age children 
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engage in joint attention, they share the attention toward an object with the adult’s 
attention, by following her gaze or pointing gestures (Tomasello & Haberl, 2003). At 
earlier stages, between 4 and 9 months, infants start to develop the ability to pick up 
social cues, including eye gaze and facial expressions, and discriminate between 
those signals which are directed to the self and the other (i.e. dyadic context) and 
those which are directed to the environment (triadic context) (Striano & Stahl, 2005). 
For instance, at 7 months of age infants show sensitivity to referential fearful facial 
expressions (with eye gaze directed to an external object) suggesting an early ability 
to use relevant social information to process potential dangerous objects in the 
environment (Hoehl, Palumbo, Heinisch, & Striano, 2008).  
Thus, the ability not only to detect but also to use social signals properly while 
engaging in social interactions starts to develop very early in life, despite that at that 
stage high cognitive functions are still poorly developed. 
In conclusion, on one hand new directions tend to emphasize the role played by 
cognitive functions and high level reasoning processes involved in the use of such 
concepts, especially in those tasks where taking the perspective of the other person 
is an effortful activity. On the other hand, it is possible that social understanding may 
also be supported by implicit processes, which can make use of immediate social 
information without requiring such difficult cognitive computations. Whether and 
when in real life people adopt one or the other way this possibly depends on the 
complexity of the social scenario. 
 
1.2.1.2 The neural correlates of ToM: the mentalizing network 
It was suggested that a specific neural network is involved during tasks assessing 
the comprehension of beliefs and desires (Frith, 2001; Frith & Frith, 2003; Saxe & 
Kanwisher, 2003). This network, which includes the medial prefrontal cortex, the 
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temporal parietal junction (TPJ) and the precuneus, is commonly termed the 
‘mentalizing network’. The TPJ is located around the supramarginal gyrus; the 
medial prefrontal cortex is considered the medial area of the prefrontal cortex and 
the precuneus is located in the posterior medial brain. Typically, this network is 
involved in tasks assessing explicit inferential components of social understanding. 
For instance, the mentalizing network is involved when participants are asked to 
assess other people’s intentions from stories (Jenkins & Mitchell, 2010), using 
pictures of human actions (de Lange, Spronk, Willems, Toni, & Bekkering, 2008) or 
displays of moving geometrical shapes (Castelli, Happe, Frith, & Frith, 2000). 
Recently the same areas where found active when participants observed irrational 
actions as compared to rational actions (Brass, Schmitt, Spengler, & Gergely, 2007). 
However, another study did not find the same engagement of TPJ during irrational 
actions (Jastorff, Clavagnier, Gergely, & Orban, 2010). In a recent meta-analysis 
study the mentalizing areas were found active when inferences about goals, beliefs 
or moral issues are presented in an abstract way and without involving biological 
motion of body parts (Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). According to this meta-
analysis, the TPJ results involved in understanding the intent of a social agent when 
goal-directed social behaviour do not include body-part information. The medial 
prefrontal cortex seems to be recruited in deliberative reasoning or trait inferences 
(Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). 
 
 
1.2.2 Simulation Theory (ST) 
 
In contrast to TT accounts, defenders of the simulation approach claim that pre-
linguistic representations of mental states are not generated by inferential processes 
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or high level theorizing, but rather by creating simulated ‘pretend states’ in the self, 
as if the observer would be standing in the agent’s shoes (Goldman, 2006; Goldman 
& Sripada, 2005).  
In Simulating minds Goldman (2006) provides a distinction between low-level 
mindreading and high-level mindreading. The former is supported by an automatic, 
unconscious simulation (or ‘unmediated resonance’, Goldman & Sripada, 2005), 
which is free from any task-specific knowledge (low-level simulation). The second 
form of mindreading is supported by high-level simulation which is linked to the 
traditional version of pretence-driven or imagination-driven simulation and it is driven 
by task-specific information (Goldman, 2009). Goldman suggests that low level 
mind-reading supports motor intention attribution and face-based emotion 
attribution, while the high-level mindreading may better explain decision, desire and 
belief attributions.  
Although the notion of simulation is considered misleading as it may assume 
different meanings (Gallagher, 2007; Stich & Nichols, 1992), here simulation of the 
other person’s states of mind is meant to be a functional process which contains 
representations of the possible mental/emotional states of target objects (Gallese & 
Lakoff, 2005; Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2011; Goldman, 2006). 
 
1.2.2.1 Low level mindreading, embodied simulation and the ‘mirroring’ mechanism 
Following the work: ‘Ecologic Approach to Visual Perception’ by Gibson (1979), a 
new view of cognitive science, called Embodied cognition came about which 
emphasized the importance of body-environment interaction and its role in the 
production of internal mental states (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). This approach 
involved several contributions from different disciplines ranging from philosophy of 
mind and cognitive neuroscience to artificial intelligence and robotics. Embodied 
Chapter 1 
Implicit, automatic and explicit inferential mechanisms in social understanding 
 
 
17 
 
cognition emphasizes the way cognition is shaped by the body and its sensori-motor 
interaction with the surrounding social and material world, making clear that mental 
operations involved in cognitive activities are not computed only in the mind (Clark, 
1997; Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Thelen & Smith, 1994). In philosophy of mind the 
phenomenological tradition already provided an account for embodiment and its 
relation to cognition (Gallagher, 2005; Lennon, 1990; Lennon & Gilbert, 2005). For 
instance, Heidegger in his ‘being-in-the-world’ put light on the fact that humans are 
engaged in dealing with things in the world which then allows a theoretical 
constructions of the reality. Similarly, Merleau-Ponty (1962) observed: 
“Representations are therefore ‘sublimations’ of bodily experience, possessed of 
content already, and not given content or form by an autonomous mind; and the 
employment of such representations “is controlled by the acting body itself, by an ‘I 
can’ and not an ‘I think that’ “.  
In line with theories of Embodied cognition on the embodiment of the mind, a 
new alternative model of simulation, called embodied simulation, has been proposed 
to explain intersubjective understanding (Gallese, 2001, 2007). According to Gallese 
(2007), humans are equipped of a simple, direct and automatic mechanism enabling 
intersubjective understanding in a very immediate way and without the use of 
complex reasoning or inferential analogy. Embodied simulation, which is the 
substrate of low-level mindreading as discussed by Goldman (2006), refers to an 
activation of neural mechanisms in response to someone’ else behaviour, which are 
the same as those used in the production of one’s own behaviour. Thus, 
understanding others’ mental states can be explained in terms of sensori-motor 
processes through the re-activation of neural circuitry active in bodily perception, 
action, and emotion. The neural mechanism enabling such direct understanding is 
often referred to as the Mirror Neuron System (MNS; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004).  
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Mirror neurons in the monkey’s brain 
Mirror neurons (MNs) are a particular class of motor neurons, which were first 
discovered in the ventral premotor cortex (area F5) of the macaque’s brain using 
single-cells recording (Di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992; 
Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 
1996).  
These neurons, which constitute around 20% of cells in F5, are called ‘mirror 
neurons’ because they discharge both when the monkey performs an action (such 
as grasping) and when the monkey observes a similar action done by another 
monkey or the experimenter. Importantly, when the motor act was executed in the 
absence of a target object (e.g. food) these mirror neurons were silent. This led to 
the idea that mirror neurons could underpin action understanding (Rizzolatti, 
Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001). The mirror neuron system (MNS) in the monkey’s brain 
also includes the inferior parietal lobule (IPL; Fogassi et al., 2005; Gallese, Fadiga, 
Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 2002). The latter receives input from the STS (Rozzi et al., 
2006), which responds only to the observation of biological movements, and sends 
an output to F5 (see Keysers & Perrett, 2004 for a review). Mirror neurons in F5 
were classified in two main categories: ‘strictly congruent’ and ‘broadly congruent’. 
In the first category there are mirror neurons (one third of all mirror neurons) that in 
order to be triggered require the observation of the specific action they would 
execute (e.g. grasping an object with a precision grip instead of a power grip). The 
remaining two third of all mirror neurons are ‘broadly congruent’, which can be 
triggered by dissimilar actions (grasping with the hand or grasping with the mouth) 
which have the same goal. Thus, it was suggested that mirror neurons allow the 
observer to understand what has been witnessed, namely the overall goal of others' 
actions (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). 
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Further, mirror neurons do not fire during observation of a pantomimed action 
(without the target object), but they do fire if the monkey sees the starting point of an 
action (hand-reaching for a target object), which is subsequently occluded by a 
screen (Umiltà et al., 2001). Importantly, the same study revealed that if the monkey 
knew that there was not an object behind the screen then the discharge of the mirror 
neurons was absent. This finding suggested that mirror neurons activity reflects a 
representation of the agent’s goal. Importantly, the described mirror neurons 
properties were not only found with transitive actions but also with intransitive, 
communicative mouth actions, e.g. lip-smacking (Ferrari, Gallese, Rizzolatti, & 
Fogassi, 2003). Thus, mirror neurons seem to underpin also social facial 
communication in monkeys. Moreover, it has been shown that ‘audio-visual F5 MNs’ 
discharge not only during execution and observation of a (noisy) act (e.g. breaking a 
peanut), but also by simply hearing its sound (Kohler et al., 2002). In another study 
monkeys were trained to use two types of pliers requiring either opening or closure 
of the hand in order to grasp food (Umiltà et al., 2008). Notably, F5 MNs in these 
trained monkeys responded to the observation of grasping performed with both 
types of pliers. This finding suggests that motor knowledge can modify MNs motor 
proprieties and can also modulate the way MNs generalize their visual response. 
Therefore, it was suggested that MNs may also code action’s intention and not only 
its goal (the end-state of the action). In a different study the monkey was presented 
with two conditions in which grasping a piece of food or an object was achieved 
either to eat or to place (Fogassi et al., 2005). In the first part of the task grasping 
the target was identical in the two conditions. The results showed that almost all of 
the parietal and premotor MNs were sensitive to the action intention, i.e. to either eat 
or to place. The data led the authors to propose that motor acts are organized in 
chains (grasp-for-eating and grasp-for-placing). Importantly, these chains were 
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activated before the observation of the forthcoming motor act of the chain, thus 
providing the observer with a map of the whole future action before it was executed. 
It has been suggested that these MNs could provide the neural basis for action 
prediction and intention understanding.  
Recently, in a behavioural study a looking paradigm previously applied to 
human babies (Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra, & Biro, 1995) was adapted to test the 
ability of macaque monkeys to evaluate and predict goal-directed actions of others 
(Rochat, Serra, Fadiga, & Gallese, 2008). The authors found that non-human 
primates, similarly to 9 to 12-month-old humans, were able to detect the goal of an 
action and build expectations about the most likely action the agent will execute in 
accordance with the physical characteristic of the context. It should be noted though 
that this was evident only when those actions were part of the monkey’s own motor 
repertoire, thus suggesting that previous experience plays a crucial role.  
On the basis of these results the mirroring mechanism is interpreted as 
enabling the transformation of sensorial information into potential motor acts. The 
derived sensorimotor information produces multimodal representations equipped 
with the meaning of the observed actions. Thus, according to the group of 
researchers in Parma, by automatically matching the agent’s observed movements 
onto her own motor repertoire (motor resonance, Rizzolatti, et al., 2001) without 
executing them, the activity of mirror neurons in the observer’s brain simulates the 
agent’s movements and thereby contributes to the understanding of the perceived 
action (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996). The direct matching approach is 
therefore retrodictive as the underlying goal of the actor is inferred by a bottom-up 
mechanism activated in the motor system.  
Although the mirror mechanism was discovered in the monkey’s brain, 
subsequent studies verified its presence in the human’s brain too.  
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Mirror neurons in the human’s brain  
Comparative and neuroimaging studies showed that the MNS in humans includes 
the premotor cortex, the lower part of the prefrontal gyrus and the posterior part of 
the inferior frontal gyrus (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004).  
Although almost all evidence for the presence of mirror neurons in the human 
brain is derived from neuroimaging studies, the presence of the mirror mechanism in 
the human brain was recently verified in a single neuron recording study conducted 
by Mukamel, Ekstrom, Kaplan, Iacoboni, & Fried (2010). Interestingly, in this study 
MNs were found outside the traditional circuit, thus suggesting that the MNS in 
humans is more broadly extended compared to the MNS in the monkeys. 
Importantly, in this study ‘super mirror neurons’ were identified and described as the 
cells that inhibit the execution of the observed actions, thus enabling off-line 
simulation. Furthermore, this subset of mirror neurons may help the observer to 
distinguish the actions of other people from her own actions.   
The MNS is closely connected to the posterior STS which sends the visual 
information forward to the parietal MNS and further to the frontal MNS where such 
information is translated in potential motor acts. The core system is also defined as 
Action-Observation network (AON; Cross, Kraemer, Hamilton, Kelley, & Grafton, 
2009; Kilner, 2009) referring to the action-observation matching accomplished by 
the MNS. The first study assessing the presence of the mirror mechanism in the 
human brain was conducted by using transcranic magnetic stimulation (TMS) 
(Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995). The left motor cortex (area 44 or 
Broca area, the homologue of F5 in the monkey’s brain) was stimulated using TMS 
in order to produce motor evoked potentials (MEPs), which were recorded from the 
right hand muscles. Crucially, Fadiga and colleagues found a significant increase of 
the MEPs during observation of transitive actions that involved the agent’s right 
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hand, but not by the observation of other actions not involving the agent’s right 
hand. It has also been shown that the mirror neuron system in humans is directly 
involved in imitative behaviour (Iacoboni et al., 1999; Iacoboni et al., 2005) and in 
the intention to imitate (Frey & Gerry, 2006). 
Additional evidence for the mirroring mechanism derives from studies 
employing electroencephalography (EEG) and magnetoencephalography (MEG). It 
had been known for some time that EEG rhythm recorded from central derivations 
(mu rhythm) is disrupted/reduced during active movements (Berger, 1929), but it 
turned out that the mu rhythm is also disrupted during passive observation of actions 
performed by someone else (Altshuler, Vankov, Wang, Ramachandran, & Pineda, 
1997; Altshuler et al., 2000). Moreover, desynchronization of the rhythmic oscillation 
was found during action execution and observation in the central sulcus (Hari & 
Salmelin, 1997; Hari et al., 1998). The intensity of activation of the MNS is 
correlated with the familiarity of the observed action in adults (Buccino et al., 2004; 
Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grezes, Passingham, & Haggard, 2005; Cross, Hamilton, & 
Grafton, 2006) and infants (van Elk, van Schie, Hunnius, Vesper, & Bekkering, 
2008). This finding seems to be in line with behavioral tests in monkeys (Rochat et 
al., 2008). Thus it seems that if the mirror system has a role in action understanding, 
then this is more likely the case with familiar actions which belongs to the motor 
repertoire of the observer. 
Interestingly, in an fMRI study the hypothesis that the mirror system may serve 
intention understanding (Fogassi et al., 2005) was corroborated in humans (Iacoboni 
et al., 2005). Participants were presented with three kinds of stimuli: grasping hand 
actions without a context; context only (a scene containing only objects); and 
grasping hand actions embedded in contexts. In the context condition it was 
possible to discriminate the intention behind the grasping action (either drinking or 
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cleaning up). The results revealed a significant increase of the signal in the posterior 
IFG and the ventral PMC when actions were embedded in contexts, compared with 
the other two conditions. This suggested that the mirroring mechanism may enable 
not only action recognition (‘what’, goal understanding), but also the intention which 
generated the action (‘why’, intention understanding). 
Importantly, the instructions aimed at determining the intention of the observed 
actions did not modulate the effect observed in the premotor mirror areas. This 
finding, according to Gallese (2007), further suggested that at least for the simple 
actions employed in this study, the ascription of intentions proceeded by default, 
underpinned by a mandatory activation of embodied simulation. 
Altogether these studies echoed the idea that mirror neurons could serve action 
understanding (Gallese & Goldman, 1998) or ‘teleological sensitivity’ (Decety & 
Grezes, 2006), imitation (Jeannerod 1994; Iacoboni, 2009) and intention 
understanding (Iacoboni et al., 2005). 
In conclusion, it is suggested that a mirroring mechanism promoting a direct 
grasping of the other’s sensori-motor experience is also present in humans and it is 
possibly more flexible and widespread in the human brain as compared to the 
monkey’s brain. It is further considered that this direct action-observation module, 
underpins, through embodied simulation, the understanding of intentions for simple 
actions, especially when the observed motor acts belong to the motor experience of 
the subject (Gallese, 2007). 
 
1.2.2.2 Embodied simulation and emotional stimuli 
The reflexive mirroring mechanism engaged in action understanding has also been 
suggested to underpin the understanding of others’ emotional states (Carr, Iacoboni, 
Dubeau, Mazziotta, & Lenzi, 2003; Keysers et al., 2004; Leslie, Johnson-Frey, & 
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Grafton, 2004). Evidence for this notion comes from studies in which other people’s 
facial expressions were observed, which showed that motor programs and visual 
codes for facial expressions are closely linked (Botvinick et al., 2005; Carr et al., 
2003; Wicker et al., 2003). In a fMRI study Carr et al. (2003) found that premotor 
and parietal cortices were both involved in both facial expression observation and 
execution, giving support to the direct matching hypothesis in understanding facial 
expressions. Further, Wicker et al. ( 2003) found that the insula was activated both 
when subjects observed and when they experienced the emotion ‘disgust’. 
Neurophysiological studies, using the facial Electromyographical technique (EMG), 
indicate that the perception of facial expressions elicits facial muscular activity 
congruent to the presented facial expressions (Dimberg, 1982; Dimberg & 
Thunberg, 1998; Larsen, Norris, & Cacioppo, 2003; Sato, Fujimura, & Suzuki, 2008). 
Interestingly, these reactions can even be evoked unconsciously (Dimberg, 
Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000) and they may reflect the neural mechanism allowing 
people to understand the emotion conveyed by the face. These results found a 
convincing explanation in the embodied simulation model proposed by Gallese 
(2007). Thus, the observation of the target’s facial expression ‘directly’ triggers (sub-
threshold) activation of the neural substrate associated with the experience of the 
emotion in question. Therefore, on the basis of the feeling or experience generated 
by the simulated expressions, the observer’s brain ‘knows’ (reflexively) the meaning 
of those expressions (Gallese, 2006a).  
In summary, the above studies seem to confirm the existence of a specific low-
level mindreading mechanism for face-based emotion instantiated by embodied 
simulation (Goldman, 2006; Goldman & Sripada, 2005; Gallese, 2007).  
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1.2.3 Alternative models to the ‘direct matching’ hypothesis for action understanding 
 
The discovery of the mirror neurons and their contributions to low-level mind-reading 
and social cognition are highly debated and several aspects of the direct matching 
account underwent intense scrutiny.  
One of the most criticized points is that the original direct matching hypothesis 
is not sufficient to explain the fact that two identical actions may represent two 
different meanings (like grasping a glass to drink or grasping a glass to clean it). 
Many have argued that context information and prior knowledge and some kind of 
psychological theory about others are necessary ingredients too. The distinctive 
characteristic of the mirroring mechanism is that the simulation of the motor acts is 
initiated by a direct matching between the acts observed in the reality and the 
internal simulations. 
However, people can understand other’s actions without the need to imitate or 
simulate someone’s motor act exactly as it is performed, or by the same means. In a 
fMRI experiment it was shown that ‘mentalizing’ areas were active when participants 
were required to understand the intention of unusual actions (Brass et al., 2007). 
This finding may suggest that the embodied simulation account is basically confined 
to familiar actions or actions executed in simple, stereotypic contexts. 
Several doubts were raised up about the suitability of the mirroring mechanism 
for explaining social understanding (see Csibra, 2007; Csibra & Gergely, 2007; 
Jacob, 2008; Jacob & Jeannerod 2005). It was claimed that the study conducted by 
Iacoboni et al. (2005) does not exhaustively exclude that mirroring mechanisms 
could be instantiated (top-down) by higher cognitive processing (Jacob, 2008). In 
contrast to the bottom-up, retrodictive explanation of action understanding by 
embodied simulation or direct matching, different models were suggested. For 
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instance, Csibra (2007) proposed that whenever an intention is attributed to an 
observed action, the meaning of this action first needs to be analyzed at a higher 
cognitive level (possibly the ‘mentalizing’ system). Subsequently, the information is 
sent (top-down) to the motor system (how that is done remains unclear), which 
accomplishes an action reconstruction via a predictive simulation. Thus, according 
to Csibra, action understanding is the input (and not the output) of action mirroring, 
which in turn generates predictive action monitoring as output. This model was 
inspired by studies in infancy research which do not support a ‘direct matching’ 
hypothesis for understanding others’ intentions (Csibra, Biro, Koos, & Gergely, 
2003; Lou and Baillargeon, 2005; Onishi, Baillargeon, & Leslie, 2007). However, 
there is still a substantial lack of studies testing the mirroring mechanism at early 
stages of development and additional investigations are required. 
Alternatively, Kilner, Friston, & Frith (2007) proposed the ‘predicting coding’ 
model which combines a Bayesian approach to theories of action hierarchy, which 
involve different levels of actions (from kinematic to intentions and context). 
According to this model prior knowledge of intentions allows to detect likely action 
goals via motor resonance. Thus, given the information about what the action is for, 
what the MNS does is to predict whether the observed actions in the reality may 
correspond to the predicted ones. If they do not match, then a ‘prediction error’ is 
projected up to the action hierarchy, thus enabling the inference of the most likely 
cause of the action.  
In summary, what is acknowledged in the direct-matching ‘mirroring’ hypothesis 
is its automatic predictive property. What is denied is the possibility that 
understanding of intentions may derive from predicting the forthcoming new goal 
(retrodictive explanation). What it is suggested is that the automatic predictive 
property of action mirroring serves action monitoring (Csibra, 2007) or action 
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inference via error reduction (Kilner, 2009). However, what is not clarified by these 
models is where and how the prior knowledge about action’ intention is computed 
and how this information (from wherever it originates) is then able to exactly find 
those areas of the mirror mechanism that correspond to the observed action. 
Moreover, when adopting Csibra’s model, the question why the brain should be 
equipped with such a direct-matching mechanism remains unresolved.  
At present it is unknown to what extent the mentalizing network and the 
mirroring areas depend on each other. Some authors suggested that the MNS might 
inform and support the mentalizing system (Blakemore, Winston, & Frith, 2004; 
Decety & Chaminade, 2003; Keysers & Gazzola, 2007; Uddin, Iacoboni, Lange, & 
Keenan, 2007), while other authors suggest the two system operate independently 
(Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005; Saxe, 2005; Saxe & Wexler, 2005).    
Like actions, emotions are biologically relevant stimuli which involve visceral 
and somatosensory reactions. Importantly, while intention, i.e. a conscious purpose 
of the agent, underlies an action, emotional expressions are generally displayed 
spontaneously and involuntarily, though they can also be voluntarily posed. In either 
case, they have a relevant communicative function.  
 
 
1.3 Why the face is so special  
 
A lot of research focuses on socially relevant stimuli, such as faces, and 
exhaustively reports that faces are processed ‘specially’ compared to other visual 
stimulus categories (Kanwisher, 2000; Spiridon & Kanwisher, 2002). Faces are 
attended preferentially and recognized very early in life (Bushnell, Sai, & Mullin, 
1989; Morton & Johnson, 1991; Slater & Quinn, 2001; Valenza, Simion, Macchi, & 
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Umilta, 1996). This is because face perception involves the recognition of individuals 
and their mental dispositions, thus providing important information enabling social 
interactions.  
Bruce and Young (1986) proposed a cognitive model of face recognition where 
two different processes serve identity and emotion recognition. According to this 
model, the first step of the analysis is the structural encoding, which involves the 
perceptual processing of the facial features and their configural relations (Calder, 
Young, Keane, & Dean, 2000). At a second level specialized functional models 
enable the recognition of specific types of information from the face such as the 
person identity and the expressions. Facial expressions are considered as view-
centred descriptions and are analysed separately by the cognitive system for their 
emotional meaning.  
Studies with typical subjects showed that people can label expressions of 
unfamiliar faces as fast as those of familiar faces (Bruce, 1986; Young, Ellis, Flude, 
McWeeny, & Hay, 1986). This confirmed that two independent systems underpin 
identity and expression recognition.  
The same conclusion followed from neuropsychological studies.  There are 
brain-injured patients who can understand emotional facial expressions, despite 
being unable to recognize familiar faces (Bruyer et al., 1983; Tranel, Damasio, & 
Damasio, 1988). The opposite dissociation was also reported, with impaired 
comprehension of facial expressions and an intact recognition of the identities 
(Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1994; Calder et al., 1996; Nijboer & 
Jellema, 2012; Young et al., 1995).  
Relying on the Bruce and Young (1986) model, Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini 
(2000, 2002) proposed a ‘distributed human neural system’ in which the perceptual 
information of facial features proceeds from the inferior occipital gyrus to the lateral 
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fusiform gyrus (identity information) and to the STS. In the latter area, dedicated 
face-regions process changeable aspects of the face such as eye gaze, lip 
movements and facial expressions; all crucial elements for non-verbal 
communication. Importantly, the model emphasized the bidirectionality of the 
connections between its components. The core system is extended to other areas 
such as the amygdala, the insula and the limbic system. Adolphs (2002) 
incorporated also the orbitofrontal cortices which are involved in the categorization 
of facial expressions. Further, these cortices may retrieve associated knowledge 
concerning the emotion, and they may be involved, via connections to motor 
structures, in producing emotional responses.    
Eimer & Holmes (2007), reviewing recent event-related brain potential (ERPs) 
studies, concluded that the analysis of emotional facial expressions relies on a 
complex neural network that includes a rapid, obligatory, and pre-attentive 
classification of emotional content as well as a subsequent deeper analysis of 
emotional expressions in neocortical emotion regions such as somatosensory 
cortex, anterior cingulate, and medial prefrontal cortex. 
 
 
1.3.1 Models of emotional facial expressions  
 
Facial expressions are social signals which can convey emotional dispositions and 
serve interpersonal communication (Darwin, 1872/1998; Fridlund, 1994; Ekman & 
Oster, 1979; Russell & Fernandez-Dols, 1997; Schmidt & Cohn, 2001). Generally 
those two aspects go hand in hand as at the moment an individual is expressing an 
emotion, even when spontaneously without intentionality, she/he also communicates 
the associated affective inner state. Therefore, genuine emotional facial expressions 
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can also be seen as (spontaneous) actions having an onset, a peak and an offset.  
However, the social value of emotional facial expressions is more evident for the so-
called social, moral, emotions such as embarrassment, guilt or pride. In this 
scenario, also the posed, voluntary, situational expressions, which do not have a 
direct link to the agent’s emotional state but are intentional and culturally 
conditioned, play an adaptive role in modulating social interactions and 
communication (see Ekman, 2004).  With respect to felt, emotional facial 
expressions, one of the most debated issues is whether emotions refer to discrete 
affective states or whether they are mapped onto a continuum. Emotion displays to 
which subjects assign labels and undergo categorical perception are considered 
discrete states (Ekman, 1992). However, the boundaries between emotion 
categories may be somewhat foggy at the level of recognition (Russell & Bullock, 
1986).  
There are basically two views with respect to the universality of emotional face 
recognition. The first states that basic facial expressions are universally recognized 
(Ekman, 1994; Ekman & Friesen 1971) and fall in discrete categories, with a 
differentiation between basic and complex emotional displays (Ekman,1992). 
Specifically, it was proposed that there are seven discrete emotional 
expressions (neutral, happiness, sadness, surprise, fear, anger and disgust), which 
are biologically determined and are recognized by all individuals regardless of ethnic 
or cultural differences (Darwin, 1872/1998; Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Izard, 1994). 
Complex emotions can be considered subcategories or combinations of basic facial 
signals. 
 The second view questions about the universality of emotional facial 
expressions, and suggest that emotions fit into two dimensions, arousal and 
valence, each with a similar structure (Russell, 1980, Russel & Fehr, 1987). 
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According to the latter view, the categorization of the expression is not universal but 
depends to some extent on the contextual relation to the other expressions (Russell 
& Fehr, 1987). 
Despite those differences, both the discrete-category view (Ekman, 1992) and 
the dimensional view (Russell, 1980) share the notion that the affective information 
are directly “read out” from the face. Specifically, facial expressions are processed 
by a perceptual system that analyzes both configural and facial features information 
to identify the emotion (Calder et al., 2000).  Consequently, they are immediate 
signifiers of affective dispositions of other people (Adolphs, 2002, 2003; Ekman, 
1992, 1993; Russell & Fernandez-Dols, 1997).  
 
 
1.3.2 The influence of bottom-up visual processes in the evaluation of facial 
expressions 
 
The perception of an emotional facial expression typically focuses on the facial 
features and their configural relations (Calder et al., 2000). The visual analysis of 
such physical proprieties guides (bottom-up) the perceptual evaluations of the face 
stimuli, corresponding to the first-step analysis in the model proposed by Bruce and 
Young (1986). Perceptual judgments of facial expressions can be influenced by 
bottom-up visual processes, as is the case for many other classes of objects. A 
large body of studies reported that emotional facial judgments can be influenced 
(bottom-up) by a range of different visual processes/mechanisms, such as contrast 
or context effects, adaptation and extrapolation or Representational momentum 
(RM).  
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In contrast/context effects, the presentation of a stimulus influences the 
perception of a subsequent stimulus (e.g. Russell & Fehr, 1987; Suzuki & 
Cavanagh, 1998, Tanaka-Matsumi, Attivissmo, Nelson, & D’Urso, 1995; Thayer, 
1980;). Thayer (1980) showed that sad and happy facial expressions were rated as 
more intense when they were preceded by contrasting, as opposed to similar, facial 
expressions. This effect was previously observed by Russell & Fehr (1987). These 
authors presented two facial expressions of different identities side by side and 
found that the judgment of the first face (anchor) affected the judgment of the 
second face (target) in a repulsive manner. 
This effect was particular evident when the target was a neutral facial 
expression. Ekman and O’Sullivan (1988) argued that although the perception of 
emotion in facial expressions should be accurate and absolute, neutral or 
ambiguous expressions may be subject to contrast/context effects. Tanaka-Matsumi 
et al. (1995) found that a happy anchor face would make a neutral face (the target) 
less pleasant and less arousing as compared to a sad anchor face. Interestingly, the 
fact that two different identities were depicting the emotions did not modulate the 
contrast/context effect.  
Visual adaptation to a (distorted) stimulus produces a so called ‘aftereffect’, i.e. 
a biased perception of the stimulus towards the opposite of the adapting stimulus. 
Adaptation was found for various visual features such as size, orientation, curvature, 
motion, spatial frequency and natural images.  In the literature, even visual 
adaptation for high-level stimuli such as faces is well documented (Leopold, 
O’Toole, Vetter, and Blanz, 2001; Rhodes, Jeffrey, Watson, Clifford, & Nakayama, 
2003). Face after-effects induced by adaptation were found for at least five different 
facial traits: identity (Leopold et al., 2001), gender (Webster, Kaping, Mizokami, & 
Duhamel, 2004), attractiveness (Rhodes et al., 2003), ethnicity (Webster & MacLin, 
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1999) and facial expression (Fox & Barton, 2007; Hsu & Young, 2004; Rutherford, 
Chattha & Krysko, 2008; Webster et al., 2004). With respect to facial expressions, it 
was reported that prior presentation of happy facial expressions for 180 s (with 5 s 
top-ups) made subsequently presented neutral expressions look slightly angry, 
reflecting a shift in the boundary between the happy and angry categories in the 
direction of the happy expression (Webster et al., 2004). Rutherford et al. (2008) 
found that a 45 s long exposure to a sad face facilitated perceiving a neutral face as 
happy and vice versa. Leopold et al. (2001) reported that shorter period than 5 s 
failed to produce after-effects. Interestingly, Fox and Barton (2007) reported identity 
invariance in facial expression adaptation. 
In face studies employing adaptation paradigms, or related paradigms inducing 
contrast or context effects (Russell & Fehr, 1987; Suzuki & Cavanagh, 1998; 
Tanaka-Matsumi et al., 1995; Thayer, 1980), the adapting or contextual stimulus 
typically consists of static face images. However, this is in contrast to natural facial 
displays, which usually contain dynamic information (cf. Sato, Kochiyama, 
Yoshikawa, Naito, & Matsumura, 2004), allowing other, additional, processes to play 
a role in bringing about perceptual biases. One such process is representational 
momentum (RM), which is generally defined as the phenomenon that an observer’s 
memory for the final position of a moving target is displaced further along the 
observed trajectory (Freyd & Finke, 1984; Freyd, 1987). The target’s motion can 
either be real, or implied by a sequence of static images. RM results from the 
observer’s inferences regarding the physical dynamics of the (implied) motion (see 
Hubbard, 2005, for a review). Yoshikawa and Sato (2008) investigated the possible 
contribution of RM to the perception of dynamic facial expressions by presenting 
short video-clips depicting a neutral expression morphed into an intense expression. 
They found that the final expression of the video-clip was overestimated and that the 
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size of this effect was positively correlated with the speed of the intensity change. 
This bias was explained in terms of Representational Momentum (RM), induced by 
the preceding sequence. 
 
 
1.3.3 The influence of explicit and implicit top-down processes in the evaluation of 
facial expressions 
 
In addition to bottom up visual processes, perceptual evaluations of emotional facial 
expression can also be influenced by top-down affective or cognitive mechanisms 
related to the meaning of the facial stimulus. In line with appraisal theories of 
emotions (Scherer, 1992), it was found that the intensity of angry and fearful faces 
may depend on eye gaze direction. That is, the intensity of anger increases when 
the expression is presented with eye gaze directed to the viewer (‘attack detection’), 
whereas a fearful expression is evaluate as more intense when the eye gaze is 
averted from the viewer (‘danger detection’: Sander, Grafman, & Zalla, 2003). This 
finding was interpreted in terms of a cognitive modulation of the perception of facial 
expressions (Adams & Kleck 2003; Sander, Grandjean, Kaiser, Wehrle, & Scherer, 
2007). Similarly, in a recent study it was reported that high-level mental attributions 
can affect the perception of gaze direction (Teufel et al., 2009). In this study, the 
agent whose gaze the observers adapted to faced left or right and wore one of two 
pairs of highly reflective goggles. Gaze adaptation effects increased when 
participants believed the agent wore the transparent pair compared to when they 
believed the glasses were opaque. Thus, high level social-cognitive attribution 
influenced the evaluation of eye gaze direction despite that the bottom-up 
information was the same in both conditions. This interactive process was referred 
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to by Teufel, Fletcher, & Davis (2010) ‘perceptual mentalising’, which recognizes the 
crucial influence of mental attributions to low-level visual processes/mechanisms. 
However, it is important to note that in these tasks participants’ judgments were 
guided by explicit attributions. Interestingly, in a recent work it was shown that top-
down modulations may be generated automatically and without awareness (Hudson, 
Liu, & Jellema, 2009; Hudson & Jellema, 2011). In these studies participants’ 
estimations of how far an agent’s head had rotated were influenced by the agent’s 
gaze direction. With gaze direction ahead of head rotation the head rotation was 
overestimated as compared to when the gaze was lagging behind head rotation. 
This bias seemed to be induced by implicit attributions of the intention to 
continue/discontinue to move in the direction of the head rotation.  
Thus, people’s perceptual evaluation of others’ behaviour (e.g. facial 
expressions, changes in eye gaze, or head rotations) may not only be affected by 
visual bottom-up processes, but can also be influenced by top-down processes. 
These top-down processes can be highly inferential or reflective, but they can also 
be more reflexive and automatic (Lieberman, 2007; Satpute & Lieberman, 2006). 
The recognition of the emotion associated to particular facial expression does not 
involve only a perceptual evaluation but, as described in section 1.2.2.2 above, also 
motor responses triggered by the observed expression. In the last decade several 
studies assessed the embodied cognition account on facial expression recognition 
(Carr et al., 2003; Goldman, 2006; Jabbi, Swart, & Keysers, 2007; Niedenthal, 2007; 
Pitcher, Garrido, Walsh, & Duchaine, 2008, Wicker et al., 2003). 
The discovery of the MNS clarified the role played by the motor and parietal 
cortices in experiencing the emotional meaning of facial expressions (Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti & Fabbri-Destro, 2008). Therefore, the perception of 
emotional facial expressions may also be influenced by an automatic and mandatory 
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embodied simulation (Gallese, 2006a, b), which would provide the observer with the 
meaning of the facial expressions. 
 
 
1.4 Autism Spectrum Disorders 
 
Autism is currently described as a pervasive developmental disorder, along with 
Asperger’s syndrome, Pervasive Developmental Disorder not otherwise specified, 
Rett Syndrome and Childhood Disintegrative Disorder (International Classification of 
Diseases ICD-10, World Health Organization, WHO 1992). Due to the extreme 
variability in nature and severity of symptoms, autism and Asperger’s syndrome are 
often referred to as Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). One idea that has gained 
recently a lot of support is that each individual in the clinical and typical population 
occupies a position on this spectrum or continuum, depending on the severity and 
number of autistic (-like) traits they possess (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, 
Martin, & Clubley, 2001). Autism is characterized by impairments in social 
interaction and communication, and by restricted interests and repetitive behaviour 
(ICD-10, WHO, 1992; DSM-IV, 2004). Difficulties in social interaction pertain to 
failures in developing peer relationships, in sharing interests with others and in a 
lack of emotional reciprocity. Individuals with autism ASD show difficulties in using 
and comprehending non-verbal behaviour such as eye gaze, facial expressions and 
body gestures.  
Individuals with ASD show deficits in spontaneous language, communication, 
and non-verbal behavior, which is characterized by rituals and stereotyped or 
repetitive mechanisms (American Psychiatric Association, APA, 2000).  
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According to the DSM-IV (2004) a diagnosis of ASD can be made if delays and 
abnormal functioning are persistent and have had an onset prior to the age of three 
years and that the disturbances in development cannot be accounted for by a 
genetic disorder such as Rett’s Syndrome (DSM-IV, 2004). Epidemiological data 
indicates that the incidence of ASD seems to be in a range from 30 to 60 cases per 
10000, as compared to the original estimate of 4 per 10000 made 40 years ago 
(Rutter, 2005). Estimates of the male/female ratio in children with ASD is 4:1 (m:f) 
(Rutter, 1978; Wing, 1981). 
 
 
1.4.1 Do individuals with ASD have a Theory of Mind (ToM)?  
 
It has been proposed that individuals with ASD may lack ToM abilities (Baron-
Cohen, 1995), as those individuals show difficulties to attribute epistemic mental 
states (such as beliefs, knowledge, thoughts, desires and intentions) to oneself and 
others. 
Specifically, when trying to interpret others’ behaviour, an individual with 
difficulties in mindreading seems to be thrown back on a temporal regularity 
account, using routine scripts-based explanations and ‘reinforcement schedules’. 
Baron-Cohen described individuals with ASD as ‘mindblind’ due to their deficits in 
the Shared Attention and ToM mechanisms. Several tests have been adopted to 
examine ToM skills, such as the false belief tasks. It was found that individuals with 
ASD perform significantly worse than controls on false beliefs tasks (Baron-Cohen 
et al., 1985; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1986; Leekam & Perner, 1991; Perner, 
Frith, Leslie, & Leekam, 1989; Reed & Peterson, 1990; Swettenham, 1996; 
Swettenham, Baron-Cohen, Gomez, & Walsh, 1996). 
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However, it has been recognized that in false belief tasks a variety of 
comprehension problems may interfere with success on these tasks. Interestingly, in 
a recent study (Senju et al., 2009), children with ASD were tested by adopting the 
anticipatory looking paradigm that was used by Southgate et al. (2007) on children 
with typical development. The results revealed that individuals with ASD do not 
spontaneously attribute mental states to anticipate other people’s behavior, as 
reflected in the absence of anticipatory looking in this task.  
Additional investigations focused on the production of spontaneous pretend 
play in two years-old children with ASD (Baron-Cohen, 1987; Lewis & Boucher, 
1988; Ungerer & Sigman, 1981; Wing, Gould, Yeates, & Brierley, 1977). Further, 
some studies showed that 4-6 years old children with autism have difficulty with 
mental states as causes of emotion (Baron-Cohen, 1991b; Baron-Cohen, Spitz, & 
Cross, 1993). 
Moreover, it is reported that children with autism show dysfunctional joint 
attention behaviour, specifically for gaze monitoring (Loveland & Landry, 1986; 
Mundy, Sigman, Ungerer, & Sherman, 1986; Leekam, Baron-Cohen, Perrett, 
Milders, & Brown, 1997) and using the pointing gesture (Curcio, 1978; Mundy et al., 
1986; Baron-Cohen, 1989).  
The ToM hypothesis was criticized because it involves exclusively social 
deficits while individuals with ASD present impairments also in other domains, such 
as language, imagination and motor behaviour (Volkmar, Lord, Bailey, Schultz, & 
Klin, 2004). Moreover, difficulties related to a lack of ToM do not provide a clear 
explanation for the presence of superior skills in some people with a diagnosis of 
ASD.  
Therefore, others argued that individuals with ASD are motivated to understand 
others, but due to an inadequate perceptual integration, they fail to apply their ToM 
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skills in complex social situations (Behrmann, Thomas, & Humphreys, 2006; 
Verbeke et al. 2005). 
Other theories emphasize a lack of regulation and control of behavior 
(Executive Functioning theory; e.g. Russell, 1997), and an aptitude for focusing on 
parts of objects or small details over global processing (Weak Central Coherence 
theory; e.g., Happé & Frith, 2006). A related theory, Enhanced perceptual 
functioning, focuses more on the superiority of locally oriented and perceptual 
operations in autistic individuals (Mottron, Dawson, Soulières, Hubert, & Burack, 
2006). 
 
 
1.4.2 The ‘broken mirror hypothesis’ as explanation for the lack of social 
understanding in autism 
 
Alternatively to the traditional view on the possible causes of social deficits in 
autism, which ascribes them to a dysfunction in the metalizing network (Frith, 2001; 
Marsh & Hamilton, 2011), it has been proposed that people with ASD may lack a 
proper ‘mirroring’ mechanism. Recent data suggests that a dysfunction of the MNS 
in humans may lead to core social deficits in autism (Williams, Whiten, Suddendorf, 
& Perrett, 2001). FMRI studies revealed abnormalities in the inferior frontal gyrus, 
which is part of the MNS, in ASD (Dapretto et al., 2006). 
Additional evidence comes from an EEG study showing that the suppression of 
the activity of the mu rhythm, which in typically-developed individuals occurs during 
passive observation of others’ actions and is thought to reflect mirroring activity, did 
not happen in children with autism (Oberman et al., 2005).  
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These studies are in line with behavioural investigations on individuals with 
ASD who were found less efficient in processing biological motion (Rutherford, 
Pennington, & Rogers, 2006). Interestingly, in a recent study it was shown that 
children with ASD, just like TD children, showed no deficit in intention understanding 
on the basis of the standard use of an object, while, differently from TD children, 
they did have difficulties in intention understanding when this relied on motor cues 
(Boria et al., 2009).  Further, children with autism were found to be better at 
discriminating between pictures of buildings than of faces (Boucher & Lewis, 1992; 
Boucher, Lewis, & Collins, 1998).  
Based on these results, some researchers suggest that core deficits in autism 
may be linked to impairments of the MNM, causing disabilities in social skills, 
imitation, empathy and ToM (Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Williams, Moss, Bradshaw, 
& Mattingley, 2005).  
 
 
1.4.3 Asperger’s syndrome  
 
Within the autism spectrum disorder, some individuals lack verbal impairments but 
do show difficulties in non-verbal communication, while other deficits appear less 
extreme as compared to those found in autism. This mild form of autism was first 
noted by Hans Asperger in 1944, and was later labeled as ‘Asperger’s syndrome’ 
(Frith, 1991). 
Asperger’s syndrome (AS) is a type of pervasive developmental disorder, 
included in the ICD-10 (World Health Organisation, WHO, 1992) and the DSM-IV-
TR (APA, 2000). Individuals with AS have an intelligence that is within the normal IQ 
range or above, and do not manifest a significant delay in language development. 
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However, they do show deficits in reciprocal social interaction, unusual verbal and 
non-verbal communication and the presence of idiosyncratic isolated interests. 
Recently a review of the diagnosis of Asperger’s syndrome has been proposed 
with a possible new nomenclature in the next DSM-V (2013). Autism and Asperger’s 
syndrome may be replaced by a more concise diagnostic criteria of ‘Autism 
Spectrum Disorder’ in which several ‘tiers’ of severity will be adopted (DSM-V). 
Some clinicians suggested the use of ‘high functioning autism’ instead of Asperger’s 
syndrome, or in addition to Asperger’s syndrome (Venter, Lord, & Schopler, 1992, 
Rumsey & Hamburger, 1988). However it is not clear whether high-functioning 
refers to verbal, or non-verbal, intelligence, or perhaps to relatively high social 
adaptation regardless of intelligence (Frith, 1996).  
High functioning autism (HFA) presents symptoms that overlap with both autism 
and Asperger’s syndrome (Macintosh & Dissanayke, 2004). Individuals with HFA 
are by definition more cognitively able than those with autism, but they still show 
motor and language impairments, which are absent in individuals with Asperger’s 
syndrome. Therefore, HFA and AS individuals differ not only in terms of cognitive 
functioning, but also in symptomology and early developmental history (Miller & 
Ozonoff, 2000). Specifically, individuals with Asperger’s syndrome manifest less 
severe early symptoms, a milder developmental course and a better prognosis, than 
individuals with HFA. Overall, Asperger’s syndrome and HFA present a different 
degree or severity of the same symptoms.  
 
1.4.3.1 The processing of social cues and action anticipation in individuals with 
Asperger’s syndrome (AS) 
It has been reported that individuals with AS find it difficult to process nonverbal 
social cues, such as eye contact, facial expression, and body gesture. Such 
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difficulties may be related to a failure to attribute epistemic mental states to others 
(Frith, Morton, & Leslie, 1991; Baron-Cohen, 1995; Baron-Cohen, Campbell, 
Karmiloff-Smith, Grant, & Walker, 1995) and to spontaneously interpret others’ 
social cues (Senju, Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009; Jellema et al., 2009).  
Individuals with AS may find difficult to empathize with others, showing a lack of 
social or emotional reciprocity (McPartland & Klin, 2006). However, despite 
individuals with AS having difficulty in understanding others’ mental states 
spontaneously, they may rely on statistical regularities or input-output relationships 
which typically govern the motions of non-agentive objects to explain human 
actions, to compensate for their failure in social understanding (Kuchinke, Scheider, 
Kotz, & Jacobs, 2011; Kuzmanovic, Schilbach, Lehnhardt, Bente, & Vogeley, 2011; 
Senju et al., 2009).  
One of the social cues which could be problematic to decipher by AS 
individuals is the expressivity of faces. A recent review on this topic in autism 
revealed mixed results (Harms, Martin, & Wallace, 2010). This is mainly due to 
methodological issues, such as the use of a variety of paradigms and stimuli 
(usually static pictures which are less ecologically valid), different age groups and 
different levels of severity of ASD. 
Therefore, whereas some studies showed impairments in emotional facial 
processing (e.g. Celani, Battacchi, & Arcidiacono, 1999; Hobson, 1986a, 1986b; 
Law Smith, Montagne, Perrett, Gill, & Gallagher, 2010; Lindner & Rosen, 2006; 
Tantam, Monaghan, Nicholson, & Stirling, 1989; Teunisse & de Gelder, 2001), other 
studies reported no impairments (e.g. Adolphs, Sears, & Piven, 2001; Baron-Cohen 
et al., 1997; Castelli, 2005; Gepner, Deruelle, & Grynfeltt, 2001; Loveland et al., 
1997; Ogai et al., 2003; Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1990; Prior, Dahlstrom, & 
Squires, 1990; Wicker et al., 2008; Wong, Fung, Chua, & McAlonan, 2008). 
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However, studies which were specifically focused on individuals with AS or HFA 
mostly revealed that while the processing of basic emotions is relatively preserved, 
subtle or ambiguous facial expressions such as arrogance or flirtatiousness do pose 
problems (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Kleinman, Marciano, & Ault, 2001). 
Another study with eye tracking revealed that facial expression recognition depend 
on whether participants fixate the eye region, which is extremely informative when 
the face signals fear or anger (Corden, Chilvers, & Skuse, 2008). It should be noted 
that almost all of these studies were conducted with static facial displays. 
Interestingly, when dynamic stimuli were employed facial affect recognition was 
relatively improved (Gepner et al., 2001; Loveland et al., 1997).  
With regard to ToM skills, individuals with AS tend to pass false belief tasks 
(Abell, Happe, & Frith, 2000; Baron-Cohen et al., 1997). However, they still report 
difficulties in attributing mental states to geometric shapes on the basis of their 
movement pattern (Abell et al., 2000), or in attributing mental states to other people 
from looking at photographs of their eyes (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Baron-Cohen 
et al., 2001). 
Advanced tests for impairments in the ToM domain focused on the ability of 
individuals with AS to anticipate others’ actions on the basis of social cues (Zalla, 
Labruyere, Clement, & Georgieff, 2010; Hudson, Burnett, & Jellema, 2011). Zalla et 
al. (2010) showed videotaped movies of an actor performing familiar and non-
familiar actions. The authors found that children and adolescent with AS were less 
correct in predicting the outcome of the goal-directed action even when it was a 
familiar action, as compared to the control groups. However, recently it has been 
suggested that these deficits may be compensated by alternative strategies, such as 
relying on physical dynamic characteristics of the agent (Hudson et al., 2011). In this 
study by Hudson et al. (2011) TD and AS adults needed to evaluate how far an 
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agent’s head had rotated in conditions where the eye gaze was leading the direction 
of the rotation or was lagging behind head rotation. Participants observed faces but 
also an inanimate cylindrical object containing the equivalent of eyes but not 
resembling a face at all. It was found that both TD and AS individuals believed that 
the agent’s head had rotated further when the agent’s gaze was ahead of rotation 
than when it was lagging behind rotation. However, while in TD individuals such 
anticipatory behaviour was only found for faces and not for the cylindrical objects, in 
AS individuals the anticipatory behaviour was found in both the animate and 
inanimate conditions. This suggested that while the evaluations of TD individuals 
were affected by the involuntary attribution of intentions to the agent, in the AS 
group the action anticipation was caused by the low-level visual parameters (present 
in both animate and inanimate conditions) rather than by the inferred intentions.  
 
To summarize, social cue processing is considered to play a crucial role in the 
involuntary understanding of other people’s intentions underlying their actions, and 
may also lead to an anticipation of other’s actions in the immediate future. Emotional 
facial expressions are thought to be immediate signifiers of the affective dispositions 
of others. Theory-Theory claims that people understand someone else’s emotional 
state by positioning it inside a theoretical framework. Alternatively, Simulation 
Theory suggests people grasp others’ emotions by simulating ‘pretend states’ in 
themselves. 
According to the ‘embodied simulation’ hypothesis (Gallese, 2006a, b), these 
simulations can be understood as involuntary activations of one’s own motor 
system, employed as a template to model the experiences of others. The generated 
experience reveals to the observer the meaning of the observed expressions. When 
looking at someone else’s emotional facial expression, what the observer sees are 
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not only literal facial characteristics (features and configurations) and a variety of 
different motions, but also the agent’s emotional state of mind. It is as if we directly 
perceive the emotional/mental state in the facial expression, a point emphasised by 
the phenomenological tradition in philosophy of mind (Merleau-Ponty, 1964). 
Previous research showed that the evaluation of facial expressions can be 
influenced by both bottom-up low-level visual processes and by explicit inferences 
made about others’ mental states. However, in a recent study it was found that 
implicit attributions made by the observer about the agent’s intentions can also 
influence quite early stages of the visual processing of social stimuli (Hudson et al., 
2009). When facial expressions are embedded in a dynamic action sequence the 
immediately preceding perceptual history may generate expectations in the 
observer. This may lead one to anticipate how the emotional state of the agent 
would develop in the immediate future. Therefore, implicit understanding or 
anticipation of others’ affective states in turn can bias (top-down) the evaluation of 
the displayed facial expression. 
Mind-reading skills (Baron-Cohen, 1995) are dysfunctional in individuals with 
autistic spectrum disorders (ASD) Baron-Cohen et al., 1991b; Frith, 2003; Frith et 
al., 1991). Individuals with ASD may analyze facial expressions on the basis of 
isolated elements, or low-level features (e.g. the U shaped mouth in a smile), 
missing the associated emotional meanings. Individuals with Asperger’s syndrome 
(AS), a mild form of ASD, may be able to metalize but fail to do so spontaneously 
(Jellema et al., 2009; Kuzmanovic et al., 2011; Senju et al., 2009), which determines 
socially inadequate behaviour. The lack of the ability in individuals with AS to 
implicitly attribute emotional states to others may be reflected in the evaluation of 
dynamic facial expressions.  
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1.5 Aims of the thesis 
 
The current thesis present a series of studies aimed at examining the relative 
contributions of low level visual mechanisms and of implicit attributions about an 
agent’s emotional states on perceptual judgments of the agent’s dynamic facial 
expressions, in adults with TD and AS. Further investigations tried to manipulate the 
intention behind the displayed facial expressions to test whether this could modulate 
the evaluations of the expressions in question.   
 
Research questions: 
(1)  When TD individuals are presented with dynamic sequences of emotional 
facial expressions, is their evaluation of the end-point of those sequences influenced 
by low-level visual mechanisms? Specifically, what is the contribution of (1) contrast 
or context effects, (2) adaptation and (3) extrapolation or Representational 
momentum (RM)? In principle, each of these mechanisms could produce a bottom-
up distortion of the perception of the emotional facial expressions. 
 
(2)  Alternatively, the ecologically-valid dynamic action sequence (‘perceptual 
history’) in which the emotional facial expressions are embedded may give rise to an 
anticipation of how the emotional state of mind will develop in the immediate future. 
This ‘emotional anticipation’ mechanism (emotion reading; Goldman, 2006) may 
bias (top-down) the visual perception of the current facial expression in the direction 
of the anticipated state of mind. In this case, the observers’ evaluations would be 
influenced by an implicit attribution made about the affective state of the agent.  To 
answer these questions, in Chapter 2 a series of six experiments were conducted to 
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disentangle the contributions of those mechanisms to the perception of dynamic 
emotional facial expressions in TD individuals.  
 
(3)  How would individuals with Asperger’s syndrome (AS) evaluate the 
dynamic emotional facial expressions? What would be the relative contributions of 
the low-level visual mechanisms and the emotional anticipation in this group? Which 
kind of mechanisms may account for possible perceptual bias when judging the end-
state of emotional facial expressions? Due to the difficulty in emotion reading 
eventual perceptual distortions may depend on a mechanistic analysis based on the 
physical proprieties of the stimulus rather than on the emotional information it 
conveys (Study 2, Chapter 3). To answer these questions, in Chapter 3 a series of 
four experiments were conducted to examine whether the same mechanisms would 
be active in individuals with AS. If the results in individuals with AS on the tasks 
would be different from TD individuals, then it will be determined which mechanisms 
are used (and which not).  
 
(4)  Which kind of mechanism would be triggered if the dynamic facial 
expressions are not linked to a genuine emotional state of mind? Does a dynamic 
sequence of ‘fake’ facial expression generate an automatic emotional anticipation? 
How does explicit information about the meaning of the facial expressions guide 
participants’ evaluations? To answer these questions, in Chapter 4 the emotional 
anticipation hypothesis was tested in TD individuals using deceptive, or ‘fake’, facial 
expressions displayed by professional actors. 
 
(5)  What are the neural mechanisms responsible for the overshoot response 
bias? Is emotional anticipation underpinned by embodied simulation of the observed 
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facial expressions? To make a start with answering these questions, an 
electromyographical study was performed (Appendix), in which activity in the 
Zygomaticus Major and Currugator Supercilii was recorded from participants while 
they observed the dynamic facial expressions. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
Emotional anticipation in adults with typical 
development  
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2.1 Introduction 
 
It is virtually impossible to look at an expression displayed on a human face and not 
automatically get a notion about the individual’s emotional state of mind. It is as if we 
directly perceive the emotional/mental state in the facial expression, a point 
emphasised by the phenomenological tradition in philosophy of mind (e.g. Merleau-
Ponty, 1964). Wittgenstein, although not a phenomenologist, remarked: “We see 
emotion”. - As opposed to what? - We do not see facial contortions and make the 
inference that he is feeling joy, grief, boredom. We describe a face immediately as 
sad, radiant, bored, even when we are unable to give any other description of the 
features. - Grief, one would like to say, is personified in the face.” (Wittgenstein, 
1980, Vol. 2, Section 570). These ideas have been reinvigorated by contemporary 
philosophers (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008), and were echoed by a renewed interest 
into the interplay between bottom-up visual processes and top-down attributions of 
mental/emotional states or Theory of Mind (cf. Teufel et al., 2010). 
New evidence emphasises that quite early stages of the visual processing of 
social stimuli, such as the processing of other’s physical postures, which were 
previously thought to be fairly autonomous and immune to top-down influences, can 
be influenced by (implicit) attributions made by the observer about the agent’s 
mental/emotional state of mind. For example, Hudson et al. (2009) and Hudson & 
Jellema (2011) found that estimations of how far an agent’s head had rotated were 
influenced by the agent’s gaze direction. With gaze directed ahead of head rotation, 
the angle of head rotation was overestimated as compared to when the gaze was 
lagging behind head rotation. This bias seems to be induced by implicit attributions 
of the intention to continue/discontinue to move in the direction of the head rotation. 
Further, it was demonstrated using a gaze-adaptation paradigm that high-level 
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mental attributions of ‘seeing’ versus ‘not seeing’ affect the basic mechanism of 
gaze perception differently (Teufel et al. (2009). In this study, the agent whose gaze 
the observers adapted to faced left or right and wore one of two pairs of highly 
reflective goggles. When observers believed the agent wore the transparent pair, 
the gaze adaptation effect increased compared to when the observer believed the 
glasses were opaque. Thus, attribution of a ‘seeing’ mental state increased gaze 
processing relative to attribution of a ‘non-seeing’ mental state, despite identical 
perceptual bottom-up information in both conditions. 
It should be noted, though, that while in the Teufel et al. (2009) study the 
mental attributions reflected explicit knowledge, in the Hudson et al. (2009) study the 
attribution of the mental states occurred implicitly, as participants did not recall 
having seen the gaze manipulation. The studies presented in Chapter 2 investigated 
on implicit attribution/anticipation made by the observer about the agent’s emotional 
state of mind and how these may influence the perception of dynamic facial 
expressions. 
Thus, whereas previously it had been argued that the bottom-up processing 
stages involved in the perception of an agent give rise to inferences about the 
mental/emotional state of mind of the agent, which are then subsequently attributed 
to the agent (e.g. Blakemore & Decety, 2001), it is now becoming clear that these 
emotional/mental attributions already affect the very basic processing stages in 
social perception. This highlights the bi-directional interaction between bottom-up 
and top-down streams, which has been captured under the term ‘perceptual 
mentalizing’ (Teufel et al., 2010).  
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2.1.1 Influence of mental attribution on the perception of facial expressions 
 
The study presented in Chapter 2 aimed at examining to what extent the perception 
of low-level facial characteristics, such as the ‘neutrality’ of facial expressions, is 
affected in an automatic manner by mental/emotional attributions to the agent on the 
basis of the immediate perceptual history. It utilized the idea that experimentally-
induced perceptual distortions can offer a handle on the investigation of the relative 
contributions of bottom-up and top-down processes.  
A new perceptual distortion of neutral facial expressions induced by the 
immediately preceding perceptual history of the face was previously described 
(Jellema et al., 2011). This study showed that neutral facial expressions were 
judged as slightly angry when they were immediately preceded by video-sequences 
that depicted a facial expression of joy that gradually morphed into a neutral 
expression, while the identical neutral expressions were judged as slightly happy 
when the videos started off with an angry expression that morphed into a neutral 
one. Thus, the participants showed a perceptual ‘overshoot’ response bias. 
Participants were instructed to evaluate the last expression of the Joy-to-neutral 
and Anger-to-neutral video-clips on a 5-point scale ranging from slightly angry via 
neutral to slightly happy. Thus, even though the last frames depicted identical 
neutral expressions, they were perceived differently depending on the specific 
perceptual history. The video-sequences were ecologically valid, meaning that the 
morphed Joy-to-neutral and Anger-to-neutral sequences resembled movements 
occurring during naturalistic dynamic facial expressions (Sato & Yoshikawa, 2004). 
Jellema et al. (2011) employed these video-sequences in an affective priming 
paradigm as task-irrelevant distractors, while the targets were formed by positive or 
negative words superimposed on the last frame of the sequences. Participants had 
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to make speeded evaluations of the word valence. The study found that positive 
words were faster detected when superimposed on the Anger-to-neutral videos (as 
compared to Joy-to-neutral videos), and negative words were faster detected when 
superimposed on the Joy-to-neutral videos (as compared to Anger-to-neutral 
videos). The important conclusion from this experiment was that the Joy-to-neutral 
sequence induced a negative affect, and the Anger-to-neutral sequence a positive 
affect, in the observer. It further suggested that the perceptual ‘overshoot’ biases 
were not due to a cognitive response strategy, such as selecting the opposite of the 
start-emotion, but reflected a genuine change in the observer’s judgement. A 
speculative interpretation of the results of the Jellema et al. (2011) study was that 
the perceptual distortions were due to the observer involuntarily keeping track of the 
emotional state of mind of the actor, leading to an involuntarily anticipation of the 
most likely future emotional state. The anticipated emotional state would then in turn 
affect the perception. Thus, here the context affecting perception was provided by 
dynamic information contained in the social stimulus itself, rather than by external 
information provided by the experimenter, as in Teufel et al. (2009). The underlying 
process was called ‘emotional anticipation’, referring to the ability to anticipate how 
the agent’s emotional state of mind will develop in the immediate future, based on 
the immediate perceptual history. This could be seen as a kind of low-level 
mindreading (cf. Goldman, 2006). That is, in the Joy-to-neutral condition the 
observer expects the agent’s emotional state to continue to move into a ‘negative’ 
state, as a consequence of a decrease of positive affect and in the Anger-to-neutral 
condition to continue to move into a ‘positive’ state as a consequence of a decrease 
of negative affect. The emotional anticipation hypothesis is also related to the 
contention that humans with typical development have a Theory of Mind (ToM), 
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meaning they are equipped with the ability to ‘read’ others’ mental states, such as 
beliefs, desires, intentions and emotions (Baron-Cohen, 1995). 
Why would observers attribute emotional/mental states to the agent in the Joy-to-
neutral and Anger-to-neutral conditions? 
The ability to predict how the emotional state of mind of individuals may change 
across time (whether in a positive or negative sense) is crucial for successful social 
interactions, and also opens up possibilities to persuade others (Weiner & Handel, 
1985; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). With respect to the specific emotional sequence 
presented in the Jellema et al. (2011) study, it seems fair to assume that a naturally 
occurring change of relatively short duration (a few hundred ms, e.g. Sato, 
Kochiyama, Yoshikawa, Naito, & Matsumura, 2004; Yoshikawa & Sato, 2008; Sato 
& Yoshikawa, 2010)  from a maximally happy expression into a neutral expression 
constitutes a negative signal, and that the most likely anticipation of the agent’s 
future emotional state of mind would be a negative emotional state. Thus the trend 
in the emotional change is anticipated to continue, which inevitably leads to a 
negative emotional state of mind. Similarly, a sudden change from a maximally 
angry expression into a neutral expression constitutes a positive signal, and the 
agent’s emotional state of mind would be anticipated to continue to move into a 
positive emotional state of mind.  
However, the emotional anticipation hypothesis, which is still highly speculative 
at this stage, is not the only plausible candidate to explain the overshoot response 
bias found in Jellema et al. (2011). Basic low-level visual mechanisms might just as 
well have contributed to the overshoot response bias. 
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2.1.2 The influence of basic perceptual processes   
 
A number of bottom-up visual processes could have caused, or contributed to, the 
distorted perception of the neutral expression in the above paradigm. These include 
(i) (sequential) contrast/context effects, (ii) extrapolation or representational 
momentum (RM), and (iii) adaptation.  
 
(i) Contrast/context effects.   
In contrast/context effects, the target stimulus is influenced by the presentation 
of an inducing stimulus or anchor (e.g. Russell & Fehr, 1987; Suzuki & Cavanagh, 
1998; Tanaka-Matsumi et al., 1995; Thayer, 1980). Thayer (1980) showed that 
intensity ratings of both sad and happy facial expressions were enhanced when they 
were preceded by contrasting, as opposed to similar, facial expressions. Russell & 
Fehr (1987) presented two facial expressions of different identities side by side and 
found that the judgment of the first face (anchor) affected the judgment of the 
second face (target) in a repulsive manner. The results of this study were, however, 
criticized by Ekman & O’Sullivan (1988), who maintained that the perception of 
emotion in facial expressions should be accurate and absolute, though they agreed 
that neutral or ambiguous expressions may be subject to contrast/context effects. 
Tanaka-Matsumi et al. (1995) found that a neutral face (the target) was rated as less 
pleasant and less arousing when preceded by a happy face (the anchor) as 
compared to when preceded by a sad anchor face. A common finding in these 
contrast/context effect studies was that it did not matter whether the identities of the 
actors depicting the emotion in the anchor and target stimuli were the same or 
different, the effect would always be there (Thayer, 1980). What the studies 
methodologically had in common was that the anchor and target stimuli formed a 
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less ecologically valid sequence, which consisted of discrete stimuli conveying an 
emotion, as compared to a gradual transition from one expression into the other for 
one and the same identity. Nevertheless, in the Jellema et al. (2011) study the 
contrast between the initial maximally happy or angry expression and the final 
neutral expression may have made the last neutral expression look slightly angry or 
happy, respectively.  
 
 (ii) Representational momentum (RM). 
RM refers to the finding that the observer’s memory for the final position of a 
moving target is displaced further along the observed trajectory. It results from the 
observer’s inferences regarding the physical dynamics of the movement, and is 
hypothesized to reflect an anticipatory function (Finke & Freyd, 1985; Freyd & Finke, 
1984). The extent of the memory displacement depends on the physical causes 
(e.g. gravity) and constraints (e.g. friction) that are inferred to act upon the object’s 
motion (Hubbard, 1995). The displacement even occurs for static images of implied 
motion (Freyd, 1983) and can be influenced by conceptual knowledge the observer 
has about the nature of the object (Vinson & Reed, 2002). In the study by Jellema et 
al. (2011) RM might also act on the gradual dynamic changes of the facial features, 
such as the U-shaped mouth in the happy expression, which morphs into a flat 
shape in the neutral expression and might then be extrapolated into an inverted U 
shape, giving the impression of a slightly angry face. However, it could, in principle, 
also act on an underlying positive-to-negative valence dimension. Recently, 
Yoshikawa and Sato (2008) presented short video-clips depicting neutral 
expressions that morphed into intense emotional expressions, while observers had 
to judge the intensity of the expression depicted on the last frame. They found that 
the intensity of this final expression was overestimated and that the size of this 
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effect was positively correlated with the speed of the intensity change. They 
explained the bias in terms of an RM effect, induced by the preceding sequence. 
They did, however, not specify which dimension the RM effect was supposed to 
operate on.  
 
 (iii) Adaptation.  
Adaptation, which is ubiquitous in visual processing, is another candidate for 
explaining the overshoot response bias. A prolonged observation of a distorted face 
causes a normal (test) face to look somewhat distorted in the opposite direction. 
Face after-effects induced by adaptation were found for emotional expressions (Fox 
& Barton, 2007; Hsu & Young, 2004; Rutherford et al., 2008; Webster et al., 2004) 
and for a variety of other facial traits.  
 
 
2.1.3. Aim of the current study  
 
The studies presented in Chapter 2 were conducted to investigate the causes of the 
perceptual distortion in the above described paradigm (Jellema et al., 2011), by 
trying to experimentally disentangle the relative contributions of basic bottom-up 
perceptual processes from possible top-down attributional processes. The Jellema 
et al. (2011) study merely speculated about possible causes for the overshoot bias, 
no attempt were made to investigate the underlying mechanism. The dynamic 
perceptual histories used in the current study, depicting intense emotional 
expressions morphing into neutral expressions, were thus effectively the reverse of 
those presented by Sato & Yoshikawa (2008). They were ecologically more valid 
(Sato & Yoshikawa, 2004), and may therefore produce different effects, than 
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perceptual histories consisting of static facial expressions as typically used in 
adaptation and contrast-effect studies. 
Six experiments were conducted to test whether the overshoot bias may be due 
to basic visual contrast effect, adaptation, extrapolation or RM, or whether it would 
be better explained by top-down emotional anticipation. 
In Experiment 1 the endpoint of the clips was varied to test whether a crossing 
of the category-boundary would occur even when the endpoint belonged to the 
same category as the starting point. In Experiment 2 the identity of the agent was 
changed at the end of the clips, which should not affect contrast/context effects, RM 
on the underlying positive-negative valence dimension, nor adaptation, but would 
affect emotional anticipation. In Experiment 3 the contribution of contrast/context 
effects was further examined by employing sequences which started from a neutral 
expression and morphed via happy (or angry) back to the same neutral expression. 
In Experiment 4 the speed of the video-clips was manipulated to further examine the 
role played by RM. In Experiment 5 a blank was inserted just before the final neutral 
expression to investigate whether disruption of the flow of motion present in the 
video-sequence would affect the evaluation due to a reset of low-level visual 
mechanisms (cf. Enns, Lleras, & Moore, 2010). Finally, in Experiment 6 the duration 
of the first frame of the video-sequence was doubled to further test the possible 
contribution of visual adaptation.  
 
 
2.2 Experiment 1 
 
Experiment 1 aimed at assessing whether the crossing of the category boundary in 
the perceptual evaluation of the neutral expression depicted in the last frame of the 
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videos, (Jellema et al., 2011), would even occur when the video’s endpoint depicted 
an emotion of the same category as the emotion at the start of the video. Short 
video-clips were presented of dynamic facial expressions that morphed from an 
expression of intense joy or anger to a neutral expression or to a 10% joy or a 10% 
anger expression. If the overshoot would occur also when the end-point is not 
neutral but belongs to the same emotion category as the starting point, then this 
would reveal the strength of such effect. 
Participants were required to evaluate the last expression of the sequence.  
 
 
2.2.1 Method  
 
2.2.1.1 Participants 
Thirty-nine undergraduate Psychology students at Hull University (UK) took part in 
the experiment. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, gave 
informed consent, and received course credit for taking part. After applying 
exclusion criteria (see data reduction below), the data of thirty-three participants 
were included in the analysis (age, M = 20.1 years, SD = 3.2 years; 28 females, 5 
males).  
 
2.2.1.2 Stimuli 
Pictures of eight actors displaying facial expressions of joy and anger were selected 
from the Pictures of Facial Affect (four males: EM, JJ, PE, WF, and four females: C, 
MO, PF, SW; Ekman & Friesen, 1976).  
All faces were shown from frontal view with their eye gaze directed straight 
ahead. The photographs were in greyscale. The hair had been blackened so as to 
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merge with the black background. The pictures were digitally adjusted to match in 
contrast and brightness. The eyes of all actors were positioned on approximately the 
same location on the screen. Faces measured about 13 x 20 cm when displayed on 
the screen, subtending roughly 8° vertically.  
Nine interpolated images, in between the full-blown expression of joy or anger 
(which is called 100%) and the neutral expression (0%) were created at equal steps 
of 10% intensity change, using computer morphing procedures (Perrett, May, & 
Yoshikawa, 1994). Rapid successive presentation of these interpolated frames 
constituted the videos. The first frame of each video sequence showed the 
emotional expression at 100% intensity and was presented for 300 ms to ensure the 
type of emotion was properly recognised (Eimer & Holmes, 2007; Palermo & 
Rhodes, 2007). The subsequent interpolated frames were shown for 30 ms each, as 
reported in previous studies which employed similar video-clips (Sato & Yoshikawa, 
2010). The clips ended either in a neutral expression, in a 10% joy expression or in 
a 10% anger expression. The last frame remained on the screen for 300 ms as the 
starting frame, to control temporal effects. The total duration of the morph sequence 
was 270 ms (9 x 30 ms), and was 30 ms longer or shorter for clips with 10% 
intensity endpoints (see Figure 2.1). A total of 48 videos were made (8 actors x 2 
perceptual histories x 3 endpoints).  
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Figure 2.1. Schematic illustration of the stimulus presentations in Experiment 1. Joy-
to-‘neutral’ videos started with a facial expression of intense joy (100%), which 
gradually morphed into a 10% joy, a neutral or a 10% anger expression (top panel). 
Anger-to-‘neutral’ videos started with a facial expression of intense anger (100%), 
which gradually morphed into a 10% anger, a neutral or a 10% joy expression 
(bottom panel). 
 
2.2.1.3 Measurement of the perceptual evaluations: The response scale 
As in Jellema et al. (2011), the participants’ perceptual judgments of the facial 
expressions were measured on a scale where verbal labels indicated the different 
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facial expressions and their intensities (from slightly angry to neutral to slightly 
happy), rather than a scale formed by the facial expressions themselves. Providing 
the participant with different pictures of facial expressions and requiring them to 
select the expression that most resembled the expression at the end of the clip (cf. 
Yoshikawa & Sato, 2008) would be problematic for the current experimental 
purposes. The process of going through the range of pictures of emotional 
expressions (e.g. by using an interactive slider) would in itself, unwillingly, create a 
new perceptual history. This new perceptual history would than interfere with the 
crucial perceptual history, which immediately precedes the to-be-judged final neutral 
expression. Also a procedure by which the participant selects, out of two different 
expressions, the expression that best resembled the clip’s end-expression would not 
be appropriate, as it could induce contrast effects with respect to the end-
expression.  
 
 
Why ‘joy’ and ‘anger’, and not ‘joy’ and ‘sadness’? 
Expressions of joy and anger were selected as the two end-points on the 5-point 
emotion response scale, rather than joy and sadness, on the basis of the following 
considerations. The end-points on the scale should ideally be equal in terms of 
approach/avoidance, arousal, and the extent to which their distinctive physical 
features differ geometrically from those in the neutral expression. This is important 
as it allows to exclude that a possible response bias on the 5-point scale is due to 
any of these factors. Joy and anger are both approach-oriented emotions, whereas 
sadness is an avoidance-related emotion (cf. Davidson & Hughdahl, 1995). 
Therefore, differences in responses could not be related to different positions on the 
underlying approach/avoidance dimension. According to the Circumplex model of 
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emotion (Russell, 1980; Russell & Bullock, 1985), in which facial expressions are 
represented by values on the continuous dimensions of arousal and pleasantness, 
joy and anger are similar in terms of arousal (whereas joy and sadness are not). 
Ideally, the extent of geometrical change in the face when morphing from 100% 
intensity to neutral should be identical for the different emotional expressions used, 
to exclude the possibility that response biases are due to differences in the amount 
of change in physical features, which could cause e.g. differences in the extent of 
extrapolation of these curves. Joy and anger are in this respect fairly similar, 
whereas happy and sad are not (as the sad expression is less expressive than the 
happy and angry ones (cf. Calvo & Marrero, 2009). This is also reflected by the 
finding that the expressions of joy and anger are both detected faster and more 
accurately in visual search tasks than the expressions of sadness and fear (Williams 
et al., 2005). The above findings render the sad expression unsuitable for use on the 
5-point scale opposite to joy. However, according to the Circumplex model, joy and 
anger do differ maximally in terms of valence, as reflected by their positions on the 
pleasantness dimension, which is an essential requirement for the current 
experiment.  
Other facial expressions were considered inappropriate for the ‘overshoot’ 
paradigm for various reasons. The surprise expression was not appropriate because 
it has a twofold emotional valence (Neta & Whalen, 2010), while disgust was not 
used because it less recognizable, as it may present a mixture of other basic 
emotions (Kohler et al., 2003). Allowing participants to choose from all six basic 
emotions (joy, surprise, anger, sadness, disgust and fear; Ekman & Friesen, 1997) 
might induce a bias towards negative responses as the majority of basic emotions is 
negative.  
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It should be noted that this scale was not a forced two-choice scale (angry or 
happy) as participants could select the middle point of the scale, corresponding to a 
neutral expression. Nevertheless, it might that the particular labels ‘anger’ and ‘joy’ 
were somehow instrumental in producing the ‘overshoot’ response bias. To examine 
this, a pilot study was conducted on 8 participants (age, M = 20.4 years, SD = 2.5 
years; 7 females, 1 male), in which the labels ‘anger’ and ‘joy’  were replaced by the 
labels ‘negative’ and ‘positive’. Thus the scale in this pilot ranged from slightly 
negative (1) via neutral (3) to slightly positive (5). The results showed a robust 
overshoot effect, similar to that obtained using the ‘anger’ and ‘joy’ labels: the 
expression in the last frame was perceived as more negative in the Joy-to-neutral 
videos (M = 2.65, SD = 0.33) as compared to the Anger-to-neutral videos (M = 3.46, 
SD = 0.54; t(7) = -4.86, p = .002).  
 
2.2.1.4 Experimental procedure 
Participants were seated at a viewing distance of 80 cm from a PC screen (17-inch 
monitor, 1024 x 768 pixels, 100 Hz). The stimuli were presented using E-Prime (v. 
1.2; Psychology Software Tools, Inc.).  
First a calibration condition was presented in which the eight actors were shown 
with static neutral expressions (i.e. neutral expressions according to the ratings from 
Ekman & Friesen, 1976). Each calibration trial started with a fixation cross displayed 
in the centre of the screen for 500 ms, followed by a single frame depicting the 
neutral face, presented for 600 ms. Sixteen calibration trials were presented (8 
actors, 2 repetitions each) in random order. Participants were prompted to rate 
these ‘neutral’ expressions using the 5-point scale, ranging from slightly angry (1) 
via neutral (3) to slightly happy (5), by pressing one of the 5 labeled keys on a 
button box (SR-Box, Psychology Software Tools, Inc., USA).  
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After the calibration trials, 8 practice trials were completed, followed by 64 
randomised experimental trials, half of which started with a happy expression (called 
joy-to-‘neutral’ videos) and half with an angry expression (called anger-to-‘neutral’ 
videos). Of both types of videos, 50% of trials ended with the neutral expression, 
25% of trials ended with the 10% joy and 25% of trials with the 10% anger 
expression. Each trial started with a fixation cross (500 ms), followed by the video. 
As soon as the video ended a blank screen appeared with a prompt to provide a 
response. The participant’s task was to evaluate the last expression using the same 
5-point scale as for the calibration trials. Participants were instructed that their RTs 
were irrelevant, but that they should give their response within 3 seconds. The 
duration of the entire experiment was 20 minutes. 
 
2.2.1.5  Data reduction and analysis 
Trials in which the RTs fell below 250 ms or above 3000 ms were considered 
outliers and were removed (4.8%). Participants were excluded if more than 25% of 
the RT values were outside the 250 – 3000 ms range (n = 4). Further a +2.5 SD rule 
was applied to the mean difference ratings (mean rating in Anger-to-neutral 
condition minus mean rating in Joy-to-neutral condition), which excluded 2 more 
participants.  
The calibration scores were used to adjust the scores in the experimental trials; 
a calibration factor of [3.00 minus the calibration score] was added to the raw 
scores. For illustrative purposes the calibration scores for the neutral expression of 
each actor as obtained in Experiment 1 (n = 33) are shown in Figure 2.2. A very 
similar pattern of calibration scores was obtained across experiments, with the 
neutral expression of actors C and WF systematically rated as slightly angry. The 
calibration procedure allowed to perform one-sample t tests with test value 3.00 for 
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each perceptual histories. All statistical analyses were performed on the calibrated 
scores.  
 
 
Figure 2.2. Calibration scores in Experiment 1. Ratings on the 5-point scale (vertical 
axis) for the neutral expressions of the 8 actors presented in the calibration phase. 
Error bars indicate +1SD. 
 
 
2.2.2 Results  
 
The results are shown in Figure 2.3. A 2x3 repeated measures ANOVA with 
Perceptual history (joy-to-‘neutral’ videos vs. anger-to-‘neutral’ videos) and Endpoint 
(10% joy vs. neutral vs. 10% anger) as within-subject factors, showed a robust 
significant main effect for Perceptual history (F(1, 32)  = 67.4, p < .0001, ηp
2  = .68). 
The expression in the last frame was perceived as more angry in the joy videos (M = 
2.81, SD = 0.34) as compared to the anger videos (M = 3.43, SD = 0.35), which 
reflects the ‘overshoot’ response bias. There was also a significant main effect for 
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the factor Endpoint (F(2, 64)  = 58.9, p < .0001, ηp
2  = .65), with expressions in the 
10% anger endpoint condition evaluated as more negative than those in the neutral 
endpoint condition (t(32)= -3.32, p = .002), and expressions in the neutral endpoint 
condition as more negative than those in the 10% joy endpoint condition (t(32) = -
8.05, p < .001). The Endpoint by Perceptual history interaction was significant (F(2, 
64)  = 3.77, p = .028, ηp
2  = .11). In the neutral endpoint condition, the mean ratings 
in the joy-videos (M = 2.76, SD = .30) and anger-videos (M = 3.34, SD = .33) 
differed significantly from each other (t(32) = -6.45, p < .0001), and each of them 
differed significantly from 3.00 (joy-video: t(32) = -4.67, p < .0001; anger-video: t(32) 
= 5.94, p < .0001; two-tailed).  
In the 10% joy endpoint condition the ratings in the two perceptual histories 
were M = 3.00, SD = .35 for the happy-videos and M = 3.76, SD = .38 for the anger-
videos, while in the 10% anger endpoint condition they were M = 2.66, SD = .37 for 
the happy-videos and M = 3.20, SD = .34 for the anger-videos. 
Remarkably, the 10% joy endpoint in the joy-videos was rated as significantly 
more angry than the 10% anger endpoint in the anger-videos (t(32) = 2.34, p = 
.025), despite the former expression being 20% more ‘positive’ than the latter.  
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Figure 2.3. Results of Experiment 1. (A) Ratings on the 5-point scale (vertical axis) 
for the expressions depicted on the last frame of the joy-to-‘neutral’ and anger-to-
‘neutral’ videos. The sequences ended at 10% anger, neutral or 10% joy (horizontal 
axis). Error bars indicate 1SD. (B) Ratings for exclusively the neutral expressions at 
the end of the happy- and angry-videos. Scores are shown for each of the 8 actors 
(horizontal axis) to illustrate the consistency of the bias across actors. 
 
 
2.2.3 Discussion 
 
In Experiment 1 videos starting with joy or anger ended either with a neutral, a 10% 
joy or a 10% anger expression. This manipulation allowed to test whether the 
overshoot bias would occur even when the end-point of the videos depicted an 
expression belonging to the same emotional category as that of the starting frame. 
The results showed a robust overshoot response bias: the neutral expression in the 
last frame of the joy-to-‘neutral’ videos was judged as slightly angry, while the 
identical neutral expression in the last frame of the Anger-to-neutral videos was 
judged as slightly happy, confirming the results by Jellema et al. (2011). This finding 
was quite consistent across actors. Importantly, the conditions in which the endpoint 
was not neutral, but 10% joy or 10% anger, demonstrated that this response bias 
was strong enough to overcome a 20% difference in emotional intensity, as the 10% 
joy endpoint in the joy-videos was rated as significantly more angry than the 10% 
anger endpoint in the anger-videos. 
In the following five experiments the mechanism underpinning this perceptual 
distortion of facial expressions induced by the perceptual history was investigated, 
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by attempting to disentangle the contributions of bottom-up visual processes from 
top-down emotional anticipation. 
 
 
2.3 Experiment 2 
 
In Experiment 2 the identity of the agent was changed in the last frame of the video-
clips. Therefore the judgment of the final expression was made from an identity that 
was new to the observer; i.e. someone for whom no immediate perceptual history 
was available. The rationale was that if the overshoot bias would result from 
sequential contrast/context effects then a change in identity should not affect the 
bias, as the contrast remained intact. Studies of contrast effects showed that it does 
not matter whether the emotion depicted in the anchor and target stimuli are of the 
same or different identities (e.g. Tanaka-Matsumi et al., 1995; Thayer, 1980). 
Similarly, if the overshoot bias would result from extrapolation (RM) on an underlying 
positive-negative valence dimension, then it should also not be affected by the 
change in identity as the underlying valence dimension remains intact. If the bias 
was due to adaptation to the intense facial expression in the first frame (300 ms), 
resulting in an aftereffect in opposite direction, then a change in identity should 
again not affect the bias, as the facial expressions aftereffects typically generalise 
over different identities, although to a less extent (e.g. Fox & Barton, 2007; Ellamil, 
Susskind & Anderson, 2008). Thus, if the response bias would be reduced or 
removed due to the identity change, than that would suggest that these low-level 
mechanisms were not the only elements causing the response bias. Such a result 
(bias removal) would, however, be consistent with an emotional anticipation 
account. Emotional anticipation would predict the absence of an overshoot bias as 
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the observer cannot anticipate the emotional state of someone on the basis of a 
perceptual history that pertains to a different identity.  
Even though care was taken to limit the perceptual shift due to the identity 
transition, a certain amount of shift was unavoidable. In theory, this might have 
disrupted the perceptual flow causing the perceptual system to ‘reset’ (cf. Enns et 
al., 2010). Therefore, additionally, a version of Experiment 2 was conducted in which 
the identity change was smooth and gradual (smooth-identity-change experiment). 
 
 
2.3.1 Method  
 
2.3.1.1 Participants  
The two versions of Experiment 2 were performed on two different samples of 
participants. All participants were undergraduate Psychology students at Hull 
University. After applying exclusion criteria (see below), twenty-three participants 
were included in the instant-identity-change experiment (age, M = 19.3 years, SD = 
1.53 years; 19 females, 4 males), and twenty participants in the smooth-identity-
change experiment (age, M = 19.4 years, SD = 2.56 years, 17 females, 3 males). 
None of the participants took part in any of the other experiments. All had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, gave informed consent, and received course credit for 
taking part. 
 
2.3.1.2 Stimuli  
First, in the same identity condition, one identity was shown throughout the video, 
from 100% joy or anger to neutral (Figure 2.4, top panel). This condition was 
identical to the condition shown in Experiment 1 where the endpoint was 0%.  
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In the identity-change conditions, videos started with an actor (identity-A) 
displaying a 100% emotional expression (joy or anger), which ended with the neutral 
expression depicted by a different actor (identity-B; Figure 2.4, middle and bottom 
panels).  
In the instant identity-change experiment, the identity changed from the last but 
one to the last frame (Figure 2.4, middle panel). The entire duration was 870 ms 
(first frame for 300 ms, 9 interpolated frames for 30 ms each, and last frame for 300 
ms). The face images of identities A and B were resized to match in outer 
dimensions as much as possible, with the eyes presented at a fixed location on the 
screen, to try and limit the extent of geometrical shift between identities. 
In the smooth identity-change experiment, the identity transition was morphed 
by creating three interpolations between identity-A at 10% happy or angry and 
identity-B at 0%, and inserting these in the sequence directly before the last, neutral, 
frame (Figure 2.4, bottom panel). The three inserted frames consisted of 80%A-
20%B, 50%A-50%B and 20%A-80%B. Each lasted 20 ms, increasing the total 
duration of the sequence to 930 ms. Each actor was combined with four other 
actors, two of which were of the same and two of opposite gender.  
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Figure 2.4. Schematic illustration of the stimulus presentations in Experiment 2. 
Examples of the same identity condition (top), the instant identity-change condition 
(middle) and the smooth identity-change condition (bottom), for Joy-to-neutral (left 
side) and Anger-to-neutral (right side) perceptual histories. 
 
2.3.1.3 Experimental procedure 
Both the instant and smooth identity-change experiments started with a calibration 
phase, in which the participants rated the static neutral expression of each actor 
presented for 600 ms, using the same 5-point scale (ranging from slightly angry, via 
neutral, to slightly happy), similarly to Experiment 1. Then, following 8 practice trials, 
64 experimental (identity-change) and 64 control (same identity) trials were 
presented in random order (8 actors x 2 perceptual histories x 4 repetitions). The 
participants’ task was to evaluate the last frame of the video-clips on the same 5-
point scale as used in the calibration phase. Further procedures and apparatus were 
as in Experiment 1.  
 
2.3.1.4 Data reduction and analysis 
Exclusion criteria were the same as used in Experiment 1. Trials in which the RTs 
fell below 250 ms or above 3000 ms were removed (4.9% in the instant-change and 
6.9% in the smooth-change experiment). 
Participants were excluded if more than 25% of the RTs values were outside 
this range (n = 2, in both experiments). The +2.5 SD rule to the mean difference 
ratings excluded another three participants (one in the instant-change and two in the 
smooth-change experiment).  
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As in Experiment 1, the calibration scores were used to adjust the scores in the 
experimental trials and all statistical analyses were performed on the calibrated 
scores. 
 
 
2.3.2 Results  
 
2.3.2.1 Instant change in identity  
A 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA with Identity-change (no change vs. change) and 
Perceptual history (Joy-to-neutral vs. Anger-to-neutral) and as the within-subject 
factors showed significant main effects of Identity change (F(1, 22)  = 7.9, p = .010, 
ηp
2  = .264) and Perceptual history (F(1, 22)  = 41.2, p < .0001, ηp
2  = .652). 
Importantly, the interaction factor was highly significant (F(1, 22)  = 18.8, p < 
.0001, ηp
2  = .461; Figure 2.5A). Similarly to Experiment 1, in the same identity 
condition, neutral faces were perceived as more angry in the Joy-to-neutral videos 
(M = 2.82, SD = 0.23) than in the Anger-to-neutral videos (M = 3.32, SD = .26), 
(t(22) = -7.13, p < .0001), and each differed significantly from 3.00 (joy: t(22) = -3.69, 
p = .001; anger: t(22) = 5.87, p < .0001). However, in the identity-change condition 
the ratings for the neutral expressions in the two perceptual histories did not differ 
(t(22) = -1.15, p = .263). Thus, a change of identity of the actor in the last frame of 
the video-sequence effectively removed the overshoot bias. The consistency of the 
lack of a response bias across actors in the identity-change condition is illustrated in 
Figure 2.5 B.  
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Figure 2.5. Results of the Instant identity-change version of Experiment 2. (A) 
Scores for the neutral expressions at the end of the Joy-to-neutral and Anger-to-
neutral sequences in the same identity (left) and instant identity-change conditions 
(right). Error bars indicate SEM. (B) Ratings for each of the eight actors in the 
instant identity-change condition are shown to illustrate the consistency in the lack of 
a response bias across actors. 
 
2.3.2.2 Smooth change in identity 
A 2x2 ANOVA, similar to the one performed for the Instant identity-change 
experiment (section 2.3.2.1), showed no significant main effect for the Identity-
change factor (F(1, 19)  = .25, p = .62, ηp
2  = .013) but a robustly significant main 
effect for Perceptual history (F(1, 19)  = 75.3, p < .0001, ηp
2  = .79). The interaction 
factor was highly significant (F(1, 19)  = 33.9, p < .0001, ηp
2  = .64; Figure 2.6A). In 
the same identity condition the perceptual histories again differed significantly from 
each other (t(20) = -8.68, p < .0001) and from 3.00 (p’s < .01). In the smooth 
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identity-change condition, even though the mean ratings for the neutral expression 
in the joy and anger videos overlapped considerably (Figure 2.6B), the ratings in two 
perceptual histories did differ significantly from each other t(19) = -4.21, p < .001). 
However, neither perceptual history differed from 3.00 (Joy, t(19) = -1.5, p = .15; 
Anger, t(19) = .72, p = .48).  
 
Importantly, doing a comparison between the smooth identity change and the 
abrupt identity change versions, a 2x2x2 mixed ANOVA with Perceptual History 
(Joy-to-neutral vs. Anger-to-neutral) and Identity-change (no change vs. change) as 
the within subjects factors and Group (smooth vs. abrupt) as the between subjects 
factor revealed a main effect of Perceptual history (F(1, 41) = 100.89, p < .0001, ηp
2 
= .711) and a main effect of Group (F(1, 41) = 4.50, p < .05, ηp
2 = .099), whereas the 
main effect of Identity-change was nearly significant (F(1, 41) = 3.72, p < .061, ηp
2 = 
.083). Remarkably, the 2-way interaction Perceptual history by Condition was 
significant (F(1, 41) = 41.17, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .018), whereas the 2-way interactions 
with Group were non-significant (all ps > .3). The 3-way interaction Perceptual 
history by Identity by Group was also not significant (F(1, 41) = .75, p = .392, ηp
2 = 
.018). This means that the amount of overshoot as found in the smooth version is 
really subtle.  
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Figure 2.6. Results of the Smooth identity-change version of Experiment 2. (A) 
Scores for the neutral expressions at the end of the Joy-to-neutral and Anger-to-
neutral sequences in the same identity (left) and smooth identity-change (right) 
conditions. Error bars indicate SEM. (B) Ratings for each of the eight actors in the 
smooth identity-change condition are shown to illustrate the consistency in (lack of) 
response biases across actors. 
 
 
2.3.3 Discussion 
 
In Experiment 2 a change in the actor’s identity was introduced at the end of the 
video-clips to test whether the overshoot response bias could have been generated 
by sequential contrast/context effects, by extrapolation (RM) on an underlying 
positive-to-negative valence dimension, or by adaptation to the expression displayed 
in the first frame. 
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The current results showed that for an overshoot response bias to occur, the 
identity of the actor should remain the same during the perceptual history: a change 
in identity in the last frame of the sequence effectively removed the bias. The 
removal of the bias was more evident when the identity change was instantaneous, 
while some bias seeped through when the identity-change was smoothed. The most 
likely explanation for this seeping through is that the participants in some cases did 
not notice the change in identity due to the morphing procedure and believed actors 
A and B to be one and the same person. In contrast, in the instant condition the 
identity change was always noticed. This was confirmed by debriefing of 
participants.  
The results suggest that the proposed low-level visual mechanisms do not 
significantly contribute to the generation of the response bias in our sample of 
typically-developed individuals. Influences of contrast effects to the evaluation of 
facial expressions are known to be independent on the identity of the actors 
(Thayer, 1980). Therefore, the significant reduction (Smooth identity-change 
experiment) and removal (Instant identity-change experiment) of the bias suggests 
that the large bias in the same-identity condition was not caused by sequential 
contrast effects. If it was caused by contrast effects, there should have been an 
overshoot bias in the identity-change conditions as well. The contrasts in facial 
expression and emotional valence between the 100% emotional expression and the 
neutral expression were equally strong in same identity and identity-change 
conditions.   
The results further suggest that extrapolation on an underlying positive-negative 
valence dimension (RM) did not cause the overshoot bias in the same identity 
condition either, as an identity change does not change the underlying valence 
dimension.  
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It seems the results also ruled out adaptation as a major cause of the bias as 
the change in identity should not dramatically affect the aftereffects induced by 
adaption to a facial expression. Although some decrease in aftereffect may be 
anticipated (Fox & Barton, 2007; Ellamil et al., 2008), a significant adaptation effect 
should still be present. However, the instant identity-change experiment revealed no 
overshoot bias whatsoever. Moreover, the perceptual histories used in our paradigm 
were fairly short (the initial frame depicting the maximally intense emotion was 
presented for just 300 ms). Several studies (Leopold et al., 2001; Rhodes et al., 
2003; Webster et al., 2004) reported that face afteraffcts only appear with adaptor 
durations ranging from several seconds to minutes, which renders adaptation a less 
likely candidate. For example, Leopold et al. (2001) reported that periods shorter 
than 5 s failed to produce facial aftereffects. One exception is provided by 
Rijsbergen, Jannati, & Treves (2008) who found aftereffects for emotional 
expression with adaptor primes of 24 ms. However, it remains unclear whether the 
perceptual distorsion found by Rijsbergen et al. (2008) may rather be due to 
contrast-effects.  
The results are compatible with the idea that the overshoot bias was due to top-
down emotional anticipation. Actor B in the last frame was someone for whom no 
perceptual history had been witnessed, so the observer did not know anything about 
B’s emotional state other than that B had a neutral expression, and therefore rated B 
as neutral. 
In Experiment 3 the role played by contrast/context effects in bringing about the 
overshoot bias was further investigated. 
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2.4 Experiment 3  
 
Experiment 3 was designed to further assess a possible contribution of contrast 
effects to the overshoot response bias but by using a different rationale than in 
Experiment 2. The video-sequence was modified so that it started from a neutral 
expression and morphed via an expression of maximal joy or anger back to the 
same neutral expression (Loop condition). If the response bias found in the previous 
experiments was due to the contrast between the to-be-evaluated expression in the 
last frame and the ‘anchor’ stimulus in the first frame presented for 300 ms, then in 
the Loop condition one would expect the last neutral expression to be judged as 
neutral and not obtain an overshoot bias, despite the second half of the sequence 
(from maximally intense emotion to neutral) being identical to the sequence in the 
previous experiments.  
 
 
2.4.1 Method  
 
2.4.1.1 Participants 
Twenty-eight undergraduate Psychology students at Hull University took part in the 
experiment. After applying exclusion criteria, twenty-four participants were included 
in the analysis (age, M = 19.92 years, SD = 2.04; 15 females, 9 males). None of the 
participants took part in any of the other experiments. All participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, gave informed consent, and received course credit for 
taking part. 
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2.4.1.2 Stimuli  
In the No loop condition, the video-clips were identical to those used for the same-
identity condition of Experiment 2 (Joy/Anger-to-neutral). In the Loop condition, a 
modification was implemented such that the video-clips started with a neutral 
expression, and morphed via maximal joy (or anger) back to the same neutral 
expression. In this condition, the morphing sequence consisted of nineteen 
interpolated frames, each 30 ms long. The first and the last frames both lasted 300 
ms, making the entire sequence last for 1170 ms (see Figure 2.7).  
 
 
 
Figure 2.7. Schematic illustration of the stimulus presentations in Experiment 3. (Top 
panel) Joy-to-neutral sequence in the No loop condition (top row) and Neutral-to-joy-
to-neutral sequence in the loop condition (bottom row). (Bottom panel) Similar 
sequences but for Anger-to-neutral (top row) and Neutral-to-anger-to-neutral 
(bottom row). 
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2.4.1.3 Experimental procedure 
Procedures were as described in Experiment 1 and 2. Participants first rated the 
static neutral expression of each actor presented for 600 ms by using the 5-point 
scale. 
Then, following 8 practice trials, one experimental block was presented with 96 
randomized trials: 8 actors x 2 perceptual histories x 2 conditions x 3 repetitions. 
The participants’ task was to evaluate the last frame of the video-clips on the same 
5-point scale as used in the calibration. Further procedures and apparatus were as 
in the Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
2.4.1.4 Data reduction and analysis 
Exclusion criteria were as in the previous experiments. Trials in which RTs fell below 
250 ms or above 3000 ms were removed (7.9%). Participants were excluded if more 
than 25% of the RTs values fell out of the mentioned range (n = 3) and when the 
mean rating fell out of a +2.5 SD range (n = 1). The analyses were performed on the 
calibrated scores as in the previous experiments. 
 
 
2.4.2 Results  
 
The 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA with Condition (No loop vs. Loop) and 
Perceptual history (Joy-to-neutral videos vs. Anger-to-neutral videos) as the within-
subjects factors showed no significant main effect for Condition (F(1, 23)  = .35, p = 
.56, ηp
2  = .015) and Perceptual history (F(1, 23)  = .024, p = .88, ηp
2  = .001), but a 
highly significant Condition by Perceptual history interaction (F(1, 23)  = 21.4, p < 
.0001, ηp
2  = .48; Figure 2.8). In the No loop condition the typical overshoot effect 
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was found; the mean ratings of the neutral faces was 2.79 in the Joy-to-neutral and 
3.20 in the Anger-to-neutral sequences, which differed significantly from each other 
(t(23) = 4.18, p < .0001). However, in the Loop condition the reversed pattern 
emerged: the neutral expression at the end of the Neutral-to-joy-to-neutral video 
was evaluated as slightly happy (M = 3.24, SD = 0.53), and at the end of the 
Neutral-to-anger-to-neutral videos as slightly angry (M = 2.80, SD = 0.47). These 
evaluations differed significantly from each other (t(23) = 2.60, p = .016) and each 
differed significantly from 3.00 (neutral-joy-neutral: (t(23) = 2.50, p = .020); neutral-
anger-neutral (t(23) = -2.16, p = .041; two tailed). The response bias, which was in 
opposite directions in the No loop and the Loop conditions, was consistent across 
actors as illustrated in Figure 2.8. The reversed response bias in the Loop condition 
might be called an “undershoot” response bias. 
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Figure 2.8. Results of Experiment 3. (A) Ratings of the neutral expressions at the 
end of the video-sequences in the No loop and in the Loop conditions. Error bars 
indicate SEM. (B) Ratings for each of the eight actors in the No loop and Loop 
conditions are shown to illustrate the consistency across actors. 
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2.4.3 Discussion 
 
The experimental manipulation in Experiment 3 consisted of removal of the 300 ms 
frame depicting the maximally intense emotion at the start of the sequences and 
replacing it by a 300 ms frame depicting a neutral expression, which gradually 
morphed into a maximally intense emotion, and then morphed back into the same 
neutral expression as where it started from. Its aim was to further test for a possible 
contribution of sequential contrast effects to the overshoot response bias. The 
results of this experiment established that the contrast between the initial frame (300 
ms duration) and the last, to-be-evaluated, frame (300 ms) of the sequence did not 
play a significant role in bringing about the overshoot response bias. In the Loop 
condition there was no contrast between the initial and last frames (both showed 
identical neutral expressions) and therefore the sequential contrast hypothesis 
predicted the absence of a response bias. However, a response bias was obtained 
but in opposite in direction to the one in the No loop condition (i.e. an undershoot 
response bias). 
The findings of Experiment 3 are also not compatible with an extrapolation on 
an underlying positive-negative valence dimension (or RM) being the cause for the 
overshoot response bias, as this would have predicted an overshoot bias for the 
Loop condition (i.e. a continuation of the second half of the video).  
In principle, emotional anticipation, i.e. the tendency to keep track of the other’s 
emotional state of mind and to predict what the emotional state is most likely to be in 
the immediate future, is able to explain the reversed bias direction (undershoot). The 
perceptual histories in the loop condition, differently from the control condition, 
involve whole expressions (onset and offset of a smile or frown). In our daily life we 
rarely attribute a negative state of mind to a person who smiles at us while it is 
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difficult to attribute a positive state of mind to a person who frowns. Thus, it could be 
that observers perceived the brief smile as a positive social sign, indicating the 
agent possessed a positive attitude towards them, and consequently evaluated the 
agent positively, as we tend to like people who like us (cf. Jones, DeBruine, Little, 
Conway, & Feinburg, 2006). Similarly, the brief frown may have constituted a 
negative social sign resulting in the notion that the agent held a negative disposition 
toward the observer, and hence the negative evaluation of the neutral expression.  
 
 
2.5 Experiment 4 
 
Experiment 4 was specifically designed to examine the possible contribution of RM 
to the overshoot response bias. Yoshikawa and Sato (2008) presented short video-
clips of neutral (0%) expressions that morphed into more intense expressions (70%, 
80% or 90%). Video-sequences of 21 frames at equal steps of 4% intensity change 
were administered with four different velocity conditions: 210 ms (10 ms/frame), 420 
ms (20 ms/frame), 840 ms (40 ms/frame) and 1680 ms (80 ms/frame). 
The authors reported that participants overestimated the expression of the last 
frame of the sequence and that the size of this effect was positively correlated with 
the speed of the intensity change. These results were interpreted in favour of an RM 
effect, which is the phenomenon that an observer’s memory for the final position of a 
moving target is displaced further along the observed trajectory (Freyd, 1987; Freyd 
& Finke, 1984).   
Similarly, in the ‘overshoot’ paradigm with Joy-to-neutral and Anger-to-neutral 
videos, one could expect an RM effect operating on the dynamic facial features. The 
motion contained in the Joy-to-neutral videos could have caused a displacement of 
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the memory of the last neutral expression further along its trajectory, crossing the 
category boundary. Similarly, the motion contained in the Anger-to-neutral videos 
could have displaced the memory of the same last neutral expression beyond its 
category boundary, resulting in the recollection of a slightly happy expression. In 
Experiment 4 the speed of the video-clips was manipulated to test whether this 
would modulate the overshoot effect. If the amount of the overshoot bias does not 
positively correlate with the speed of the video-clips then that would make it unlikely 
that the overshoot bias is related to RM. 
 
 
2.5.1 Method  
 
2.5.1.1 Participants 
Twenty-two undergraduate Psychology students at Hull University took part in the 
experiment. After applying exclusion criteria, twenty participants were included in the 
analysis (age, M = 21.3 years, SD = 1.77; 13 females, 7 males). None of the 
participants took part in any of the other experiments. All had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, gave informed consent, and received course credit for taking part. 
 
2.5.1.2 Stimuli  
Joy-to-neutral and Anger-to-neutral video-clips of the same eight actors were 
presented in four different velocity conditions, which were called: fast, normal, slow 
and very slow. The fast condition consisted of only one interpolated frame of 50% 
intensity between the first maximally happy or angry (100%) frame and the last 
neutral (0%) frame of the sequence. The interpolated frame lasted 15 ms, while the 
first and the last frames both lasted 300 ms (total duration of the entire sequence: 
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615 ms). The normal condition contained nineteen interpolated images in between 
the full-blown expression of joy or anger (100%) and the neutral expression (0%), at 
equal steps of 5% intensity change. 
The 19 interpolated frames lasted 15 ms each one (total duration: 285 ms).  
The velocity of the normal condition was fairly similar to the velocity of the 
videos used for the control conditions in the previous experiments (30 ms by 9 
frames = 270 ms). The first (100%) and the last (0%) frames both lasted 300 ms 
(total duration of the entire sequence: 885 ms). In the slow condition the same 
nineteen interpolated images lasted 30 ms each one (total duration: 570 ms) and the 
first 100% happy or angry frame and the last 0% neutral frame both lasted 300 ms 
(total duration of the entire sequence: 1170 ms). Finally, in the very slow condition 
the duration of the nineteen interpolated frames was increased to 45 ms each (total 
duration 855 ms), making the total duration of the entire video, including the first 100 
% and the last 0% frames, 1455 ms. The four conditions are illustrated in Figure 2.9.  
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Figure 2.9. Schematic illustration of the stimulus presentations in Experiment 4. Joy-
to-neutral videos (top panel) and Anger-to-neutral videos (bottom panel) in the four 
velocity conditions (fast, normal, slow and very slow). 
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2.5.1.3 Experimental procedure 
Procedures were the same as in the previous experiments, except that Experiment 
4 consisted of 128 randomized trials (8 actors x 2 perceptual histories x 4 speeds x 
2 repetitions).  
 
2.5.1.4 Data reduction and analysis 
Exclusion criteria were as in the previous experiments. Trials in which RTs fell below 
250 ms or above 3000 ms were removed (4.5%). Participants were excluded if more 
than 25% of the RTs values fell out of the mentioned range (n = 0) and when the 
mean rating fell outside a +2.5 SD range (n = 2). As in the previous experiments all 
the analyses were performed on the calibrated scores. 
 
 
2.5.2 Results  
The results are shown in Figure 2.10. The 2x4 repeated measures ANOVA with 
Perceptual history (Joy-to-neutral videos vs. Anger-to-neutral videos) and Velocity 
(fast vs. normal vs. slow vs. very slow) as the within-subjects factors showed a 
strong significant effect for Perceptual history (F(1, 19)  = 35.01, p < .0001, ηp
2  = 
.648), but no significant main effect for Velocity (F(3, 57)  = 1.01, p = .395, ηp
2  = 
.050). Importantly the Velocity by Perceptual history interaction was not significant 
(F(3, 57)  = .795, p = .502, ηp
2  = .040). Paired sample t-tests revealed a robust 
overshoot bias in each of the 4 velocity conditions (Fast: t(19) = -4.44, p < .0001; 
Normal): t(19) = -4.04, p = .001; Slow: t(19) = -6.45, p < .0001; and Very slow : t(19) 
= -5.15, p < .0001; α= 0.012). The mean scores in each velocity condition for each 
actor separately are also illustrated in Figure 2.10. 
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Figure 2.10. Results of Experiment 4. (A) Ratings of the neutral expressions at the 
end of the video-sequences at fast, normal, slow and very slow velocities. Error bars 
indicate SEM. (B) Ratings for each of the eight actors in the four conditions (fast, 
normal, slow and very slow) are shown to illustrate the consistency across actors. 
 
 
2.5.3 Discussion 
 
Experiment 4 was conducted to test the possibility that the overshoot response bias 
found at normal velocity (see the previous experiments) could be explained in terms 
of RM rather than in terms of an emotional mindreading/anticipation mechanism. 
Sato and Yoshikawa (2008) used video-sequences, which morphed from neutral to 
an intense expression, with four different velocity conditions: 210 ms, 420 ms, 840 
ms and 1680 ms. In their study participants overestimated the intensity of the 
expressions depicted in the last frame when the video-clips were fast (210 ms and 
420 ms), while this effect was not found with slower videos (840 ms and 1680 ms). 
Experiment 4 presented here showed that in our paradigm the overshoot effect is 
not modulated by the speed of the video-clips. The four velocity conditions adopted 
in the current experiment were fairly comparable to the ones adopted by Yoshikawa 
and Sato (2008). Therefore, it is unlikely that the response bias found in the current 
study can be explained in terms of RM.  
Moreover, as noted in the Methods section of Experiment 1 (2.2.1.3), the RM 
paradigm applied by Yoshikawa and Sato (2008) presents some methodological 
differences with the ‘overshoot’ paradigm. First of all, in the study by Yoshikawa and 
Sato participants were instructed to select, using an interactive slider, the emotional 
intensity out of a sequence of different possible emotional intensities (i.e. ranges of 
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20%-120%, 30%-130%, 40%-140%), which they believed corresponded best to the 
expression they saw at the end of the video-clip. This procedure could itself have 
affected participants’ choices as this selection procedure created new perceptual 
histories, affecting the perception of the test intensities themselves. In the 
‘overshoot’ paradigm, participants needed to make perceptual evaluations using a 
verbal 5-point scale, of the last (neutral) frame of the sequence, without being 
showed any other expressions for comparison. This removed the possibility of 
‘contamination’ by the test stimuli. Further, in contrast to the reversed video-
sequences (i.e. neutral-to-joy) used by Yoshikawa and Sato (2008), the overshoot 
effect obtained with Joy-to-neutral and Anger-to-neutral videos entailed a crossing of 
the category boundary. 
 
 
2.6 Experiment 5 
 
In the video-sequences presented so far, many geometrical features in the face 
changed in a continuous and smooth manner. To examine to what extent the 
overshoot response depended on the continuous, uninterrupted flow of motion up to 
the last, neutral frame that had to be evaluated, in Experiment 5 the video-sequence 
was disrupted by inserting a mask (consisted of a 400 ms long frame) immediately 
before this last frame. If the overshoot bias is determined by an extrapolation of the 
facial geometries then interruption of the video flow would remove or reduce the 
bias. For example, the U-shaped mouth in the smile gradually transformed into a 
flat-shaped mouth in the neutral expression that might be extrapolated into a slightly 
inverted U shape, which would give the face a slightly angry look. However, 
insertion of the mask would not affect the anticipation of the emotional state of the 
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actor, and therefore the emotional anticipation explanation would predict to find an 
overshoot bias.  
 
 
2.6.1 Method  
 
2.6.1.1 Participants 
Sixteen undergraduate Psychology students at Hull University took part. After 
applying exclusion criteria (see below), fifteen participants were included in the 
analysis (age, M = 20.2 years, SD = 3.0; 12 females, 3 males). None of the 
participants took part in any of the other experiments. All had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, gave informed consent, and received course credit for taking part. 
 
2.6.1.2 Stimuli 
The same Joy-to-neutral and Anger-to-neutral video-clips were presented as in the 
normal velocity condition in Experiment 4, which also corresponds to the control 
condition of the previous experiments. A 400 ms long mask, consisting of an oval 
grid in grey scale, was inserted in the sequence directly before the last frame 
(Figure 2.11). The contour of the oval shape matched that of the faces. Due to 
insertion of the mask the total duration of the sequence was 1270 ms; all other 
stimulus parameters were as in the previous experiments. The control condition was 
identical to the mask condition except that no mask was inserted (Figure 2.11).  
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Figure 2.11.  Schematic illustration of the stimulus presentations in Experiment 5. 
Joy-to-neutral videos (top panel) and Anger-to-neutral videos (bottom panel) in the 
No mask and in the Mask conditions are shown.   
 
2.6.1.3 Experimental procedure  
As for the previous experiments, participants started with a calibration phase, rating 
the neutral expression of each actor presented for 600 ms using the 5-point scale. 
Following 8 practice trials, one experimental block was presented with 64 trials, 32 
for the no mask condition and 32 for the mask condition (8 actors x 2 perceptual 
histories x 2 repetitions) in random order. The participants’ task was to evaluate the 
last frame of the video-clips on the same 5-point scale used in the calibration. 
Further procedures and apparatus were as in the previous experiments. 
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2.6.1.4 Data reduction and analysis 
The same criteria as for the previous experiments were adopted. Trials in which the 
RTs fell below 250 ms or above 3000 ms were removed (8%). Participants were 
excluded if more than 25% of the RTs values were out of the mentioned range (n = 
0). The +2.5 SD rule to the mean difference ratings excluded one participant. The 
analyses were performed on the calibrated scores as in the previous experiments.  
 
 
2.6.2 Results  
 
A 2X2 repeated measures ANOVA with Condition (No mask vs. Mask) and 
Perceptual history (Joy-to-neutral vs. Anger-to-neutral) as factors showed a robustly 
significant main effect of Perceptual history (F(1, 14)  = 47.50, p < .0001, ηp
2  = .77). 
The factor Condition was not significant (F(1, 14)  = 1.86, p = .194, ηp
2  = .117), and 
the Condition by Perceptual history interaction (F(1, 14)  = 1.68, p = .215, ηp
2  = .107) 
was not significant (Figure 2.12). 
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Figure 2.12. Results of Experiment 5.  (A) Mean scores for the neutral expressions 
at the end of the Joy-to-neutral and Anger-to-neutral video-clips with an inserted 
mask (Mask) and without (No mask). Error bars indicate SEM. (B) Ratings for each 
of the eight actors in the two conditions (No mask and Mask) are shown to illustrate 
the consistency across actors. 
Chapter 2 
Emotional anticipation in adults with TD 
 
 
97 
 
2.6.3 Discussion 
 
In Experiment 5 the flow of motion in the video-clips was interrupted by inserting a 
400 ms long mask just before the last neutral frame (i.e. the frame that had to be 
evaluated) to specifically test for the role of extrapolation in bringing about the 
overshoot bias. The results showed that the overshoot bias survived the insertion of 
a 400 ms long mask; the extent of bias in the conditions with and without the mask 
was very similar. As this manipulation should have reset low-level mechanisms that 
rely on the flow of motion (cf. Enns et al., 2010), the conclusion is that such 
mechanisms did not play a crucial role in bringing about the overshoot bias.  
It should be noted that the insertion of the mask induced quite an abrupt 
perceptual change. Yet, this sudden change in perceptual parameters did not affect 
the overshoot response bias in any way. This has also implications for the 
interpretation of the results of instant identity-change version of Experiment 2. That 
is, it shows that the rather abrupt change in low-level features associated with the 
transition between the two identities could not have caused the removal of the 
overshoot bias in that experiment. The mask in Experiment 5 introduced a 
considerably more abrupt change in low-level parameters than the instant transition 
between identities, yet the Mask experiment resulted in an overshoot bias whereas 
the instant identity-change experiment did not. 
 
 
2.7 Experiment 6 
  
In Experiment 6 the adaptation hypothesis was further investigated. Although the 
typical finding of adaptation studies is that adaptation periods shorter than 5 s do not 
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produce any aftereffects, one study reported aftereffects at 500 ms duration of the 
adapting stimulus (Kovacs, Cziraki, Vidnyanszky, Schweinberger, & Greenlee, 
2008). We therefore set out to test the adaptation hypothesis in more detail. 
The possible contribution of adaptation to the overshoot response bias was 
tested by increasing the duration of the first frame of the video-clip to 600 ms, which 
meant that the full blown expressions (joy or anger) lasted the double amount of 
time as compared to the previous experiments.  If the initial 300 ms duration of the 
first frame, despite its very short duration, was already able to induce an aftereffect, 
then doubling its duration may induce an increased after adaptation effect, which (if 
adaptation plays a role) should be reflected in an enhanced overshoot bias.  
 
 
2.7.1 Method  
 
2.7.1.1 Participants 
Eighteen undergraduate Psychology students at Hull University took part. After 
applying exclusion criteria (see below), fourteen participants were included in the 
analysis (age, M = 19.4 years, SD = 1.2; 13 females, 1 male). None of the 
participants took part in any of the other experiments. All had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, gave informed consent, and received course credit for taking part. 
 
2.7.1.2 Stimuli 
The same Joy-to-neutral and Anger-to-neutral video-clips were presented as in the 
control condition of Experiment 5. In the experimental condition the duration of the 
first maximally happy or angry expression was increased to 600 ms. The total 
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duration of the sequence was 1170 ms (Figure 2.13).  In the control condition the 
duration of the first frame did not undergo any variation. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.13. Schematic illustration of the stimulus presentations in Experiment 6. 
Joy-to-neutral videos (top panel) and Anger-to-neutral videos (bottom panel) were 
presented with two durations of the first frame (300 ms and 600 ms).   
 
2.7.1.3 Experimental procedure  
Participants first rated the static neutral expression of each actor, presented for 600 
ms, by using the 5-point scale (ranging from slightly angry, via neutral, to slightly 
happy). Next, following 8 practice trials, two experimental blocks (one for the control 
and one for the experimental condition) were presented counterbalanced across 
participants. Each block consisted of 32 trials, (8 actors x 2 perceptual histories x 2 
repetitions), presented in random order. The participants’ task was to evaluate the 
last frame of the video-clips on the same 5-point scale as used in the calibration. 
Further procedures and apparatus were as in the previous experiments. 
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2.7.1.4 Data reduction and analysis 
Exclusion criteria were as in the previous experiments. Trials in which the RTs fell 
below 250 ms or above 3000 ms were removed (3.8%). Participants were excluded 
if more than 25% of the RTs values were out of the mentioned range (n = 4). The 
+2.5 SD rule to the mean difference ratings did not exclude any participant.  
As in the previous experiments, all statistical analyses were performed on the 
calibrated scores. 
 
 
2.7.2 Results  
 
The results are shown in Figure 2.14. A 2X2 repeated measures ANOVA, with First 
frame (300 ms vs. 600 ms) and Perceptual history (Joy-to-neutral vs. Anger-to-
neutral) as within-subject factors, showed a significant main effect for perceptual 
history (F(1, 13) = 85.97, p < .0001, ηp
2  = .869), but no significant main effect for the 
factor First frame (F(1, 13) = .087, p = .773, ηp
2  = .007. Importantly, no significant 
interaction effect was found (F(1, 13) = .006, p = .940, ηp
2  = .000). Thus, the degree 
of overshoot was independent of the duration of the first frame (300 ms or 600 ms).   
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Figure 2.14. Results of Experiment 6. (A) Scores for the neutral expressions at the 
end of the Joy-to-neutral and Anger-to-neutral sequences. The first frame of the 
videos was presented for either 300 ms or 600 ms. Error bars indicate SEM. (B) 
Ratings for each of the eight actors in the two conditions (first frame: 300 ms and 
600 ms) are shown to illustrate the consistency of the bias across actors. 
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2.7.3 Discussion 
 
Experiment 6 was conducted to examine a possible contribution of visual adaptation 
to the overshoot response bias as found in the previous experiments. This was 
achieved by doubling the duration the first frame, depicting a maximally intense, 
expression. The rational was that if the first 300 ms frame was already able to 
induce an adaptation effect, then doubling its duration should have produced an 
enhanced overshoot bias. However, this manipulation did not modulate the amount 
of overshoot. A similar result was previously reported in Jellema et al., 2011, where 
the duration of the first frame was tripled as compared to the control condition. 
These findings, together with the finding of the identity change manipulation 
(Experiment 2), where the change of the actor’s identity completely removed the 
response bias, strongly suggests that the overshoot response bias was not related 
to adaptation aftereffects. This is in line with reports that after-effects typically only 
occur after much longer exposures to the adapting stimulus and that they are not 
affected by identity variations (Leopold et al., 2001; Fox & Barton, 2007; Ellamil et 
al., 2008). 
 
 
2.8 General discussion  
 
The studies presented in Chapter 2 aimed at examining the contributions of basic 
bottom-up perceptual processes and top-down emotional anticipation to the 
generation of perceptual biases during the observation of dynamic emotional 
expressions, and the role these biases may play in anticipating and understanding 
other’s emotional states.  
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In Experiment 1, the immediate, ecologically-valid and dynamic, perceptual 
history biased the perception of the neutral expression depicted at the end of the 
video-sequence. The identical neutral facial expression was consistently judged as 
more angry when presented at the end of Joy-to-neutral videos as compared to 
Anger-to-neutral videos. This bias was strong enough to overcome a 20% difference 
in emotional intensity. One interpretation of these results is that observers 
involuntarily kept track of the emotional state of mind of the actor and implicitly 
anticipated what the actor’s emotional state would most likely be in the immediate 
future. Such a top-down influence could bias the visual perception of the current 
facial expression in the direction of the anticipated emotional state of mind. We 
called this the ‘emotional anticipation’ hypothesis. However, a number of basic 
perceptual processes, such as sequential contrast/context effects, extrapolation or 
representational momentum (RM) and adaptation, might just as well be able to 
explain the bias in perceptual report. Therefore, in Experiments 2 to 6, the viability of 
the different explanations was tested.  
In Experiment 2 a change in facial identity just before the final neutral 
expression was reached effectively removed the overshoot bias. This suggested 
that sequential contrast/context effects probably did not contribute to the bias, as the 
degree of contrast between the first and last frames of the videos remained 
unaffected by this manipulation. It also argued against an explanation in terms of an 
extrapolation on an underlying positive-to-negative valence dimension (RM) as the 
underlying valence dimension was also not affected by the manipulation.  
Experiment 3 further assessed a contribution from sequential contrast effects. 
The last neutral frame was judged as slightly happy after the ‘joy loop’ and as 
slightly angry after the ‘anger loop’, which again argued against the sequential 
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contrast and against the underlying positive-negative valence dimension, as both 
explanations would have predicted an overshoot bias.  
The results of Experiment 4 argued against a contribution of RM effects, as 
such RM effects are typically modulated by the speed of the video-sequence 
(Yoshikawa & Sato, 2008), while we found that the speed variations did not affect 
the magnitude of the overshoot bias. In Experiment 5 the overshoot bias was found 
despite the insertion of a 400 ms long mask immediately before the last, neutral 
expression. This made clear that the overshoot bias did not depend on low-level 
visual mechanisms generated by the continuous flow of motion in the video-
sequence, as such mechanisms would have been ‘reset’ by the mask insertion (cf. 
Enns et al., 2010). Finally, the possible role played by adaptation was specifically 
tested in Experiment 6. Here, doubling the duration of the first frame of the videos 
did not increase the overshoot effect, suggesting that the bias is not a typical 
adaptation aftereffect.  
Taken together, these manipulations suggest that the overshoot bias found in 
Experiment 1 is not caused - at least not predominantly - by bottom-up perceptual 
mechanisms. A sequential contrast/context effect (cf. Suzuky & Cavanagh, 1998; 
Tanaka-Matsumi et al., 1995; Thayer, 1980) is an unlikely explanation as a change 
in identity removed the overshoot (Experiment 2), while a neutral starting-point did 
not result in a neutral evaluation of the endpoint, but in an undershoot (Experiment 
3). RM operating on an underlying positive-negative valence dimension is an 
unlikely explanation for the overshoot bias because it would predict that a change in 
identity does not affect the bias yet it did (Experiment 2). Further, it would predict an 
overshoot in the ‘Loop’ experiment, whereas the opposite, i.e. an undershoot, was 
elicited (Experiment 3). The overshoot bias as found in the current study can also 
not be explained by RM operating on the dynamic facial features, because the 
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speed of the videos did not modulate participants’ responses (Experiment 4). 
Extrapolation of dynamic facial geometries can also be excluded as the insertion of 
a mask did not remove the overshoot (Experiment 5).  
The explanation of RM operating on dynamic facial features can be further 
discredited by considering the extent of geometric change in the two perceptual 
histories. Happy facial expressions typically present a U-shaped mouth with raised 
cheeks and pulled up lip corners (Ekman & Friesen, 1975). Thus, in the happy-to-
neutral morphs, the change of the U-shaped mouth (happy expression) into the flat 
mouth (neutral expression) might have been extrapolated in the observer’s mind into 
a slightly inverted U-shaped mouth (denoting slight anger). However, the shape of 
the mouth in the maximally angry expressions was less well defined. Some actors 
(C, MO, PE, PF) showed a flat mouth as lips were pressed together while others 
(EM, JJ, SW, WF) displayed an open mouth with the lips parted in a square shape 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1975; Kohler et al., 2004). Neither a starting flat shape, or  a 
starting square shape, would be extrapolated into a U shape typical of a smile at the 
end of the video-clip, yet in the Anger-to-neutral condition an equally large overshoot 
bias was found as in the Joy-to-neutral condition and the extent of the effect was 
consistent across actors. Changes in the height of the eye brows, which are typically 
lowered in angry expressions, can also not explain the response bias as in Joy-to-
neutral morphs the eyebrow height hardly changed (cf. Kohler et al., 2004), yet a 
large overshoot bias was induced. Extrapolation of many other facial features and 
curves typically do not produce clear cut results. 
Finally, adaptation can be ruled out as the change in identity should not affect 
the aftereffects induced by adaptation (Fox & Barton, 2007), at least not to a large 
extent, while this manipulation effectively removed the overshoot (Experiment 2). 
Adaptation was further excluded as a main contributor by Experiment 6, as doubling 
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the duration of the first frame should have increased the overshoot bias if adaptation 
played a role in bringing about the bias, confirming earlier reports (Jellema et al., 
2011). 
As the above low-level visual mechanisms do not seem able to satisfactorily 
explain the overshoot response bias, it is suggested that instead an emotional 
anticipation mechanism was responsible for the perceptual biases. That is, the 
observer keeps track of any changes in the agent’s emotional state of mind and 
continually updates its prediction, or anticipation, of what the most likely next 
emotional state of mind of the agent will be on the basis of the immediately 
preceding dynamics in the agent’s facial expressions. These processes are 
proposed to be entirely involuntary.  
 
 
2.8.1 Why would observers attribute to the agents a negative emotional/mental state 
in the Joy-to-neutral condition and a positive emotional/mental state in the Anger-to-
neutral condition? 
 
A recent study by Mühlberger, Wieser, Gerdes, Frey, Weyers & Pauli (2011) 
provided support for the contention that Joy-to-neutral clips induce a negative 
emotional/mental state attribution, while Anger-to-neutral clips produce a positive 
attribution. These authors presented clips depicting facial expressions that morphed 
between neutral and either joy or anger, in both directions. Using fMRI, they found 
that the joy-to-neutral and neutral-to-joy clips activated largely different brain areas, 
and similarly that the anger-to-neutral and neutral-to-anger clips also activated 
largely different brain areas. The joy-to-neutral clips shared a strong common 
activation with the neutral-to-anger clips in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex bilaterally, 
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and in the left amygdala and left insula. The anger-to-neutral clips shared a strong 
common activation with the neutral-to-joy clips in the left dorsal striatum. This 
suggests that the joy-to-neutral clips are to some extent processed similarly as 
neutral-to-anger clips, but quite differently from neutral-to-joy clips. Their common 
denominator may be their negative/threatening character, resulting in activation of 
threat-related areas such as the amygdala (Morris et al., 1996; Whalen et al., 1998) 
and the insula (Schienle et al., 2002). It also suggests that the anger-to-neutral clips 
are to some extent processed similarly as neutral-to-joy clips, but quite differently 
from neutral-to-anger clips. For them, the common denominator may be their 
positive/rewarding character, reflected by activation of reward-related areas, such as 
the ventral striatum and putamen (Morris et al., 1996; Whalen et al., 1998). 
Watching an angry person calming down may serve as a positive reinforcer, 
activating reward circuitries (Mühlberger et al., 2011). Thus, the onset of a happy 
expression and the offset of an angry expression share a positive valence, while the 
offset of a happy expression and the onset of an angry expression share a negative 
valence. 
Thus, one possibility is that the anger-to-neutral clips activated motivational 
areas in the brain related to approach and/or reward, even though the anger 
expression itself would activate avoidance and/or threat areas (Öhman, 1993; 
Whalen et al., 1998). The joy-to-neutral clips may have activated areas related to 
avoidance and/or threat, even though the joy expression on its own would activate 
approach and/or reward areas (Whalen et al., 1998). Alternatively, or in addition to 
such an activation of motivational areas, the joy/anger-to-neutral clips could activate 
areas involved in simulation such as the premotor cortex and parts of the parietal 
cortex (Gallese et al., 1996), where mirror mechanisms might enable the observer to 
understand the dynamic emotional action and to anticipate the most likely next 
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emotional state, on the basis of the observer’s own experiences (Gallese, Keysers, 
& Rizzolatti, 2004; Goldman, 2006).  
 
 
2.8.2 Possible mechanisms underpinning emotional anticipation  
 
Widely different models have been proposed for the way in which we understand 
and anticipate other’s emotional/mental states. The two main approaches to 
intersubjective understanding are often referred to as Theory Theory (TT) and 
Simulation Theory (ST). According to TT the attribution of emotional/mental states 
reflects the theoretical use of folk psychology, tacit knowledge and psychological 
laws (e.g. Fodor, 1968; Leslie, 1994b). ST might involve either an explicit simulation 
(i.e. putting oneself in the other’s shoes; e.g. Gordon, 2004), or an implicit 
(subpersonal) or ‘embodied simulation’, (i.e. simulating others’ actions and emotions 
in one’s own sensorimotor system (e.g. Gallese, 2007). ST received a huge boost 
by the discovery of mirror neuron systems (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004), which are proposed to play a crucial role in the simulation 
process. In addition, some authors proposed hybrid approaches, in which the 
immediate and involuntary understanding of, in particular, other’s emotions is 
subserved by mirror mechanisms and embodied simulation, while more 
sophisticated intersubjective understanding is guided by TT principles (e.g. 
Goldman, 2006).   
In parallel, researchers in neuroscience focused their attention on the neural 
mechanisms underlying the perception of faces and the emotional expressions they 
convey, and the ways in which these stimuli affect the understanding of the agent’s 
emotional state of mind. Single unit studies in the macaque monkey (see Jellema & 
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Perrett, 2002a, b; 2005, for reviews) and fMRI studies in humans (e.g. Haxby, 
Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2002) have shown that especially the processing of the variant 
aspects of faces, including their emotional expressions, involves the superior 
temporal sulcus (STS). STS cell responses to the image of a face were shown to 
depend on the immediate perceptual history of that face image and how it is 
embedded in a natural action sequence (Jellema & Perrett, 2003; Perrett et al., 
2009). The STS therefore may well be implicated in the bias in perceptual report 
found in the current study. Although STS cells might generate expectations, or 
anticipations of impending behaviour of others (Jellema & Perrett, 2003; Perrett et 
al., 2009) and may play a role in processing other’s intentions (Jellema & Perrett, 
2000; Saxe, 2006; Saxe et al., 2004), intuitive and immediate understanding is 
unlikely to be accomplished by just the STS. The description of currently observed 
actions generated by the STS may activate its motor equivalent in the MN areas, 
which in turn generates associated internal states, i.e. those states that would have 
been evoked would the observer herself have executed that particular action. These 
states are then attributed to the actor. Hence, a distributed system, involving the 
STS and the mirror neuron system, might underlie the tacit/intuitive understanding of 
others’ facial expressions through motor simulation.  
This might (top-down) shape the perception of the visual stimulus as reported 
here, without requiring any conceptual reasoning (cf. Gallese & Goldman, 1998). 
The hypothesised neurophysiological correlates of emotional anticipation are in 
harmony with various accounts of the involvement of embodiment in the perception 
of facial expressions (Carr et al., 2003; Niedenthal, 2007; Pitcher et al., 2008, 
Wicker et al., 2003).  
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2.8.3 Limitations of the current studies and future research directions 
 
The studies in Chapter 2 present some limitations. First, only happy and angry facial 
expressions were used. This choice was motivated by the requirement to have 
opposite expressions in terms of positive-negative valence but fairly similar 
expressions in terms of arousal (Russell & Bullock, 1985). Thus, at present the 
emotional anticipation hypothesis cannot be extended to other emotional facial 
displays and further examinations are needed. Second, even though the results 
found in the six experiments seem to rule out a bottom-up explanation based on 
contrast effects, adaptation, and RM for the overshoot response bias, they do not 
provide direct evidence for a top down affective account. It would be interesting to 
further test the emotional anticipation hypothesis using deceptive facial expressions 
(Ekman, 2003), which, despite their similarities with genuine expressions in terms of 
features and geometries, do not have the same link with the  emotional state of the 
agent.  
Another possible line of research could involve the use of electromyographical 
measures (e.g. Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000) of the observer’s facial 
muscles to investigate the role of motor resonance and embodied simulation. 
Specifically, it would be relevant to test whether at the end of the Joy-to-neutral 
video clips EMG activity occurs in the observer’s ‘frowning’ muscle (Corrugator 
Supercilii) and no activity in the observer’s ‘smile’ muscle (Zygomaticus Major). This 
would be surprising as in these video-clips there is no angry facial expression at all. 
Similarly, one could test whether at the end of the Anger-to-neutral video clips EMG 
activity occurs in the observer’s Zygomaticus and no activity in the observer’s 
Corrugator.  Again, that would be surprising as in these video-clips there is no happy 
facial expression at all. If these hypotheses are confirmed then that would provide 
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compelling evidence for embodied simulation as the underlying mechanism for the 
perceptual overshoot bias.  
Further investigations should also try to disentangle the specific contributions of 
embodied simulation and of a ‘tacit’ version of TT in emotional anticipation. The 
automatic and involuntary nature of the processes does not need to constitute an 
obstacle for TT as folk psychological theory is partly ‘tacit’ (Fodor, 1968; Stich & 
Nichols, 1992).  
 
 
2.8.4 Conclusions 
 
The perception of neutral facial expressions in this first experiment was not biased 
by basic visual processes; rather it seems that it was shaped by the attribution of the 
anticipated emotional state of mind of the agent, based on the immediate dynamic 
perceptual history of the face. These findings are in line with the interactive model of 
social perception, recently proposed by Teufel and colleagues (Teufel et al., 2010), 
which emphasises the influence of mental attributions to conscious social 
perception.  
According to theories of embodied cognition, the recognition of facial 
expressions is not only the result of visual processing, but also involves motor 
simulation of the observed expression and/or activation of associated 
somatovisceral responses (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996; Adolphs 
2000; Goldman, 2006; Gallese, 2007). Several imaging studies provided support for 
the role played by embodied mechanisms in emotional face processing, mediated 
by mirror mechanisms (Carr et al., 2003; Niedenthal, 2007; Pitcher et al., 2008; 
Wicker et al., 2003). In addition, simulation of observed actions has been argued to 
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not only influence the recognition of the action, but may also facilitate the 
understanding of the action in terms of intentions and goals (Gallese, 2007; Ortigue, 
Sinigaglia, Rizzolatti, & Grafton, 2010). In line with this way of thinking, the recently 
proposed ‘simulation of smiles model’ (SIMS) by Niedenthal, Mermillod, Maringer & 
Hess (2010) suggests that the observer’s motor experience in response to the 
perception of a facial expression facilitates the understanding of the emotional state 
of the agent. These involuntary simulation processes might enable a form of ‘low-
level’ emotion reading, which does not require any deliberate internal reasoning 
(Goldman, 2006; Goldman & Sripada 2005). 
The emotional anticipation hypothesis may reflect the activation of mirror 
mechanisms triggered by the visual information in the perceptual history, which 
implicitly enables the anticipation of the other’s future emotional state of mind. In this 
view, emotional anticipation does not rely on the use of a ‘theory’ as in Theory of 
Mind, but occurs implicitly and automatically (cf. Goldman, 2006).  
The overshoot bias found in our studies does not seem to arise from high-level 
theorising, a deliberative use of psychological rules, or explicit knowledge. Rather, it 
is proposed that the perceptual history gives rise, in an involuntary manner, to 
‘emotional anticipation’, i.e. a type of ‘low-level mindreading’ (cf. Goldman, 2006; 
Goldman & Sripada, 2005), which in turn affects perception. However, direct 
evidence for this interpretation is not yet available at this stage (but see ‘Future 
research directions’ for specific additional investigations to shed light on the possible 
contribution of a simulation’s account).  
At present, the emotional anticipation hypothesis with its underlying embodied 
simulation mechanism as explanation for the response bias found in the current 
study are still highly speculative. It would be relevant to test the emotional 
anticipation task in clinical populations with impairments in emotion reading and 
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social/communicative domain, such as individuals with Autism spectrum disorders 
(ASD), as this might shed light on the possible underlying mechanisms. This is what 
will be done in the next chapter.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3  
 
Emotional anticipation in adults with  
Asperger’s syndrome 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 reported that a rapid decrease of the intensity of emotional facial 
expressions, i.e. a happy or angry expression that gradually morphed into a neutral 
expression, biased the perception of that last neutral expression in individuals with 
typical development (TD; Jellema et al., 2011). This perceptual distortion involved a 
crossing of the category boundary: the neutral expression at the end of the Joy-to-
neutral video-clips was evaluated as slightly angry, and the same neutral expression 
at the end of the Anger-to-neutral video-clips was evaluated as slightly happy 
(‘overshoot’ response bias). In Chapter 2, a number of investigations, aiming at 
assessing the underlying mechanisms responsible for this phenomenon, were 
reported. Specifically, these investigations tried to disentangle the roles played by 
bottom-up visual perceptual processes (such as contrast effects, adaptation and 
extrapolation or Representational Momentum), and a top-down mechanism called 
‘emotional anticipation’. The findings suggested that the perceptual history 
immediately preceding the last neutral expression gave rise to an involuntary 
anticipation of the emotional state of the agent, which in turn gave rise to the 
perceptual distortion of that neutral expression, reflected by the overshoot response 
bias. Emotional anticipation was described as a low-level (automatic and 
involuntary) mind-reading mechanism, which enables the tacit/intuitive 
understanding of others’ emotional states of mind. Debriefing suggested that TD 
individuals performed the tasks without adopting any conscious/cognitive strategy 
involving deliberative reasoning.   
The importance of an emotional anticipation mechanism is clear from day-to-
day interactions. Our social life would indeed be extremely difficult if every time we 
interact with others we would need to effortfully infer the reasons underlying their 
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behaviour. Rather, we immediately grasp others’ emotional and mental states from 
facial and/or bodily expressions and we keep track of someone’s intentions by 
monitoring eye gaze direction or meaningful gestures. The ability to ‘read’ social 
cues automatically and involuntary in terms of the agent’s inner states is essential to 
make sense of - and be part of - the social world. TD Individuals are equipped with 
such intersubjective understanding or Theory of Mind (ToM; Baron-Cohen, 1995). 
Importantly, it enables one to anticipate the behavior and mental/emotional states of 
others, thus promoting appropriate social interactions.  
Whenever we perceive another person performing a certain act (including 
adopting a static posture), we tend to attribute a mental and/or emotional state to 
that person. This compelling tendency of typically-developed humans to attribute 
mental/emotional states to others, or to ‘mindread’ others, has been well 
documented (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1995). The premier source of information on the 
basis of which such attributions are formed is directly derived from the (visual) 
perception of the other’s body. It consists of bodily cues such as gaze direction, 
facial expressions, postures and action sequences, often in relation to objects in the 
environment (context).  
The bottom-up pathways along which the ‘perceptual’ processing of these 
social stimuli/cues take place are fairly well understood (Allison et al., 2003; Puce & 
Perrett, 2003). It should be noted that by ‘perceptual’ processing of a social stimulus 
we mean the processing in terms of physical or geometrical features and dynamics 
of the stimulus, possibly in relation to other cues, but devoid of any ‘higher’ 
psychological meaning. This constitutes what one could call a ‘mechanistic’ 
description (Jellema & Perrett, 2002a, b; 2005). It is generally accepted that these 
mechanistic descriptions of social cues allow one to form inferences about the 
emotional/mental state of the agent (Jellema & Perrett, 2005; Blakemore & Decety, 
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2001). These attributions tend to be susceptible to prior explicit knowledge about the 
other, acquired by the observer at an earlier stage. A plethora of studies show that 
when confronted with one and the same action, our attributions will vary depending 
on the nature of the prior knowledge (or prejudices) (Gamond et al., 2011; Kozak, 
Marsh, & Wegner, 2006; Read, Druian, & Miller, 1989). This description of social 
cue processing reflects a fairly rigid, fixed processing protocol. The top-down 
modulation of the visual perception kicks in relatively late, i.e. after the social cues 
have been analysed and attributions on the basis of these cues have been formed, 
possibly modulated by prior knowledge and context.  
However, recently studies have challenged the dogma that there is a marked 
distinction between ‘perceptual’ processing on the one hand and ‘mentalising’ on the 
other hand. For example, Teufel, Fletcher, & Davis, (2010)  build on the idea of a 
bidirectional relationship between the mechanisms supporting the perceptual 
processing stages, and the attributions made by the observer about the agent’s 
inner states on the basis of prior explicit knowledge. Teufel et al. (2010) made the 
point that low-level ‘perceptual’ processing of social cues is already susceptible to 
explicit knowledge about the actor’s mental state and can be modulated according 
to such attributions. They referred to this interaction with the term ‘perceptual 
mentalising’.  
We extend this notion of an interactive relationship by proposing that the 
perceptual processing of social cues also interacts with attributions made on the 
basis of the immediate perceptual history of the observed action (Palumbo & 
Jellema, under review). These latter attributions are thought to reflect the operations 
of a prediction or anticipation mechanism, which operates automatically and 
involuntarily, and which, in a way, is part of the perceptual system. In Teufel et al.’s 
model the observer is fully aware of the attributions, as they reflect explicit 
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knowledge provided by the experimenter to the observer prior to the task. In our 
model, the processing of the dynamic facial expressions generates in an 
automatic/involuntary fashion a prediction or anticipation in the observer about what 
the actor’s most likely next mental/emotional state of mind will be. This happens ‘on 
line’ during the task, whereby the anticipation of the most likely next state of mind is 
continuously updated on the basis of the immediately preceding events, without the 
observer being aware of it. These ideas blur the distinction between perception and 
anticipation (or mentalising) as it basically incorporates anticipation (or mentalising) 
within the perceptual process. That is, anticipation is an automatic consequence of 
the dynamic perceptual input stream. Thus, the mental/emotional anticipations do 
not involve deliberate reasoning, but can be entirely involuntary and automatic. It is 
as if the mere perception of the social stimulus automatically and subconsciously 
induces ‘mentalizing’ activities, which then in turn modulate the low-level bottom-up 
perception. It enables the observer to implicitly, or tacitly, form expectations and 
anticipations about the most likely next action and/or state of mind (cf. Hudson et al., 
2009; Hudson & Jellema, 2011). Similarly, the literal or physical emotional 
expressivity of a face, especially when it is embedded in a dynamic sequence, may 
automatically lead to an anticipation of what the agent’s emotional state most likely 
will be in the immediate future, which then affects the perceptual judgments 
(Palumbo & Jellema, under review).  
 
 
3.1.1 Social cue processing and ‘emotion-reading’ in ASD 
 
Autism Spectrum disorder (ASD) is a pervasive developmental condition 
characterized by impaired social development, dysfunctional communicative skills, 
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and stereotypical, repetitive behaviours, which are often accompanied by obsessive 
interests and a lack of emotion, empathy and pretend play (Rutter, 1978; WHO, 
1992; DSM-IV, 2004; Baron-Cohen, 2005). Despite these marked deficiencies, 
many other cognitive abilities are intact (Happé and Frith, 2006).  
Under the ASD umbrella, Asperger’s syndrome (AS) is a relatively mild form of 
autism, in which the development of language and cognitive skills is preserved, 
while IQ scores are in the normal, or above normal, range. The distinction with high-
functioning autism (HFA), in which there is a delay in the development of language 
and cognitive abilities, is often difficult to make as records of symptoms in early 
development may be absent. In addition to mild problems in the communicative and 
relational domains, individuals with AS may also show limited empathy, lack of 
social or emotional reciprocity, and impaired nonverbal behaviors related to eye 
contact, facial expression, posture, and gesture (McPartland & Klin, 2006). These 
difficulties have been linked to a failure to attribute epistemic mental states (such as 
desires, beliefs and intentions) to others (Frith et al. 1991; Baron-Cohen, 1995; 
Baron-Cohen et al., 1995) and  to a failure to involuntary or spontaneously interpret 
others’ social cues (Senju et al., 2009; Jellema et la., 2009). 
Even though individuals with HFA or AS may fail to compute others’ mental 
states spontaneously, they can use explicit (non-social) information to try and 
understand others (Kuchinke et al., 2011; Kuzmanovic et al., 2011; Senju et al., 
2009). Thus, through explicit reasoning about others’ inner states, individuals with 
AS may compensate for an automatic failure, although this would render their social 
interactions more slow and effortful.  
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3.1.2 Anticipation in individuals with AS  
 
Recently, it was suggested that individuals with AS specifically have problems with 
anticipating others’ actions (Zalla et al., 2010; Hudson et al., 2011). These deficits 
may, however, be compensated by alternative strategies, such as relying on 
physical dynamic characteristics of the agent (Hudson et al., 2011). In this study by 
Hudson et al. (2011), TD and AS participants believed that the head of an agent had 
rotated further when the agent’s gaze was leading the direction of rotation than 
when it was lagging behind rotation. However, while estimations in the TD group 
were influenced by the involuntary attribution of intentions to the agent conveyed by 
the eye gaze direction, in the AS group the action anticipation seemed to be caused 
by the low-level visual appearance of the gaze direction rather than by the inferred 
intentions. This latter contention was suggested by the finding that the AS group 
was influenced to the same extent by the gaze of the agent as by the ‘equivalent of 
gaze’ in an inanimate cylindrical object. It remains an open question whether the 
inability to involuntary anticipate others’ actions in AS individuals is caused by an 
inability to keep track of the agent’s state of mind. It is also unknown to what extent 
they may use atypical means to compensate their failure.  
 
 
3.1.3 Emotional face processing in ASD 
 
The extent to which individuals with ASD are able to recognize and understand 
emotional facial expressions is still much debated despite a large amount of 
research into this topic. This is mainly due to a large variety of paradigms and stimuli 
(usually static pictures which are less ecologically valid), different age and different 
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levels of severity of ASD. On the one hand there is evidence about ASD deficits in 
processing emotional facial expressions (e.g. Celani et al., 1999; Corden et al., 
1994;  Grossman, Klin, Carter, & Volkmar, 2000; Hobson, 1986a, 1986b; 
Humphreys, Minshew, Leonard, & Behrmann, 2007; Law Smith et al., 2010; Lindner 
& Rosen, 2006; O’ Connor, Hamm, & Kirk, 2005; Tantam et al., 1989; Teunisse & de 
Gelder, 2001), while on the other hand some studies show that individuals with ASD 
are relatively unimpaired in processing emotional facial expressions (e.g. Adolphs et 
al., 2001; Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Castelli, 2005; Gepner et al., 2001; Loveland et 
al., 1997; Ogai et al., 2003; Ozonoff et al., 1990; Prior et al., 1990; Wicker et al., 
2008; Wong et al., 2008).  
According to the Weak Central Coherence theory (WCC; Happé, 1999; Happé 
and Frith, 2006), social perception in individuals with ASD is impaired because they 
focus their attention on the local details of a stimulus, rather than on the whole. 
Therefore, ASD individuals may analyze facial expressions on the basis of isolated 
elements, or low-level features (e.g. the U shaped mouth in a smile), thereby losing 
sight of the global configuration and the meaning of it. Another possibility is that 
individuals with ASD, due to their difficulty in ascribing intentions to animate objects 
via referential cues, may adopt systemizing mechanisms (i.e. based on input-
operation-output relations) to understand and anticipate other people’s behaviour 
(Baron Cohen, 2002; Hudson et al., 2011; Ristic et al., 2005). This might also 
account for their lack of empathy (Baron-Cohen, 2006). The prevalence of a 
mechanistic processing mode, as opposed to a mentalistic one (Driver et al., 1999; 
Jellema & Perrett, 2002a, 2002b; 2007), may also contribute to the impairments in 
social perception in ASD.  
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3.1.4 The current study  
 
In Chapter 2 the study of TD individuals revealed that the perceptual judgment of a 
face with neutral expression is biased (overshoot effect) by the immediate 
perceptual history. It was suggested that the underlying mechanism consisted of an 
involuntary anticipation of the agent’s emotional state of mind, generated by the 
perceptual history immediately preceding that neutral expression (Palumbo & 
Jellema, under review).  
The experiments in Chapter 3 aimed at testing the same ‘emotional anticipation’ 
task on individuals with AS, matched with TD control groups. In Experiment 7 the 
question was whether individuals with AS would also show an overshoot response 
bias. The hypothesis was that they would not engage in ‘emotional anticipation’, in 
accordance with theories about their assumed lack of empathy and ToM (Baron-
Cohen, 1995). However, on the basis of previous findings suggesting that AS 
individuals can anticipate someone else’s actions by using alternative strategies 
(Hudson et al., 2011), it might be that AS individuals would produce an overshoot 
bias in their judgments, but through a different route.  
 
3.1.4.1 The recruitment of the clinical group 
The clinical group consisted of twenty-five students recruited through disability 
services at universities in the North-East of England (UK). All these students had 
previously received a diagnosis of AS, based on DSM-IV criteria (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994). The diagnostic evaluations involved a review of prior 
records/psychiatric observation. For the purpose of the current experiments the 
ADOS (Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule, module 4; Lord, Rutter, DiLavore, 
& Risi, 1999), was administered by a qualified psychologist. The ADOS is a semi-
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structured, standardized interview using developmentally appropriate social 
interactions and equipment. Algorithms are calculated for social interaction, 
communication and repetitive behaviours. An ADOS score of 7 or higher is 
indicative of clinical levels of ASD. All participants in the clinical group also 
completed the Autism Spectrum Quotient questionnaire (AQ; Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001; Hoekstra, Bartels, Cath, & 
Boomsma, 2008; Wheelwright et al., 2006). The AQ is a fifty-statement, self-
administered questionnaire, designed to measure the degree to which an adult with 
normal intelligence possesses autistic-like traits.  It covers social skills, attention 
switching, and attention to detail, communication and imagination.  
In the clinical group three participants with ADOS score below 7 were excluded 
as they did not meet the classification of AS (these participants were not tested in 
any of the experiments presented in this chapter). Therefore, the final clinical group 
was constituted of twenty-two AS individual (see participants’ individual 
characteristics in Table 3.1). 
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Table 3.1. The clinical group: individual characteristics. Age (years); Gender (F, M); 
AQ, Autism-spectrum Quotient; IQ-T, total IQ score; IQ-V, verbal IQ score; IQ-P, 
Performance IQ score; ADOS, autism diagnostic observation schedule. All 
participants’ native language was English. Participants highlighted in grey were 
excluded because they had ADOS scores < 7 (they were not included in the 
calculations of the means). 
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All 22 individuals performed the Control condition. However, to avoid 
familiarization effects, only in two experiments (Experiments 7 and 9) the Control 
condition was included, while in the other two experiments (8 and 10) it was absent. 
For AS participants in Experiments 8 and 10, their scores obtained in the Control 
condition of either Experiment 7 or 9 were used in the analyses.  
 
 
3.2 Experiment 7 
 
Short video-clips of dynamic facial expressions, which morphed from 100% joy or 
anger to a 0% neutral expression (and to a 10% joy or a 10% anger expression), 
were presented to adults with AS, and to a control group consisting of TD 
participants matched for age, gender and intellectual abilities. Participants were 
asked to judge the last expression of the sequence, which last expression was 
presented for 300 ms. The primary hypothesis was that the individuals with AS do 
not engage in  ‘emotional anticipation’ and therefore will not show an overshoot bias 
in their evaluations. 
However, in principle, there was also the possibility that they would compensate 
for a lack of ‘emotional anticipation’ by using low-level visual effects, such as 
contrast effects or extrapolation to solve the task. In the control group, it was 
predicted to replicate the findings of Experiment 1 (Chapter 2).   
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3.2.1 Method 
 
3.2.1.1 Participants  
All AS and TD participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and provided 
written consent prior to the experiment. Participants received course credits or a fee 
for taking part. The study was approved by the Ethics committee of the Department 
of Psychology of Hull University. 
 
AS group 
AS participants who took part in Expriment 7 consisted of seventeen students. After 
applying exclusion criteria (see Data reduction below for details) one student was 
excluded from the analysis. The sixteen students included (5 females, 11 males; 
mean age = 20.3 years, SD = 3.2) had a mean total ADOS score of 8.0 (SD = 0.9) 
and a mean AQ score of 32.1 (SD = 7.4). Their mean total IQ score was 117.1 (SD 
= 10.9; assessed using the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-III, Wechsler, 
1997).  
 
TD group 
The control group consisted of twenty undergraduate Psychology students at Hull 
University (UK). The TD group was recruited to match the AS group for age, gender 
and intellectual abilities. After applying exclusion criteria (see Data reduction below 
for details), the data of 18 participants were included in the analysis (age, M = 20.1 
years, SD = 4.0 years; 7 females, 11 males).  All individuals in this control group 
completed the AQ. Their mean AQ score was 15.3 (SD = 5.2). Their mean total IQ 
score was 113.4 (SD = 8.3); see Table 3.2.  
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The AS and TD groups did not differ significantly in terms of age (t(32) = .554, p 
= .583), gender ratio (X2(1, 33) = .216, p = .642) nor IQ (t(32) = -1.14, p = .264). The 
AQ scores were significantly higher in the AS group than in the TD group (t(32) = -
7.74, p < .0001)  
 
Table 3.2. AS and TD groups in Experiment 7: participant characteristics. Age is in 
years.  Standard deviations are shown between brackets.  F, female; M, male; AQ, 
Autism-spectrum Quotient; IQ-T, total IQ score; IQ-V, verbal IQ score; IQ-P, 
Performance IQ score; ADOS, autism diagnostic observation schedule. 
 
 
 
3.2.1.2 Stimuli and experimental procedure 
The stimuli and experimental procedure were the same as in Experiment 1 of 
Chapter 2. In short, the stimuli consisted of video-clips depicting a maximally happy 
or angry expression of which the intensity gradually decreased until a neutral (or a 
10% joy or 10% anger) expression was reached. The first and the last frames lasted 
300 ms each. 
The nine interpolated frames between the full-blow expression and the last 
frame lasted 270 ms (9 x 30 ms). The interpolated sequence was 30 ms longer or 
shorter for clips with 10% intensity endpoints (see Figure 3.1). An illustration of the 
stimuli is provided in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1. Schematic illustration of the stimulus presentations in Experiment 7. Joy-
to-‘neutral’ videos started with a facial expression of intense joy, which gradually 
morphed into a 10% joy, a neutral or a 10% anger expression (top panel). Anger-to-
‘neutral’ videos started with a facial expression of intense anger, which gradually 
morphed into a 10% anger, a neutral or a 10% joy expression (bottom panel). 
 
3.2.1.3 Experimental design 
Participants first rated the neutral expression of each actor presented in isolation as 
in Experiment 1 (16 trials) for the purpose of calibration (see below). Then, following 
8 practice trials, 64 randomized experimental trials were presented, half of which 
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started with a happy expression (called Joy-to-‘neutral’ videos) and half with an 
angry expression (called Anger-to-‘neutral’ videos). Of both types of videos, 50% of 
trials ended with the neutral expression, 25% of trials ended with the 10% joy and 
25% of trials with the 10% anger expression.  
 
3.2.1.4 Data reduction and analysis 
Trials in which RTs were below 250 ms or above 3000 ms were considered outliers 
and were removed (3.8% of total number of trials). Participants were excluded if 
more than 25% of the RTs values were outside the above range (n = 0). A +2.5 SD 
rule was applied to the mean difference ratings (i.e. rating in the Anger-to-neutral 
condition minus rating in the Joy-to-neutral condition), which excluded 1 participant. 
Further, participants were removed if their judgments on the scale were made by 
pressing the same key for more than 90% of the total number of trials (n = 0). 
In the control group the same criteria were applied. 2.9% of total number of 
trials were removed because RTs were below 250 ms or above 3000 ms. One 
participant was excluded for having more than 25% of RTs values outside the above 
range. The +2.5 SD rule to the mean difference ratings excluded one more 
participant.  
In both groups the calibration scores were used to adjust the scores in the 
experimental trials; a calibration factor [calibration factor = 3.00 minus the calibration 
score] was added to the experimental scores. An illustration of the calibration scores 
for the neutral expressions of each actor in AS and TD individuals is provided in 
Figure 3.2. Note that the calibration scores were fairly similar across the two groups 
(and also across the experiments in this chapter), with the neutral expression of 
actors C and WF systematically rated as slightly angry (see Figure 3.2). The 
calibration procedure allowed to perform one-sample t tests with test value 3.00 on 
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the scores in the two perceptual histories. All statistical analyses were performed on 
the calibrated scores. 
 
            
 
Figure 3.2. Calibration scores in Experiment 7. Ratings on the 5-point scale (vertical 
axis) for the neutral expression presented in isolation. Scores are shown for each of 
the 8 actors (their initials are indicated on the horizontal axis) for AS (left panel) and 
TD individuals (right panel). Error bars indicate +1SD. 
 
 
3.2.2 Results  
 
The results are illustrated in Figure 3.3 (for clarity the TD and AS groups are shown 
in separate graphs). A 3x2X2 mixed ANOVA was performed with as within-subject 
factors Endpoint of the video (10% anger vs. neutral vs. 10% joy) and Perceptual 
history (Joy-to-‘neutral’ videos vs. Anger-to-‘neutral’ videos), and as the between-
subjects factor Group (AS vs. TD). The main effect of the Endpoint factor was 
significant (F( 2, 64) = 43.9, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .58), reflecting that when the videos 
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ended at 10% joy the expressions in the last frame were judged as more happy then 
when they ended at 10% anger. The main effect of the factor Perceptual history was 
highly significant (F(1, 32)  = 223.8, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .88). In the Joy-to-neutral 
condition, the last expressions were judged as more angry than in the Anger-to-
neutral condition. There was no significant main effect of Group (F(1, 32)  = 2.1, p = 
.15, ηp
2 = .063). The Endpoint by Group interaction was not significant (F(2, 64) = 
.94, p = .40, ηp
2 = .029), while the Perceptual history by Group interaction was nearly 
significant (F(1, 32) = 3.3, p = .078, ηp
2 = .095). An independent samples t-test 
revealed that AS individuals rated the last neutral frame of the angry-to-neutral 
videos as less positive comparing to TD individuals (t(32) = .81, p = .042). The 
Endpoint by Perceptual history interaction was significant (F(2, 64) = 4.1, p = .021, 
ηp
2 = .11), reflecting that across both groups the difference between the judgments 
in the two perceptual histories at the 10% Joy endpoint was larger than at both the 
neutral endpoint (t(33) = - 2.7, p = .030) and the 10% anger endpoint (t(33) = - 2.6, p 
= .013). Interestingly, the 10% joy endpoint in the joy-video was rated significantly 
more angry than the 10% anger endpoint in the anger-video (t(33) = 4.3, p < .001), 
thus overcoming a 20% difference in intensity. Importantly, the 3-way Endpoint by 
Perceptual history by Group interaction was non-significant (F(2, 64)  = .063, p = .94, 
ηp
2 = .002).  
The main conclusion is that the TD and AS groups did not differ in the extent in 
which their evaluations were influenced by the perceptual histories, at each of the 
endpoints. This was a surprising finding as the hypothesis was that the AS group 
would show significantly less overshoot bias than the TD group! 
 
We looked in more detail at the judgments made at the neutral video-endpoints 
in both groups separately. In the AS group, the mean ratings in the Joy-to-neutral 
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videos (M = 2.73, SD = 0.22) and Anger-to-neutral videos (M = 3.21, SD = 0.28 ) 
differed significantly from each other (t(15) = -6.94, p <.0001), and each of them 
differed significantly from 3.00 (joy-video: t(15) = -5.09, p < .0001; anger-video: t(15) 
= 2.97, p = .010; two-tailed). The TD group showed a very similar pattern, the mean 
ratings in the Joy-to-neutral videos (M = 2.71, SD = 0.27) and Anger-to-neutral 
videos (M = 3.36, SD = 0.31) differed significantly from each other (t(17) = -7.04, p 
<.0001), and each of them differed significantly from 3.00 (joy-video: t(17) = -4.56, p 
< .001; anger-video: t(17) = 5.01, p < .0001).  
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Figure 3.3. Results of Experiment 7. (A) Ratings on the 5-point scale (vertical axis) 
for the expressions depicted in the last frame of the Joy-to-‘neutral’ and Anger-to-
‘neutral’ videos for individuals with AS (left side) and for TD individuals (right side). 
The sequences ended at 10% anger, neutral or 10% joy (horizontal axis). Error bars 
indicate 1SD. (B) Ratings for exclusively the neutral expressions at the end of the 
happy- and angry-videos for individuals with AS (left side) and TD individuals (right 
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side). Scores are shown for each of the eight actors (horizontal axis) to illustrate the 
consistency. 
 
 
3.2 3 Discussion 
 
In Experiment 7, both AS and TD participants showed a robust overshoot response 
bias with the last neutral expression of the Joy-to-neutral videos evaluated as 
slightly angry and the identical last neutral expression of the Anger-to-neutral videos 
as slightly happy. Contrary to the initial prediction, the extent of overshoot bias in AS 
individuals did not differ from that in TD individuals. Further, in both groups the 
perceptual distortion was strong enough to overcome a 20% difference in emotional 
intensity, as the 10% joy endpoint in the Joy-video was rated significantly more 
angry than the 10% anger endpoint in the Anger-video.  
 If the AS group had shown no overshoot bias, then that would have 
suggested that they do not engage in an ‘emotional anticipation’ process. However, 
now that it is clear that they do show an overshoot bias, no firm conclusion can yet 
be drawn. It could be that they do engage in involuntary emotional anticipation, or 
that they do not, but use a compensatory mechanism resulting in the same 
overshoot bias as the TD group obtained through emotional anticipation. The results 
seem to be in line with a recent study by Uono, Sato, & Toichi (2010) who reported 
that a group of individuals with developmental pervasive disorders overestimated 
the intensity of the expression in neutral-to-emotion video-clips in the same way as 
individuals with TD.  
Experiments 8, 9 and 10 were conducted to clarify this point. Specifically, one 
possibility these experiments looked into was that individuals with AS may have 
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processed the dynamic facial expressions only in terms of physical, non-social, 
characteristics, without keeping track of the changes in the agent’s emotional state 
of mind as reflected by the changes in the facial expression. For example, they may 
have relied on the contrast between the first maximally intense expression (happy or 
angry) and the last neutral frame of the video-clip (see Suzuki & Cavanagh, 1998; 
Tanaka-Matsumi et al., 1995; Thayer, 1980). However, other mechanisms, such as 
extrapolation of curves or RM (Yoshikawa & Sato, 2008) might also be able to 
explain an overshoot bias in individuals with AS.  
 
 
3.3 Experiment 8: Identity change 
 
Experiment 8 was conducted to test whether compensatory mechanisms based on 
contrast effects, or on RM effects operating on an underlying positive-negative 
valence dimension, may explain the overshoot effect found in Experiment 7 in 
individuals with AS.  
In Experiment 8 we changed the identity of the actor in the last frame of the 
clips, similar to the manipulation performed in Experiment 2 (Chapter 2). Thus, 
participants needed to judge the last expression of the videos depicting a new 
identity for which no immediate perceptual history was available. If the overshoot 
bias in AS individuals resulted from sequential contrast effects or from RM operating 
on an underlying positive-negative valence dimension, rather than from emotional 
anticipation, then a change in identity should not affect it.  On the other hand, if the 
bias in the AS group did result from emotional anticipation, then they should not 
show an overshoot response bias, similarly to the TD group in Experiment 2 
(Chapter 2). After all, one cannot anticipate the emotional state of someone on the 
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basis of a perceptual history that pertains to a different identity. Finally, in the 
condition where the agent’s identity did not change (Same-identity condition) we 
expected to replicate the results found in Experiment 7.  
 
 
3.3.1 Method  
 
3.3.1.1 Participants  
As in Experiment 7, all AS and TD participants had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision, and provided written consent prior to the experiment. Participants received 
course credits or a fee for taking part. The study was approved by the Ethics 
committee of Hull University. 
 
AS group 
Twenty individuals with AS took part in Experiment 8. On the basis of the 
experimental criteria, three participants were excluded from the analysis (see Data 
reduction below). The remaining group of 17 AS participants had a mean age of 
22.1 years (SD = 7.2 years), consisted of 5 females and 12 males; they had a mean 
total ADOS score of 8.1 (SD = 0.9), a mean AQ score of 29.0 (SD = 8.2), and a 
mean total IQ score of 115.9 (SD = 8.1).  
TD group 
The control group consisted of twenty-one undergraduate Psychology students at 
Hull University. No one of these participants took part in any of the other 
experiments. The TD group was recruited to match the AS group for age and 
gender. After applying exclusion criteria (see Data reduction below), seventeen 
participants were included in the experiment (age, M = 22.1 years, SD = 5.5 years; 6 
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females, 11 males; with an AQ score of 15.5 (SD = 6.6) and a mean total IQ score 
of 114.5 (SD = 7.7); see Table 3.3.  
The AS (n = 17) and TD (n=17) groups did not differ in terms of age (t(32) = - 
.675, p = .10), gender ratio (X2(1, 34) = .134, p = .714) or IQ (t(32) = -.54, p = .591). 
The AQ scores were significantly higher in the AS group than in the TD group (t(32) 
= -5.28, p < .0001).  
 
Table 3.3. AS and TD groups in Expriment 8: participant characteristics. Age is in 
years.  Standard deviations are shown between brackets.  F, female; M, male; AQ, 
Autism-spectrum Quotient; IQ-T, total IQ score; IQ-V, verbal IQ score; IQ-P, 
Performance IQ score; ADOS, autism diagnostic observation schedule. 
 
 
 
3.3.1.2 Stimuli and experimental procedure 
The stimuli and experimental procedure were similar to those used in Experiment 2 
(Chapter 2). The control condition (Same-identity) involved the same videos ending 
with a neutral point as used in Experiment 7. In the Identity-change condition, the 
identity of the actor changed in the last frame of the sequence, similarly to the 
‘Instant identity change’ condition of Experiment 2. The change in identity was 
instantaneous, i.e. without inserting morphs in between the two identities to make 
the transition smooth. An illustration of the stimuli is given in Figure 3.4. 
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Figure 3.4. Schematic illustration of the stimulus presentations in Experiment 8. 
Shown are the Same-identity condition (top), and the Identity-change condition 
(bottom), for Joy-to-neutral (left side) and Anger-to-neutral (right side) perceptual 
histories. 
 
3.3.1.3 Experimental design  
All Participants first rated the neutral expression of each actor presented in isolation 
as in Experiment 7 (16 trials). Then, following 8 practice trials, 64 experimental trials 
for each condition were presented in random order (8 actors x 2 perceptual histories 
x 2 conditions x 4 repetitions). However, in this particular experiment, the AS 
participants did not perform the control condition (Same-identity), as they had 
performed this condition in either Experiment 7 or Experiment 9. 
 
3.3.1.4 Data reduction and analysis  
Exclusion criteria were the same as for Experiment 7. In the AS group, trials in 
which the RTs fell below 250 ms or above 3000 ms were removed (2.3% of total 
number of trials). Participants were excluded if more than 25% of the RTs values 
were outside the above range (n = 0) and if they exceeded the +2.5 SD rule to the 
mean difference ratings (n = 2). Two participants were removed as they pressed the 
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key corresponding to ‘neutral’ on the scale (3 = neutral) on more than 90% of total 
number of trials per condition. 
In the TD group the RTs criteria excluded 5.7% of the total trials. One 
participant was removed as more than 25% of the RTs values were outside the 
stated range. The +2.5 SD rule to the mean difference ratings excluded other 2 
participants. All TD participants used the key button appropriately to express 
judgments. 
In both the groups the calibration scores were used to adjust the scores in the 
experimental trials; a calibration factor [3.00 minus the calibration score] was added 
to the experimental scores. All statistical analyses were performed on the calibrated 
scores.  
 
 
3.3.2  Results  
 
We initially performed an overall 2x2x2 ANOVA with Task (Same-identity vs. 
Identity-change) and Perceptual history (Joy-to-neutral video vs. Anger-to-neutral 
video) as within-subject factors, and Group (AS vs. TD) as between-subjects factor.  
The main effect of Task was non-significant (F(1, 32)  = 1.02, p = .32, ηp
2 = 
.031). The main effect of Perceptual history was highly significant (F(1, 32)  = 65.9, p 
< .0001, ηp
2 = .67), reflecting that the last frame of the videos was judged as more 
‘happy’ in the Anger-to-neutral condition than in the Joy-to-neutral condition. The 
main effect of Group was also significant (F(1, 32) = 1.05, p = .010, ηp
2 = .19), with 
the AS group scoring lower (i.e. more ‘anger’ judgments) than the TD group.  
The Task by Perceptual history interaction factor was significant (F(1, 32)  = 
28.9, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .48), while the other 2 way interaction factors were non 
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significant (Task by Group: F(1, 32)  = 3.8, p = .060, ηp
2 = .106; Perceptual history by 
Group: F(1, 32)  = 1.44, p = .24, ηp
2 = .04. The 3-way interaction factor was 
significant (F(1, 32)  = 5.4, p = .027, ηp
2 = .14). 
Next, the two tasks were analyzed separately. The results are illustrated in 
Figure 3.5. 
 
Same-identity task 
A 2X2 mixed ANOVA with Perceptual history (Joy-to-neutral video vs. Anger-to-
neutral video) as the within-subject factor, and Group (AS vs. TD) as between-
subjects factor showed a significant main effect of Perceptual history (F(1, 32)  = 
70.4, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .68), reflecting that the last frame of the videos was judged as 
more ‘happy’ in the Anger-to-neutral condition than in the Joy-to-neutral condition. A 
main effect of Group was not significant (F(1, 32) = 3.23, p = .082, ηp
2 = .092). The 
Perceptual history by Group interaction was not significant (F(1, 32) = .25, p = .62, 
ηp
2 = .008). Thus, on the Same-identity task the TD and AS groups showed an 
almost identical performance, both showing a robust overshoot response bias.  
 
Identity-change task  
The 2X2 mixed ANOVA showed significant main effects of both Perceptual history 
(F(1, 32)  = 11.17, p = .002, ηp
2 = .259) and Group  F(1, 32) = 10.02, p = .003, ηp
2 = 
.239). Crucially, the Perceptual history by Group interaction was significant (F(1, 32) 
= 8.70, p = .006, ηp
2 = .214).  
In the TD group, the ratings for the neutral expressions did not differ between 
the two perceptual histories (t(16) = -.437, p = .668). Thus, in TD participants a 
change of identity of the actor effectively removed the overshoot bias. In the AS 
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group, however, the ratings in the Anger-to-neutral videos were significantly higher 
(i.e. more ‘happy’) than in the Joy-to-neutral videos (t(16) = 3.52, p = .003). 
Thus, while in the Same-identity condition the two groups performed almost 
identically, in the Identity-change condition the groups performed significantly 
different, with the AS group, but not the TD group, showing an overshoot response 
bias.  
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Figure 3.5. Results of Experiment 8. (A) Scores for the neutral expressions at the 
end of the Joy-to-neutral and Anger-to-neutral sequences in the same-identity (left 
side) and identity-change (right side) conditions with AS and TD individuals 
(horizontal axis). Error bars indicate SEM (standard error of the mean). (B) Ratings 
for each of the eight actors in the same-identity (left side) and identity-change (right 
side) conditions are shown to illustrate the consistency across actors with AS (left 
panel) and TD (right panel) individuals. 
 
Could poor identity recognition skills in the AS group explain the presence of an 
overshoot bias in this group in the Identity-change condition? 
In principle it might be possible that the overshoot bias found in the Identity-
change condition in AS individuals could result from impaired identity recognition 
skills (cf. Behrmann, Thomas, & Humphreys, 2006). If the AS participants had not 
detected the identity change in some of the trials, then they would have treated 
these trials as if they were Same-identity trials. In the Same-identity condition they 
produce a robust overshoot bias, similarly to the TD group (Figure 3.5, left panel). 
We reasoned that if the overshoot bias in the Identity-change condition was due to a 
difficulty of AS participants in recognizing the difference between the two identities, 
then more overshoot was expected in trials where the two identities were both 
females or both males, as compared to trials in which there was a gender shift 
(M>F, F>M). Recent research on the gender recognition issue in autism shed some 
light on whether these individuals are impaired in discriminating faces of different 
gender. For instance, using a gender recognition task, Best, Minshew, & Strauss 
(2010) found that adults with HF autism can detect gender from the eyes, although 
with less success as compared to TD adults. 
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Moreover, it has been reported that individuals with autism perform worse at 
discriminating gender from the whole face only when faces lack typical gender 
information (Newell, Best, Gastgeb, Rump, & Strauss, 2011). 
Therefore, the idea in the current experiment was that a change in gender would 
have alerted the participant to the change in identity. Furthermore, in terms of 
shapes and physical features, a male and a female face would look more dissimilar 
than two male, or two female, faces.   
 
When there was no switch in gender between the two identities (M>M, F>F), 
the mean score of the AS group in the Joy-to-neutral videos was 2.77 (SD = 0.25), 
and the mean score in the Anger-to-neutral videos 3.01 (SD = 0.20), which did differ 
significantly from each other (t(16) = -3.85, p = .003). When there was a switch in 
gender between the two identities (M>F, F>M), the mean score in the Joy-to-neutral 
videos was 2.88 (SD = 0.32), and the mean score in the Anger-to-neutral videos 
was 3.05 (SD = 0.29), which again differed significantly from each other (t(16) = -
3.33, p = .004) (see Figure 3.6). 
Comparing the mean difference scores [i.e. the mean score in Anger-to-neutral 
videos minus the mean score in Joy-to-neutral videos] in the trials with and without a 
gender switch showed that these did not differ from each other (t(16) = 1.23, p = 
.237). 
This may suggest that poor identity recognition skills did not play a role in 
bringing about the overshoot bias in the Identity-change condition in AS participants.   
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Figure 3.6. Results of the gender switch effect in Experiment 8. Scores for the 
neutral expressions at the end of the Joy-to-neutral and Anger-to-neutral sequences 
are shown in the identity-change condition with same gender-change and different 
gender-change (horizontal axis) in AS individuals. 
 
 
3.3.3 Discussion 
 
When the video-clips depicted the same identity throughout, both AS and TD 
individuals produced a robust overshoot response bias, confirming the results of 
Experiment 7. Interestingly, following the Identity-change manipulation, the 
overshoot bias was still present in the AS group, but was completely absent in the 
TD group. We further demonstrated that the overshoot response bias found in AS 
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participants in the Identity-change condition cannot be explained by a difficulty in 
recognizing different identities.  
On themselves, the results of the Same-identity condition might suggest that 
AS individuals show emotional anticipation, similarly to TD individuals. However, the 
results of the Identity-change condition show that this is probably not the case. The 
AS group continued to produce an overshoot bias in the Identity-change condition, 
whereas the TD group did not. Emotional anticipation would not produce an 
overshoot bias in response to agent B about whom the participant knows nothing, 
other than that agent B depicts a neutral expression. The perceptual history 
pertained exclusively to agent A, but no questions are asked about agent A, the 
evaluation has to be made about agent’s B expression. These findings open up the 
possibility that the AS group used an alternative strategy to produce the bias in the 
Same-identity condition, and simply applied the same alternative strategy in the 
Identity-change condition, hence their bias in the latter condition.  
 
What might the alternative strategy used by the AS participants be? 
One possibility is that the AS group might have relied on the contrast in facial 
expression and emotional valence between the 100% emotional expression shown 
at the start of the clip (for 300 ms) and the neutral expression shown at the end of 
the clip (also presented for 300 ms). Another strategy might involve an extrapolation 
of the dynamic geometries in the face, or an extrapolation on an underlying positive-
negative valence dimension. These two strategies involve representational 
momentum (RM; Freyd, 1987; Freyd & Finke, 1984). The underlying positive-
negative valence dimension, and to a large extent also the extrapolation of the 
dynamic geometries from the face, remained unaffected by the identity change.  
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The absence of an overshoot bias in TD individuals in the Identity-change 
condition confirmed the findings reported in Experiment 2 (Chapter 2). It suggests 
that the large overshoot in the Same-identity condition was not produced by 
sequential contrast effects or RM. Because, if TD participants relied on these low-
level bottom-up processes, then there is no reason why they should not also be 
affected by it in the Identity-change condition. This finding favours a top-down 
emotional anticipation explanation.  
 
 
3.4 Experiment 9: Mask 
 
Experiment 9 aimed to test whether the overshoot response bias found in AS 
individuals, was related to the uninterrupted flow of motion that extended up to the 
last, neutral expression. Such a flow of motion might have facilitated an 
extrapolation of facial geometries (cf. Enns et al., 2010). In the face-sequences 
presented, many geometrical features changed in a continuous and smooth manner. 
For example, the U-shaped mouth in the smile gradually transformed into a flat-
shaped mouth in the neutral expression, which might be extrapolated into a slightly 
inverted U shape, giving the appearance of a slightly angry expression. In 
Experiment 9 the continuous flow in the video-sequence was disrupted by inserting 
a 400 ms mask immediately before this last neutral frame (Mask condition). If such a 
perceptual mechanism played a crucial role in bringing about the bias in AS 
individuals, then one would expect not to find an overshoot bias in the Mask 
condition in this group. For the TD group, the interruption should not affect the 
anticipation of the emotional state of the actor, which is based on the content 
present in the immediate perceptual history. The mask would then only act as a 
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temporary occluder. Therefore the emotional anticipation hypothesis predicts to find 
an overshoot bias.  
 
 
3.4.1 Method  
 
3.4.1.1 Participants 
As in Experiments 7 and 8, all AS and TD participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, and provided written consent prior to the experiment. Participants 
received course credits or a fee for taking part. The study was approved by the 
Ethics committee of Hull University. 
 
AS group 
Fifteen AS individuals were tested for Experiment 9. All these AS participants did 
both the Mask and No-Mask conditions (see below). On the basis of the 
experimental criteria (see Data reduction below) one participant was excluded from 
the analysis. The fourteen participants included (4 females, 10 males; mean age = 
22.2 years, SD = 4.7) had a mean total ADOS score of 8.0 (SD = 0.9), a mean IQ 
score of 118.3 (SD = 6.9), and a mean AQ score of 30.8 (SD = 7.4). 
 
TD group 
Sixteen undergraduate Psychology students at Hull University took part. None of 
these participants took part in any of the other experiments. The TD group was 
matched to the AS group for age, gender and IQ. After applying exclusion criteria, 
fourteen participants were included in the analysis (age, M = 20.3 years, SD = 3.1; 5 
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females, 9 males; with an AQ score of 15.5 (SD = 4.9) and a mean total IQ score of 
113.7 (SD = 7.6); see Table 3.4.  
The TD and AS groups did not differ in terms of age (t(26) = -1.23, p = .272), 
gender ratio (X2(1, 28) = .164, p = .686) nor IQ (t(26) = -1.67, p = .106). The AQ 
scores were significantly higher in the AS group than in the TD group (t(26) = -6.43, 
p < .0001). 
 
 
Table 3.4. AS and TD groups in Expriment 9: participant characteristics. Age is in 
years.  Standard deviations are shown between brackets.  F, female; M, male; AQ, 
Autism-spectrum Quotient; IQ-T, total IQ score; IQ-V, verbal IQ score; IQ-P, 
Performance IQ score; ADOS, autism diagnostic observation schedule. 
 
 
 
3.4.1.2 Stimuli and experimental procedure 
The stimuli and experimental procedure were the same as in Experiment 5 (Chapter 
2). In short, Joy-to-neutral and Anger-to-neutral video-clips were presented. The last 
neutral frame was immediately preceded by a 400 ms long mask, consisting of an 
oval grid in grey scale. The total duration of the sequence, mask included, was 1270 
ms. The control condition was identical to the mask condition except that no mask 
was inserted. An illustration of the video-sequences is given in Figure 3.7. 
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Figure 3.7. Schematic illustration of the stimuli presentations in Experiment 9. Joy-
to-neutral videos (top panel) and Anger-to-neutral videos (bottom panel) in the No-
Mask (Control) and Mask conditions are shown.   
 
3.4.1.3 Experimental design  
Participants first rated the neutral expression of each actor presented in isolation (16 
trials) as in the previous experiments. A 2x2x2 factorial design was used with 
Condition (No mask vs. Mask) and Perceptual history (Joy-to-neutral vs. Anger-to-
neutral) and Group (AS vs. TD) as factors. The experimental block consisted of 32 
trials for both the No-Mask and Mask conditions (8 actors x 2 perceptual histories x 
2 repetitions).  
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3.4.1.4 Data reduction and analysis 
Exclusion criteria were the same as for Experiments 7 and 8. In the AS group, trials 
in which the RTs fell below 250 ms or above 3000 ms were removed (4.5% of total 
number of trials). Participants were excluded if more than 25% of the RTs values 
were outside this range (n = 0). A +2.5 SD rule to the mean difference ratings 
excluded 1 participant.  
In the TD group, 8.9% of the total number of trials fell below 250 ms or above 
3000 ms, and was removed. Participants were excluded if more than 25% of the 
RTs values were outside the above criteria (n = 0). The +2.5 SD rule to the mean 
difference ratings excluded 2 participants. No anomalies were recorded in the way 
both AS and TD participants selected the keys to express their judgments. 
In both groups the calibration scores were used to adjust the scores in the 
experimental trials; a calibration factor [3.00 minus the calibration score] was added 
to the experimental scores. All statistical analyses were performed on the calibrated 
scores. 
 
 
3.4.2 Results  
 
The results are illustrated in Figure 3.8. A 2X2x2 mixed ANOVA with Task (No-Mask 
vs. Mask) and Perceptual history (Joy-to-neutral video vs. Anger-to-neutral video) as 
the within-subject factors, and Group (TD vs. AS) as between-subjects factor, 
revealed no significant main effect of Task (F(1, 26) = .257, p = .62, ηp
2= .010). The 
main effect of Perceptual history was highly significant (F(1, 26) = 151.2, p < .0001, 
ηp
2= .85); the main effect of the between-subjects factor Group was not significant 
(F(1, 26)  = .78, p = .39, ηp
2 = .029). Of the two-way interaction factors, the 
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Perceptual history by Group interaction was significant (F(1, 26)  = 10.9, p = .003, ηp
2 
= .29). This indicated that, across both tasks, the overshoot response bias (i.e. 
score in the Joy-to-neutral condition minus score in the Anger-to-neutral condition) 
was larger in the TD group than in the AS group (t(26) = 3.30, p = .003). The other 
two-way interaction factors were non-significant (Task by Group: (F(1, 26)  = 1.1, p = 
.30, ηp
2 = .041; Task by Perceptual history: F(1, 26)  = .031, p = .86, ηp
2 = .001). The 
3-way Task by Perceptual history by Group interaction was also non-significant (F(1, 
26)  = 1.7, p = .20, ηp
2 = .063). Thus, The AS and TD groups performed very similarly 
in this experiment.  
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Figure 3.8. Results of Experiment 9. (A) Scores for the neutral expressions at the 
end of the Joy-to-neutral and Anger-to-neutral sequences in the no-mask (left side) 
and mask (right side) conditions with AS and TD individuals (horizontal axis). Error 
bars indicate SEM (standard error of the mean). (B) Ratings for each of the eight 
actors in the no-mask (left side) and mask (right side) conditions are shown to 
illustrate the consistency across actors with AS (top panel) and TD (bottom panel) 
individuals. 
 
 
3.4.3 Discussion 
 
Experiment 9 showed that the overshoot bias did survive the insertion of the mask in 
both groups. As the mask manipulation should have reset low-level mechanisms 
that rely on the flow of motion (cf. Enns et al., 2010), we conclude that an 
extrapolation of curves present in the face cannot explain the overshoot bias in both 
participant groups. The results of Experiment 9 for the TD participants replicate 
previous findings (Experiment 5, Chapter 2) and are congruent with the emotional 
anticipation hypothesis.  
In the control condition (No Mask) of the current experiment, the response bias 
appeared less robust in the AS group compared to the TD group. This contrasts 
somewhat with the findings in Experiments 7 and 8, in which the magnitude of the 
overshoot response bias in the TD and AS groups was quite similar. However, the 
performance of the AS group was quite consistent across these experiments. The 
group of AS individuals that did the control condition in Experiment 7 (n=16) and the 
group of AS individuals that did the control condition in Experiment 8 (n=14) largely 
overlapped. Of the 14 AS participants in Experiment 9, four participants were new 
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and had not been tested in Experiment 7 (there was a 10 month time interval 
between the conduction of Experiments 7 and 9). The overshoot biases of these two 
AS groups did not differ from each other (t(28) = 1.4, p = .16, independent sample t 
test, two-tailed). The TD control groups used in Experiments 7, 8 and 9 did, 
however, not overlap at all (none of the TD participants was tested in more than one 
experiment). Therefore, the slight discrepancy between Experiments 7, 8 and 9 was 
due to variability in the TD control groups. 
Experiment 10 was conducted to specifically clarify the role played by contrast 
effects in bringing about the overshoot bias in the AS group. 
 
 
3.5 Experiment 10: Loop 
 
In Experiment 10 the video-sequence was modified so that it started from a neutral 
expression and morphed via a maximally happy or angry expression back to the 
same neutral expression (Loop condition). The rational was that if the response bias 
found in the previous experiments in AS individuals was due to the contrast between 
the - to be evaluated - last neutral expression and the ‘anchor’ stimulus (the first 
happy or angry expression presented for 300 ms), then in the loop condition one 
would expect this last neutral expression to be judged as neutral and not obtain an 
overshoot bias, even though the second half of the sequence – Joy/Anger-to-neutral 
- is identical to the sequence in the previous experiments. 
Our predictions for TD individuals were based on the results found in 
Experiment 3 (Chapter 2), where TD participants showed an ‘undershoot’, effect (i.e. 
a bias which was opposite in direction to the usual overshoot).  
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3.5.1 Method  
 
3.5.1.1 Participants 
As in the previous experiments, all AS and TD participants had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision, and provided written consent prior to the experiment. Participants 
received course credits or a fee for taking part. The study was approved by the 
Ethics committee of Hull University. 
 
AS group 
Eighteen AS individuals out of the group recruited for the previous experiments 
made Experiment 10. As for Experiment 2 (Chapter 3), considering various 
difficulties related to the recruitment, these participants made only the experimental 
condition (Loop) of Experiment 10. On the basis of the experimental criteria (see 
Data reduction below) three students were excluded from the analysis. Fifteen AS 
individuals were included (5 females, 10 males; mean age = 22.3 years, SD = 7.1). 
They had a mean total ADOS score of 8.2 (SD = 1.6), a mean IQ score of 118.9 (SD 
= 8.9), and a mean AQ score of 33.7 (SD = 5.7). 
 
TD group 
Twenty-two undergraduate Psychology students at Hull University took part in the 
experiment. No one of these participants took part in any of other experiments. The 
TD group matched the AS group for age, gender and IQ (see Table 3.5 for sub-
scores). After applying exclusion criteria (see Data reduction below), nineteen 
participants were included in the analysis (age, M = 20.6 years, SD = 2.52; 6 
females, 13 males; with an AQ score of 14.7 (SD = 6.1) and a mean total IQ score 
of 115.1 (SD = 8.1).  
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The TD and AS groups did not differ in terms of age (t(32) = -1.00, p = .323), 
gender ratio (X2(1, 34) = .012, p = .914) or IQ (t(32) = -1.49, p = .147). The AQ 
scores were significantly higher in the AS group than in the TD group (t(32) =-9.29, 
p < .0001). 
 
Table 3.5. AS and TD groups in Expriment 10: participant characteristics. Age is in 
years.  Standard deviations are shown between brackets.  F, female; M, male; AQ, 
Autism-spectrum Quotient; IQ-T, total IQ score; IQ-V, verbal IQ score; IQ-P, 
Performance IQ score; ADOS, autism diagnostic observation schedule. 
 
 
 
3.5.1.2 Stimuli and experimental procedure 
Stimuli and procedure were identical to those in Experiment 3 (Chapter 2). Video-
clips displayed a neutral expression, which morphed via a maximally happy (or 
angry) expression back to the same neutral expression (Neutral-to-joy-to-neutral 
and Neutral-to-anger-to-neutral sequences). The morphing sequence consisted of 
19 interpolated frames, each 30 ms long. The first and the last frames both lasted 
300 ms, making the entire sequence last for 1170 ms. The control condition 
consisted of Joy-to-neutral and Anger-to-neutral video sequences (see Figure 3.9).  
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Figure 3.9. Schematic illustration of the stimulus presentations in Experiment 10. 
(Top panel) Joy-to-neutral sequence in the control condition (top row) and Neutral-
to-joy-to-neutral sequence in the loop condition (bottom row). (Bottom panel) Similar 
sequences but for Anger-to-neutral (top row) and Neutral-to-anger-to-neutral 
(bottom row). 
 
3.5.1.3 Experimental design 
Participants first rated the neutral expression of each actor presented in isolation (16 
trials) as in the previous experiments. The experimental design was as in 
Experiment 7, except that Experiment 10 consisted of 96 randomized trials: 8 actors 
x 2 perceptual histories x 2 conditions x 3 repetitions.  Scores for the AS individuals 
in the control condition (No Loop) were obtained from either Experiment 7 or 
Experiment 9.  
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3.5.1.4 Data reduction and analysis 
Exclusion criteria were the same as for previous experiments. In the AS group, in 
9.2% of the total number of trials the RTs fell below 250 ms or above 3000 ms and 
were removed. Participants were excluded if more than 25% of the RTs values were 
outside this range (n = 0). The +2.5 SD rule to the mean difference ratings excluded 
two participants. One more participant was removed because the judgments on the 
scale were made pressing the same key for more than 90% of total number of trials. 
In the TD group, 7.6% of the total number of trials was removed for having RTs 
outside the above range. Participants were excluded if more than 25% of the RTs 
values were outside the RTs criteria (n = 2). A +2.5 SD rule to the mean difference 
ratings excluded one more participant. No anomalies were recorded in the way as 
TD participants used the key box for their judgments.  
In both the groups the calibration scores were used to adjust the scores in the 
experimental trials; a calibration factor [3.00 minus the calibration score] was added 
to the experimental scores. All statistical analyses were performed on the calibrated 
scores. 
 
 
3.5.2 Results  
 
First a 2X2x2 mixed ANOVA was performed with Task (No-Loop vs. Loop) and 
Perceptual history (Joy-to-neutral video vs. Anger-to-neutral video) as within-subject 
factors, and Group (TD vs. AS) as between-subjects factor. The main effect of Task 
was non-significant (F(1, 32) = .038, p = .85, ηp
2= .001). The main effect of 
Perceptual history was also non-significant (F(1, 32) = .042, p = .84, ηp
2= .001). This 
was quite surprising as so far the main effect of Perceptual history had always been 
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highly significant. It reflected that in the Loop task, the pattern of scores was 
effectively the opposite of that in the No-Loop task. The main effect of the between-
subjects factor Group was not significant (F(1, 32)  = 1as.4, p = .24, ηp
2 = .042).  
Of the two-way interaction factors, the Task by Perceptual history factor was 
significant (F(1, 32)  = 35.1, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .52), reflecting the reversal of the pattern 
between the two tasks, independent of the groups. The other two-way interaction 
factors were non-significant (Task by Group: (F(1, 32)  = .932, p = .34, ηp
2 = .028; 
Perceptual history by Group: F(1, 32)  = 2.08, p = .16, ηp
2 = .061). 
The 3-way interaction of Task by Perceptual history by Group interaction was 
also non-significant (F(1, 32)  = 1.23, p = .28, ηp
2 = .037). The results are illustrated 
in Figure 3.10. 
  
Thus, the AS and TD groups both showed a robust overshoot response bias in 
the No-Loop task and a respose bias opposite in direction to the overhoot 
(undershoot) in the Loop task.  
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Figure 3.10. Results of Experiment 10. (A) Scores for the neutral expressions at the 
end of the Joy-to-neutral and Anger-to-neutral sequences in the no-loop (left side) 
and loop (right side) conditions with AS and TD individuals (horizontal axis). Error 
bars indicate SEM (standard error of the mean). (B) Ratings for each of the eight 
actors in the no-loop (left side) and loop (right side) conditions are shown to illustrate 
the consistency across actors with AS (left panel) and TD (right panel) individuals. 
 
 
3.5.3 Discussion 
 
In Experiment 10 the Loop condition was introduced, which was characterized by 
the absence of a contrast between the initial frame (300 ms duration) and last frame 
(300 ms duration) of the video-sequences (both showing identical neutral 
expressions). First, in the No-Loop task, which constituted a control condition, both 
groups showed a nearly identical overshoot response bias. This confirmed the 
findings in Experiments 7, 8 and 9, that AS participants do produce an overshoot 
bias, which is comparable in size to that of TD participants.  
In the Loop task, the overshoot bias had reversed into an ‘undershoot’ bias in 
both TD and AS groups. However, a closer look at the mean ratings in the AS group 
for the Neutral-to-joy-to-neutral condition: 3.05 (SD = 0.35), and for the Neutral-to-
anger-to-neutral condition: 2.81 (SD = 0.31), revealed that this ‘undersoot’ bias was 
very subtle (t(14) = 2.03, p =.062). On the other hand, in the TD group we did find a 
strong ‘undershoot’ effect (t(18) = 2.97, p = .008, α = .025). Therefore, in the AS 
group there was just a tendency towards an undershoot bias.  
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The current experiment was designed to shed light on the merits of two distinct 
low-level visual explanations for the overshoot response bias, namely (i) 
extrapolation or RM, and (ii) sequential contrast effects. 
(i)_Extrapolation (or RM) would predict to find an overshoot response bias in 
the Loop condition, i.e. a continuation or extrapolation of the second half of the 
sequence, which went from maximal joy or anger to a neutral expression. We did 
not obtain such an overshoot bias, but, in contrast, obtained an ‘undershoot’. This 
strongly suggests that extrapolation (or RM) was not the mechanism underpinning 
the overshoot bias in the No-Loop condition. 
(ii)_The sequential contrast hypothesis predicted that the last frame would be 
judged as neutral, as there was no contrast between the first and last frames of the 
video-sequence (both being neutral). This did not happen as there was a clear trend 
for the last frame to be judged as ‘slightly happy’ at the end of the Neutral-to-joy-to-
neutral sequence and as slightly angry at the end of the Neutral-to-anger-to-neutral 
sequence. This was found in both groups, although, as shown above, to a lesser 
extent in the AS group. This result opens up the possibility that the overshoot effect 
as found in the No loop task with AS individuals may be explained by sequential 
contrast while it rules out a mayor contribution of contrast effects to the overshoot 
bias in TD individuals.  
 
How should we interpret the ‘undershoot’ response bias? One possibility is that 
the video-sequences produced an either positive or negative ‘social signal’. The 
neutral-joy-neutral sequence might produce a positive social signal directed towards 
the observer, causing the observer to judge this person ‘positively’ in return. 
Similarly, the neutral-anger-neutral sequence would produce a negative social signal 
towards the observer, causing the observer to judge this person ‘negatively’. In this 
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scenario, the observer simply receives knowledge that the agent either likes or 
dislikes him/her, and, as we tend to like people who like us and dislike those who 
dislike us (Jones et al., 2006), the favor is returned. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that the observer shows to be able of ‘emotional anticipation’. The 
social signal per se is enough to influence the evaluations of the agent’s neutral 
face. 
Thus both groups processed these social signals and were influenced by them, 
although the TD individuals were influenced to a larger extent than the AS 
individuals.  
Alternatively, the AS group could have used an altogether different mechanism 
to produce the undershoot response bias. Possibly, individuals with AS were more 
sensitive to the pattern present in the video and expected this pattern to repeat 
itself. However, the lack of a strong ‘undershoot’ effect favours the sequential 
contrast hypothesis.  
 
 
3.6 General discussion  
 
Four different low-level visual mechanisms can be identified, each of which could 
explain the overshoot bias: (1) Contrast effects, (2) RM on a positive-negative 
valence dimension, (3) RM on facial features and (4) adaptation. Three experimental 
manipulations were applied to test the merits of these mechanisms: Identity change 
(IC, Experiment 8), insertion of Mask (Experiment 9), and the Loop sequence 
(Experiment 10). In addition, the merits of the emotional anticipation hypothesis 
were examined. During social interactions we do not perceive faces with fixed 
expressions, rather we are presented with innumerable different shades of 
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expressions that change over time. The ability to attribute the emotional states of 
mind underpinning those expressions to the agent expressing them, and to 
involuntary anticipate how these most likely would change in the immediate future, 
allows us to engage successfully in social interactions.  
In Chapter 2 it was suggested that the dynamic perceptual history of a target 
neutral face gives rise to an involuntary anticipation of how the emotional state of 
the agent would change next, which in turn biases the perception of that neutral face 
(‘overshoot’ response bias). We propose that such an effect is the result of a low-
level emotion-reading process (Goldman, 2006; Goldman & Sripada, 2005), rather 
than the result of basic visual (bottom-up) processes. This emotion reading process 
is a top-down mechanism, which we called ‘emotional anticipation’,  
In Chapter 3 we were interested to see whether individuals with Asperger’s 
syndrome (AS) use ‘emotional anticipation’ too, or whether they might use 
alternative mechanisms to solve our task. Their proposed lack of intuitive and 
involuntary understanding of other people’s behavior (Jellema et al., 2009; Kuchinke 
et al., 2011; Kuzmanovic et al., 2011; Senju et al., 2009) might suggest they meet 
the latter option.  
  
The Typical developed (TD) group. 
In Experiment 7, previous responses biases found for TD (see Chapter 2) were 
replicated. A robust overshoot response bias was found when the last expression of 
the Joy and Anger videos was neutral and even when the last frame belonged to the 
same emotion category as the start emotion. In Experiment 8, the perceptual bias 
was completely removed by the change of the agent’s identity in the last neutral 
frame (i.e. the frame that had to be evaluated). This result ruled out the possible role 
played by contrast effects, as the contrast between the maximally happy or angry 
Chapter 3 
Emotional anticipation in adults with AS 
 
 
166 
 
expression in the first frame and the neutral expression in the last frame was 
preserved. The change in identity did not affect this contrast, but it did affect 
emotional anticipation. The identity change manipulation also ruled out the RM 
explanation, thus replicating the findings reported in Chapter 2.  
In Experiment 9, a mask (400 ms duration) was inserted just before the neutral 
expression in the last frame of the clip. The rationale was that the mask should reset 
those low-level processes that rely on the continuous flow of motion (cf. Enns et al., 
2010). As the mask insertion did not affect the overshoot bias, contributions of 
extrapolations of curves from the face have to be rejected.  
The looped video-sequence in Experiment 10 specifically tested for contrast 
and RM effects. TD individuals judged the last neutral expression of the Neutral-to-
joy-to-neutral and Neutral-to-anger-to-neutral loops as slightly happy and slightly 
angry, respectively. This bias was opposite in direction to the normal overshoot 
effect, and was therefore called an ‘undershoot’ effect. The video-clips in the loop 
condition may have better resembled everyday social interactions (more 
ecologically-valid) than other video-sequences used in our studies. The observer 
might have processed the agent’s brief smile in the Neutral-to-joy-to-neutral videos 
as a positive social signal toward him/her, and the frown in the neutral-to-angry-to-
neutral videos as a negative social signal. Consequently, a positive attribution may 
have been made to the agent in the Neutral-to-joy-to-neutral condition and a 
negative attribution in the Neutral-to-anger-to-neutral condition, resulting in the 
undershoot bias in the evaluations. In future research this interpretation could be 
tested further by manipulating the eye gaze direction of the agent. It is possible that 
the rapid change in the emotional facial expression in combination with averted eye 
gaze may not convey the positive or negative signal towards the observer (as the 
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agent’s attention would be directed elsewhere) and would therefore not generate the 
undershoot response bias.  
The finding of an ‘undershoot’ effect gives rise to two conclusions. First, 
contrast effects did not play a major role as we did find a response bias. If the 
overshoot of Experiment 7 was due to the contrast between the ‘full blown’ 
expression and the neutral one, then in the loop condition, where the two 
expressions in question were both neutral, we should not have found a bias. 
Second, if the overshoot in Experiment 7 was caused by RM, then we should have 
found an overshoot in Experiment 10 too (considering that the second half of the 
loop was identical to the video-clips shown in Experiment 7). In conclusion, on the 
basis of these results we can claim that the overshoot as found in TD individuals 
was not caused by purely bottom-up visual processes, but rather that it was 
generated by a top-down mechanism, involving an involuntary anticipation made by 
the observer about the agent’s emotional state of mind in the immediate future.  
 
In summary: the results found with TD individuals in the tasks presented in 
Experiments 7, 8, 9 and 10 replicated previous findings of Experiments 1, 2, 3 and 5 
reported in Chapter 2. 
 
The Asperger’s syndrome (AS) group. 
In Experiment 7, the AS group showed the same strong overshoot response bias as 
the control group. This might suggest they used the same mechanism, i.e. emotional 
anticipation, or, alternatively, it could mean they used a different strategy which led 
to the same response outcome. Experiments 8, 9 and 10 have shed light on the 
underlying mechanism which might have operated in the AS group.  
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In Experiment 8 the Identity-change manipulation did not remove the overshoot, 
while in the TD group it did. The presence of the bias in this condition cannot be 
accounted for by a difficulty in detecting the identity-change, as the extent of 
overshoot was quite similar between the trials where the identity-change involved a 
gender swift and the trials where the gender of the two identities was the same. The 
overshoot in the identity change condition suggests that contrast effects or 
extrapolation (RM) might have constituted the alternative route AS individuals used 
to evaluate the expressions in the ‘emotional anticipation’ task. 
Experiment 9 ruled out the possibility that AS individuals have processed the 
stimuli by focusing on details and extrapolating curves in the face, as the overshoot 
response bias was still present after inserting the mask to interrupt the motion flow 
of the sequence.  
Finally, the Loop condition in Experiment 10 clarified the roles played by 
contrast and RM effects. AS participants evaluated the last neutral expression as 
neutral, i.e. identical to the starting expression. This suggests that the alternative 
mechanism which played a major role in bringing about the overshoot bias in AS 
individuals is the contrast between the initial and the last frames (each presented for 
300 ms) of the video-sequence (see Tanaka-Matsumi et al., 1995; Thayer, 1980). 
The lack of a perceptual bias in Experiment 10 suggests that, similarly as was found 
for the TD individuals, the hypothesis based on RM has to be rejected for the AS 
individuals. RM would have resulted in an overshoot effect, i.e. an extrapolation of 
the second part of the video sequence. RM effects were found for ASD individuals 
by using video-clips which were the reverse of ours (neutral-to-emotion; Uono et al., 
2010). However, it should be noted that the neutral-to-emotion video-clips employed 
in the study by Uono et al., (2010) do not involve contrast effects, whereas these 
effects may occur in the overshoot paradigm, where the emotional expression could 
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have influenced the perceptual evaluation of the target neutral face. Therefore, the 
findings reported in Chapter 3 confirm that the overshoot bias does not seem to be 
generated by RM effects.  
 
In summary: AS participants showed an ‘overshoot’ bias similar to TD 
individuals in Experiment 7. However in subsequent manipulations AS participants 
did evaluate the video-clips differently from TD participants. Specifically, in the IC 
manipulation (Experiment 8) the overshoot did occur with AS group, leaving open 
the possibility that the perceptual distortion was due to RM or contrast effects. The 
Mask manipulation (Experiment 9) had no effect on the overshoot, thus minimizing 
the role played by the extrapolation of literal facial features from the flow of motion. 
Finally, in the Loop manipulation the absence of a significant ‘undershoot’ effect 
excludes RM either on a posite-negative valance dimension or on facial features. 
Therefore, the most likely mechanism causing the overshoot bias with AS 
participants seems to rely on contrast effects.  
 
Which alternative mechanisms might be employed by individuals with AS to 
evaluate the expressions in the emotional anticipation task? 
People with AS are more inclined to understand human actions in a systemizing 
manner, by representing them in terms of their physical characteristics rather than 
their mental characteristics (Baron Cohen, 2002). Overall our findings suggested 
that AS participants could have relied on the low-level visual characteristics of 
dynamic facial expressions, rather than on the associated emotional attributions. In 
contrast, TD individuals tend to involuntarily extract these emotional attributions from 
the perceptual history pertaining to that particular agent. This is in line with the 
evidence that AS individuals may anticipate other’s actions by using atypical 
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strategies, showing a lack of comprehension of the underlying psychological 
meaning (Hudson et al., 2011). The current findings are also in accordance with the 
proposal that AS individuals may process the agentive social stimuli in the same 
way as they would process non-social/agentive objects (Baron Cohen, 2002; 
Jellema & Perrett, 2002a,b; 2007), which would explain their impairments in social 
and communicative competencies and empathy (Baron-Cohen, 2006, Driver et al., 
1999; Ristic et al., 2005).  
An alternative hypothesis that may go some way in explaining the deficits in 
social cognition and emotion reading in AS individuals is the Weak Central 
Coherence theory (WWC) theory (Happé, 1999; Happé and Frith, 2006). The WWC 
model claims that difficulties of ASD individuals in processing facial expressions of 
emotions are due to an enhanced attention to local details of the stimuli, thereby 
losing sight of the global configuration (Humphreys et al., 2007). Focusing on local 
features, such as the U-shaped mouth in the happy expression, might make them 
more prone to apply an extrapolation of these features. However, in the Mask 
condition (which should disrupt extrapolation on the basis of motion flow; cf. Enns et 
al., 2010) the AS individuals did show a normal overshoot response bias, suggesting 
that they did not applied an extrapolation. 
Moreover, our findings are in line with  some evidence that the visual 
processing of facial expressions seems to be preserved in HFA/AS participants 
(Ogai et al., 2003; Rutherford & Towns, 2008; Wicker et al., 2008), especially when 
dynamic stimuli presentations are employed (Loveland et al., 1997; Gepner et al., 
2001). If there was a deficit in visual processing, or a lack of attention for this 
particular class of stimuli, then AS participants would not have produced the robust 
response bias in Experiment 7. We can also exclude the possibility that AS 
participants might not have been able to identify the gradually less intense 
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expressions during the morph sequence. A recent study using dynamic facial 
expressions depicted at different intensities showed that adolescents with HFA 
found it difficult to accurately detect low and medium intensities (20 - 70%) of anger, 
but not of happy expressions, which were correctly recognized also at lower 
intensities (Law Smith et al., 2010). The overshoot bias in the current study was 
found for both the Joy-to-neutral and Anger-to-neutral videos. Overall the overshoot 
bias in AS individuals appeared somewhat less enhanced for the anger videos. 
However, this trend should be considered with caution as the calibrated scores of 
the neutral expressions cannot be treated as absolute measures. Further, we used 
individuals with AS, which were indeed very mildly affected (ADOS scores between 
7 and 9), while the Smith et al. (2010) study used individuals with HFA, which are 
more severely affected. 
It would be interesting to examine whether ASD individuals with more severe 
symptoms than those with AS might be even more prone to apply alternative rules, 
or adopt other compensatory strategies, to try and make sense of other people’s 
emotional states from social cues.  
 
 
3.6.1 Possible neurophysiological dysfunctions supporting the hypothesis of the lack 
of emotional anticipation in ASD 
 
We previously proposed that the neural mechanism underlying emotional 
anticipation in TD individuals could involve mirror mechanisms (Palumbo & Jellema, 
under review). The Mirror Neuron Mechanism (MNM), which is provided with a 
description of the observed facial dynamics by the superior temporal sulcus (STS), 
might underlie the tacit/intuitive understanding of others’ facial expressions through 
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motor simulation. This might shape (top-down) the perception of the visual stimulus 
in TD individuals. Emotional anticipation can be seen as a low-level mind-reading 
mechanism (Goldman, 2006; Goldman & Sripada, 2005), which does not involve 
any cognitive inferential processes or deliberate reasoning. 
Several functional neuroimaging studies on ASD individuals have reported 
abnormal activity in the social brain areas, which include the fusiform face gyrus 
(Critchley et al., 2000; Pierce, Muller, Ambrose, Allen, & Courchesne, 2001; Wang, 
Dapretto, Hariri, Sigman & Bookheimer, 2004), the amygdala (Adolphs et al., 2001; 
Baron-Cohen et al., 2000; Ogai et al., 2003) and the posterior STS (Castelli et al., 
2002; Pelphrey et al., 2007). This network, linking the structural processing of facial 
features with emotional expressions and biological motion, is supposed to be crucial 
in attributing emotional meaning to social events. In addition, it has been 
hypothesized that social impairments in ASD may be related to alterations in the 
Mirror Neuron System (MNS) (consisting basically of premotor cortex, inferior frontal 
gyrus and the posterior parietal cortex; see Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2005; Iacoboni et 
al., 1999), which would be responsible for a lack of imitation, ToM and empathy 
(Baron-Cohen, Avenanti, Walsh, & Aglioti, 2009; Dapretto et al., 2006; Iacoboni & 
Dapretto, 2006; McIntosh, Reichmann-Decker, Winkielamn, & Wilbarger, 2006; 
Minio-Paluello, Nishitani, Anikainen, & Hari, 2004; Rizzolatti & Fabbri-Destro, 2009; 
Williams, Whiten, & Singh, 2004; Williams et al., 2001).  
 
Abnormally correlated activity between visual regions and STS or inferior frontal 
gyrus, and between fusiform face gyrus and amygdala, has been reported in ASD 
while observing emotional facial expressions or bodily actions (Castelli et al., 2002; 
Grèzes, Wicker, Berthoz, & de Gelder, 2009). Further, ASD individuals may lack 
internal representations of body states associated with actions and emotions (i.e. a 
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lack of embodied simulation; Gallese, 2007), and this would preclude a direct 
experiential understanding of others, or ‘intentional attunement’ (Gallese, 2006a, 
2006b).  
Our current findings with AS individuals suggested that they possibly used 
alternative mechanisms to compensate for the absence of emotional anticipation. 
This seems to be in line with the ‘Broken Mirror’ hypothesis (Williams et al., 2001). 
This model assumes that the MNM uses ‘direct matching’ (Rizzolatti et al., 2001), 
which is that the observation of an action directly activates mirror neurons that 
(subthreshold) duplicate the motor program which would be needed to perform that 
action. In other words those neurons enable an unmediated transformation of the 
visual information into a motor code.  This transformation can be seen as an offline 
embodied simulation for understanding the goal of that action. However, the role 
played by ‘direct matching’ mirroring in the social impairments observed in ASD 
individuals is still debated (Hamilton, 2009; Hamilton, Brindley, & Frith, 2007; Marsh 
& Hamilton, 2011; Press, Richardson, & Bird, 2010; Sebanz, Knoblich, Stumpf, & 
Prinz, 2005; Southgate, Gergely, & Csibra, 2010; Southgate, & Hamilton, 2008; 
Spengler, Bird, & Brass, 2010).  
One challenging alternative to the ‘direct matching’ mirroring hypothesis is the 
‘action reconstruction’ account proposed by Csibra (2007). This author emphasizes 
that action mirroring has a predictive function, which is generated by an 
interpretation of the action’s goal. Therefore, according to Csibra’s model, we first 
understand the meaning of an observed action and this meaning (input of mirror 
mechanism) would be ‘simulated’ in our motor system in order to generate a 
prediction.  
In line with Csibra’s model, the ‘mentalizing’ theory suggests that a specific 
cognitive deficit in ‘high level’ reasoning and in representing mental states can better 
Chapter 3 
Emotional anticipation in adults with AS 
 
 
174 
 
explain the core of the social deficit in ASD (Frith, 2003; Frith et al., 1991). In 
support of this position an abnormal activation of the ‘mentalizing’ neural circuit, 
including medial prefrontal cortex and temporo-parietal junction (Brass et al., 2007) 
was found in ASD. However, it should be noted that the ‘constructive matching’ 
approach, as well as the hypothesis of a dysfunction of the mentalizing network, are 
in particular  based on experimental paradigms employing manipulations of goal-
directed movements executed with limbs, which do not directly tap into the social-
emotional dimension.  
 
 
3.6.2 Conclusions 
 
The current study suggests that AS participants could have relied on visual 
perceptual characteristic of the presented social stimuli, rather than on the conveyed 
emotional significance, which was automatically grasped by TD participants. Thus, it 
is proposed that participants with AS solved the emotional anticipation task by using 
an atypical mechanistic, rule-based strategy, typically applied to understand non-
agentive events, as a substitute for their impairment in emotion-reading. The results 
presented in Chapter 3 are in line with the evidence of compensatory mechanisms 
for action anticipation in AS individuals (Hudson et al., 2011). This may explain 
anecdotal ‘misunderstandings’ when interacting with others (cf. Frith, 1995), but also 
shows that  people with mild autistic symptoms can compensate for the lack of 
social understanding by using refined cognitive skills. Further investigations are 
needed to clarify the neural mechanisms underlying emotional anticipation and its 
dysfunction.  
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4.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 2 individuals with typical development (TD) evaluated the neutral 
expression at the end of Joy-to-neutral and Anger-to-neutral video-clips as slightly 
angry and slightly happy respectively and showed an overshoot response bias. 
Further investigations were conducted to try to clarify the nature of the overshoot 
phenomenon. A series of six experiments presented in Chapter 2 ruled out the 
hypothesis that the overshoot effect was generated by basic visual processes such 
as contrast effects, adaptation and extrapolation or Representational Momentum 
(RM). Alternatively, it was suggested a different mechanism, called emotional 
anticipation, would better account for the perceptual distortions. That is, participants 
with TD were able to involuntary anticipate the emotional state of the actors based 
on the perceptual history presented immediately prior to the target neutral 
expression. Thus, the anticipated negative emotional state of the actors at the end 
of the Joy-to-neutral videos and the anticipated positive state at the end of the 
Anger-to-neutral videos in turn modulated (top-down) the perceptual evaluation of 
the last neutral frame (Palumbo & Jellema, under review).  
Next, in a series of four experiments presented in Chapter 3, the emotional 
anticipation hypothesis was tested on individuals with Asperger syndrome (AS), who 
may have difficulties in emotion-reading and may have less empathic reactions to 
emotional stimuli (Baron-Cohen, 2006). AS individuals did show the same 
perceptual distortion as TD individuals (see Experiment 7, Chapter 3). However, it 
was found that this response bias in AS individuals was not generated by emotional 
anticipation rather by possible mechanistic compensatory strategies (see 
Experiment 10, Chapter 3).  
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Taken together these findings may suggest the existence of an automatic low-
level emotion reading mechanism (Goldman, 2006; Goldman & Sripada, 2005), 
which enables people with TD to generate immediate expectations about how an 
emotional state of another individual may develop in the immediate future, thus 
providing a direct tool to react promptly and appropriately in social interactions. In 
contrast, individuals with AS, who lack this direct and automatic access to the other 
person’s mental state, may possibly develop alternative mechanisms to face the 
social world, even though with less immediacy and accuracy.  
 
 
4.1.1 Not all smiles have the same meaning 
 
Facial expressions are powerful signifiers of others’ affective states (Darwin, 
1872/1998; Ekman, 2004), but they are also complex social stimuli. Facial 
expressivity does not always deliver a clear emotional message as it also serves 
different social, communicatory functions. A Duchenne-smile is universally 
recognized as expressing happiness (Ekman, 1971; Ekman & Friesen, 1971, Izard, 
1994). However smiles, even when they are expressed spontaneously, may assume 
different meanings according to a variety of social norms and contexts as it is the 
case of ‘greeting’ smiles (Eibl-Eibesfeld, 1972) or ‘sardonic’ smiles reported by 
Darwin (1872, p. 251). A smile may also express amusement, interest, compassion, 
respect or embarrassment (Keltner 1995; Hess, Beaupre, & Cheung, 2002). Ekman 
(2001) presented a total of 18 main smile types, and 50 subtypes, each one with a 
different social value, but not necessarily related to an enjoyment experience (see 
also Cashdan, 2004; Fridlund 1991, 2002).  
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One of the main distinctions between smiles is whether they are genuinely 
(spontaneously) expressed or whether they are deliberatively (voluntary) posed 
(Ekman, 2003). There is evidence that people can detect differences in smile type 
(Frank, 2002; Frank, Ekman, & Friesen, 1993). This ability starts developing early in 
childhood (Gross and Harris, 1988; Gosselin, Perron, Legault, & Campanella, 2002; 
Pons, Harris, & de Rosnay, 2004; Del Giudice & Colle, 2007) and is important to 
cope with the complexity of the social world. 
 
 
4.1.1.1 Genuine versus ‘false’ smiles 
Enjoyment smiles are spontaneous signals of felt emotion while posed non-
enjoyment smiles may hide a neutral state of mind (phony smile; Ekman &  Friesen, 
1982) or mask a negative feeling such as disgust (Ekman, Friesen, & Ancoli, 1980), 
disappointment (Kraut & Johnston 1979) or sadness and uncertainty (Klineberg, 
1940). Almost all studies emphasized perceptual differences related to the 
morphology and dynamics of the genuine and posed smiles (Ekman, Hager, & 
Friesen, 1981; Frank & Ekman, 1993). In the research carried out by Ekman and 
collaborators with the Facial Action Coding System (FACS; Ekman & Friesen, 
1978), different facial areas (or units) involved in the felt and unfelt smiles were 
identified (see also Gosselin, Kirouac, & Dorè, 1997; Kohler et al., 2004).  
A genuine smile presents the Duchenne marker (Action Unit 6, AU6), namely 
the contraction of the external strand of the muscle Orbicularis Oculi around the eye, 
which generates a lifting of the cheeks and the “crow’s feet” wrinkles at the corners 
of the eyes (Ekman & Friesen, 1982). Tense lower eyelids, raised cheeks and lip 
corners pulled up by the Zygomaticus Major contraction can also be indicative signs 
of positive emotion (Frank et al., 1993; Soussignan 2002). In contrast, a posed smile 
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can be detected on the basis of lip corners asymmetry (Ekman & Friesen, 1982; 
Ekman et al., 1981) and the lack of contraction of the Orbicularis Oculi, which 
prevents the cheeks to rise up to the same extent as they would in case of a 
genuine smile.  
A non-Duchenne smile is visibly evident by the absence of the wrinkles around 
the eyes. Importantly, studies with EMG reported that different muscles of the face 
are involved in genuine and posed smiles. For instance the Zygomaticus Major is 
more active during genuine smiles than during fake ones (Tassinary & Cacioppo, 
1989). Moreover it is suggested that the Risorious and Buccinator muscles would be 
more involved while faking a smile (Oberman, Winkielman, & Ramachandran, 
2007). These latter are the “say cheese” muscles. An illustration of the different 
muscles of the face involved in a smile is presented in Fig. 4.1). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Illustration of the facial muscles. The Zygomaticus Major and Orbicularis 
Oculi (left side) are typically activated during genuine smiles and the Corrugator 
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Supercilii (right side) is responsible of frowning during angry expressions. The 
Buccinator (left side) and Risorius (right side) are thought to play a major role in the 
production of fake smiles. 
 
In parallel to studies which mainly focused on the difference between felt and 
unfelt smiles on the basis of Duchenne markers, other investigations highlighted the 
importance of timing and dynamicity (see Abel et al. 2002, for a review). Deliberate, 
posed smiles feature more irregular actions, characterized by more phases, pauses, 
and stepwise intensity changes than spontaneous smiles which are smoother, and 
also have slower onset and offset durations (Ekman & Friesen, 1982; Hess & Kleck, 
1990; Krumhuber, Manstead, & Kappas, 2007; Schmidt, Ambadar, Cohn, & Reed, 
2006).  
People showing enjoyment smiles are judged as happier (Otta, Abrosio, & 
Hoshino, 1996; Otta, Lira, Delevati, Cesar, & Pires1994), more attractive, polite and 
truthful (Hess et al., 2002; Reis et al., 1990) and are liked more (Young & Beier, 
1977; Palmer & Simmons, 1995). Posed smiles are highly adaptive because they 
are assumed to deliberatily communicate social intentions and regulate 
interpersonal relationships. However, being ‘non felt’ and artificial, as opposed to 
spontaneous and natural, they may appear as less pleasant, thus producing less 
emphatic reactions (Surakka & Hietanen, 1998).  
 
4.1.1.2 Can negative facial expressions be voluntarily posed? 
Almost all of the literature on deceptive facial expressions is focused on felt and 
unfelt smiles, while few investigations were carried out on the deliberate use of other 
facial expressions. It is reported that negative emotions (sadness and fear) were 
more difficult to falsify than happiness (Porter & ten Brinke, 2008). Another study 
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focused on detecting deceptive pain from facial displays (Hill & Craig, 2002). There 
is substantial agreement on the difficulty to identify the deceptive cues associated 
with pretended negative expressions (Hurley & Frank, 2011). Moreover, little is 
known about the temporal properties and contiguity of specific facial actions 
involved in the production of such expressions.  
 It would be interesting to extend research into this area to better understand 
the social function of posed negative facial expressions and the underlying 
mechanism which enable the understanding of the social meaning conveyed by 
those expressions.  
 
 
4.1.2 Embodiment of facial expressions 
 
Relying on theories of embodied cognition in the recognition of facial expressions 
(Carr et al., 2003; Goldman, 2006; Jabbi et al., 2007; Niedenthal, 2007; Pitcher et 
al., 2008, Wicker et al., 2003), Niedenthal, Mermillod, Maringer & Hess (2010) 
proposed the simulation of smiles model (SIMS). This model ascribes an important 
role to embodied simulation in understanding the signal (social or emotional) linked 
to the facial expressivity (Gallese, 2007; Goldman & Sripada, 2005). According to 
the SIMS model the visual input, arising from specific regions of the face associated 
with the production of a particular emotional expression, elicits a congruent 
emotional response in the observer. Thus, the internal simulation of the observed 
facial expressions is promoted by the automatic facial motor mimicry (Niedenthal, 
2007). It is well known that facial expressions of negative and positive affect 
produce rapid, unconscious and specific facial EMG responses over Corrugator 
Supercilii and Zygomatic Major muscles, respectively (Dimberg & Thunberg, 1998; 
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Dimberg et al., 2000; Larsen et al., 2003). Such mimicry reactions may reflect 
activity in the neural mechanisms that play a role in the tacit understanding of the 
emotion conveyed by the face (Atkinson & Adolphs, 2005; Pitcher, Garrido, Walsh, 
& Duchaine, 2008). Therefore, individuals can distinguish happy from angry 
expressions on the basis of different somatosensory and affective experiences that 
those expressions produce in them. Interestingly, in a recent work by Maringer, 
Krumhuber, Fischer, & Niedenthal (2011) it is suggested that those somatosensory 
simulations may also help the perceiver to discriminate between genuine and false 
facial expressions. That is, a smile will be judged as a genuine expression of 
happiness if it induces such a feeling in the observer. The simulation of a false smile 
may be reflected by weaker mimicry (Surakka & Hietanen, 1998), or by a mimicry 
which may involve different facial muscles (Oberman et al., 2007), as compared to 
genuine smiles. The result is that the smile is experienced as less positive by the 
perceiver, and therefore judged as unfelt or false. At the present the SIMS model is 
applied only to smiling faces, while no attempts were made with different facial 
expressions, in particular with displays of negative facial affect. 
 
 
4.1.3 Aims of this study 
 
Facial expressions can have an emotional meaning but they can also be unaffective 
social signals (Fridlund, 1994). Successful interaction and communication implies 
the ability to use and interpret these subtle differences correctly. For instance, 
interpersonal communication sometimes can be voluntarily aimed to manipulate or 
convince the interlocutor, which is not uncommon in domains such as forensic, 
marketing, business, entertainment and politics. These are all examples suggesting 
Chapter 4 
Emotional anticipation with fake facial expressions 
 
 
183 
 
that anticipating other people’s behavior may help to face the complexity of the 
social world successfully, especially when deceptive signals are employed. 
In the previous studies (Chapters 2 and 3) it was shown that rapid changes in 
the intensity of emotional facial expressions (Joy-to-neutral and Anger-to-neutral) 
generated an automatic anticipation of the final emotional state of the agent in TD 
observers. Thus, the perception of the neutral expression depicted at the end of the 
happy and angry sequences was biased in the direction of the anticipated state of 
mind. In Chapters 2 and 3, emotional anticipation was proposed to be a low level 
mindreading mechanism underpinning embodied simulation of the agent’s dynamic 
facial expression (Gallese, 2007; Goldman, 2006; Goldman & Sripada, 2005), in line 
with SIMS model (Niedenthal et al., 2010). The main question addressed in Chapter 
4 is how participants would perform on the ‘emotional anticipation’ task if the video-
clips would display unfelt, deliberately faked facial expressions. Such faked 
expressions, contrary to genuine expressions, do not have a clear relationship to the 
emotional state of the actor. Hereto, a new set of stimuli was created, in which each 
actor displayed both felt, genuine and unfelt, posed (or commonly termed ‘fake’) 
happy and angry facial expressions. Despite genuine and fake expressions being 
relatively similar in terms of facial features, the conveyed meaning reflects different 
mental states (emotion vs. social intention). Therefore, the ‘emotional anticipation’ 
hypothesis would predict a significant reduction of the overshoot bias with fake facial 
expressions as compared to genuine ones.  
Moreover, Maringer and colleagues (2011) showed that only when blocking the 
observer’s mimicry, thus inhibiting embodied simulation of the facial expression, the 
context and stereotypes or beliefs are taken into account in the evaluation of the 
smile’s meaning. In contrast, when facial mimicry was active, no difference was 
reported in judgments of smile genuineness as a function of the context in which the 
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smile was embedded. The authors concluded that the observer’s interpretation of 
another’s smile on the basis of a re-enactment of the other’s affective state was 
strong enough to override context information. 
The additional question addressed in Chapter 4 is whether, and how, 
participants’ explicit knowledge about the lack of authenticity in the emotional 
perceptual history (Joy-to-neutral and Anger-to-neutral) would modulate the 
perceptual evaluation of the last neutral expression. Does explicit knowledge about 
the genuineness of facial expressions influence anticipatory mechanisms?  
 
 
4.3 Experiment 11 
 
A first experiment was conducted to test whether the overshoot would be replicated 
by using the new set of genuine happy and angry facial expressions. Short video-
clips were created as reported in Chapters 2 and 3. According to the ‘emotional 
anticipation’ hypothesis the prediction was to find an overshoot effect with the new 
stimuli as the faces were all depicting genuine emotional expressions. The 
overshoot bias with Ekman’s set of pictures (Ekman & Friesen, 1976) was replicated 
consistently across all the experiments in Chapters 2 and 3. Therefore, the new set 
of stimuli should induce a similar overshoot response bias if there were to be used in 
subsequent experiments.  
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4.3.1 Method 
 
4.3.1.1 Participants  
Nineteen undergraduate Psychology students at Hull University (UK) took part in the 
experiment. After applying exclusion criteria (see data reduction below), the data of 
fifteen participants were included in the analysis (age, M = 19.7 years, SD = 1.7 
years; 14 females; 1 male). None of the participants took part in any of the other 
studies. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and provided 
written consent prior to the experiment. Participants received course credits or a fee 
for taking part. 
The study was approved by the Ethics committee of Hull University. 
 
4.3.1.2 Stimuli  
Pictures of genuine and posed facial expressions were realized in collaboration with 
four professional actors (2 females: CL, MA and 2 males: BR, LO) and one 
professional photographer of “Accademia Arvamus”, a cultural association in Rome, 
Italy. 
Actors applied the Stanislavsky technique to try to experience the target 
emotion (joy and anger; Gosselin et al., 1995). Posed, deliberate happy and angry 
expressions were displayed by asking the actors to prevent facial muscles’ activity 
typically involved in enjoyment-smiles (Orbicularis Oculi and Zygomaticus Major) 
and in spontaneous angry expressions (Corrugator Supercilii). Next the method 
described by Duclos & Laird (2001) was used. Specifically, for the posed smiles 
actors were trained to relax the muscle around the eyes, as if they were posing a 
neutral expression, thus avoiding the natural contraction of the Orbicularis Oculi 
which typically occurs while smiling genuinely. Actors were instructed to maintain 
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this position for 15 seconds while lifting the lip corners. For the posed angry 
expressions actors were trained to display an angry expression (i.e. by clenching the 
teeth or compressing the superior lips against the inferior ones) and maintain this 
position for 15 seconds without contracting the brow. Actors were also asked to 
display neutral expressions. Standardized editing procedures using Adobe 
Photoshop 8.0 were applied to selected pictures. Specifically, although the camera’s 
settings and the ambient lights were fixed, luminance and contrast were equalized 
and the hair and the background were blackened. Finally, pictures were transformed 
in grey-scale bitmaps to avoid any possible visual effect related to skin color. The 
eyes of all actors were positioned on approximately the same location on the 
screen. Faces measured about 13 x 18 cm when displayed on the screen. The final 
pictures used in the morphing procedures are illustrated in Figure 4.2.   
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Figure 4.2. Illustration of the new set of stimuli with neutral, genuine and fake happy 
and angry facial expressions. At the top the initials of the four actors are indicated. 
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Similar to Chapters 2 and 3, video-clips, which consisted of nine interpolated 
images in between the full-blown genuine expression of joy or anger (called 100%) 
and the neutral expression (0%), were created at equal steps of 10% intensity 
change using multi-morphing software (Sqirlz morph 2.1, 
http://www.xiberpix.net/SqirlzMorph.html). 
The first frame of each video sequence showed the emotional expression at 
100% intensity and was presented for 300 ms, the subsequent interpolated frames 
were shown for 30 ms each (Figure 4.3). The total duration of the morph sequence 
was 270 ms (9 x 30 ms). The total duration of the stimulus presentation was 870 ms. 
These parameters were identical to those of the clips presented in Chapters 2 and 
3. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Schematic illustration of the stimulus presentations in Experiment 11. 
Joy-to-neutral videos started with a facial expression of intense joy, which gradually 
morphed into a neutral expression (top panel). Anger-to-neutral videos started with a 
facial expression of intense anger, which gradually morphed into a neutral 
expression (bottom panel). 
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4.3.1.3 Experimental procedure  
The experimental procedure was the same as in the previous studies in Chapters 2 
and 3. Participants were seated at a viewing distance of 80 cm from a PC screen 
(17-inch monitor, 1024 x 268 pixels, 100 Hz). The stimuli were presented using E-
Prime (v. 1.2; Psychology Software Tools, Inc.).  
First, participants calibrated the static neutral expressions of the new actors. 
Each calibration trial began with a black fixation cross on a grey background 
displayed in the center of the screen for 500 ms followed by the static face that was 
presented for 600 ms against a black background (each expression was presented 
twice, in random order, resulting in 8 trials). Participants were prompted to rate the 
calibration trials using the same 5-point scale as in Chapters 2 and 3 ranging from 
slightly angry (1) via neutral (3) to slightly happy (5), by pressing one of the 5 
labeled keys on the SR-Box (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., USA).  
After the calibration, 8 practice trials were completed (4 actors X 2 perceptual 
histories, joy and anger), followed by 48 randomized experimental trials (4 actors X 
2 perceptual histories X 6 repetitions). Each trial consisted of a fixation cross 
displayed for 500 ms followed by the video-clip (870 ms). As in the calibration trials, 
participants were prompted to rate the last neutral expression of the sequence by 
using the same 5-point scale. Participants were instructed to respond within 3 
seconds. The duration of the entire experiment was 20 minutes. 
.  
4.3.1.4 Data reduction and analysis 
The same exclusion criteria as reported in the previous studies were applied. A 
6.4% of the total number of trials were removed because RTs fell below 250 ms or 
above 3000 ms. Participants were excluded if more than 25% of the RT values were 
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outside the 250 – 3000 ms range (n = 4). The +2.5 SD rule to the mean difference 
ratings did not exclude participants.  
The calibration scores were used to adjust the scores in the experimental trials; 
a calibration factor [3.00 minus the calibration score] was added to the experimental 
scores. This allowed performing one-sample t tests with test value 3.00 on the 
scores in the two perceptual histories. The calibration scores for the neutral 
expression of each actor are plotted in Figure 4.4. All statistical analyses were 
performed on the calibrated scores.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Calibration scores in Experiment 11. Ratings on the 5-point scale 
(vertical axis) for the static neutral expression. Scores are shown for each of the 4 
actors (their initials are indicated on the horizontal axis). Error bars indicate +1SD. 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
Emotional anticipation with fake facial expressions 
 
 
191 
 
4.3.2 Results  
 
The results showed the usual overshoot effect (Figure 4.5). The neutral expressions 
at the end of the Joy-to-neutral sequences (M = 2.75, SD = 0.40) were evaluated as 
significantly more angry compared to the same neutral expressions at the end of the 
Anger-to-neutral sequences (M = 3.42, SD = 0.51) t(14) = -6.31, p < .0001).  
Further, the mean ratings for the Joy-to-neutral and the Anger-to-neutral videos 
differed significantly from 3.00 (joy-video: t(14) = -2.45, p = .028; anger-video: t(14) 
= 3.22, p = .006; one sample t-test, two-tailed). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Results of Experiment 11. (A) Scores for the neutral expressions at the 
end of the genuine Joy-to-neutral and Anger-to-neutral sequences. Error bars 
indicate SEM. (B) Ratings for each of the four actors with genuine Joy-to-neutral and 
Anger-to-neutral videos are shown to illustrate the consistency across actors. 
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4.3.3 Discussion 
 
The aim of Experiment 11 was to test whether the overshoot response bias could be 
replicated when using a new set of (genuine) facial expression pictures. A 
comparison between the results found with the actors of the Ekman and Friesen 
(1976) set (Experiment 1, Chapter 2) and those obtained with the new actors 
(Experiment 11, Chapter 4) revealed that the extent of overshoot bias with the new 
actors was very similar to that found with the Ekman & Friesen actors: t(46) = .088, 
p = .930 for Joy-to-neutral videos and t(46) = .622, p = .537 for Anger-to-neutral 
videos; independent sample t-tests. As the new set of facial expressions were 
comparable to the Ekman set in terms of induced overshoot bias, it was decided to 
use them in the subsequent experiments. 
 
 
4.4 Experiment 12 
 
In Experiment 12 the emotional anticipation hypothesis was tested further by directly 
comparing the genuine Joy-to-neutral videos with the fake Joy-to-neutral videos.  
The rationale was that in case of the deliberate, unfelt expressions of joy (fake), 
the observer would not associate the change in the expression with a congruent 
change in the affective state of the actor. At the start of the clip (100% faked smile) 
the actor’s emotional state of mind was not happy (but maybe neutral or even 
negative), and therefore, in terms of emotional anticipation, one does not expect to 
find an overshoot response bias following the neutral expression at the end of the 
clip. 
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Therefore, if the overshoot bias, as reported in Chapters 2 and 3 with TD 
individuals, was due to an anticipation of the emotional state of the agent, then in 
the current experiment the prediction was to find a weaker overshoot response bias 
with the fake Joy-to-neutral videos as compared to the genuine ones.  
Importantly, in Experiment 2 participants were naïve about the presence of any 
faked expressions! No mention of the possibility that expressions could be faked 
was made during the instructions prior to the experiment. This opened up the 
possibility that observers would simply not detect the fakeness of the smiles and 
would, by default, assume that all presented smiles were genuine. However, the aim 
was to explore whether the observers would be able to pick up on the fakeness by 
themselves. Thus, if the overshoot in the fake condition would not differ from that in 
the genuine condition, then that could be either due to participants not realizing that 
some smiles were faked, or to the fakeness not having an effect.  
Video-sequences of fake angry expressions were not included. This was 
because deliberate, posed angry expressions are unusual in day-to-day life and 
possibly harder to detect without additional contextual information. For example, 
people can playfully pose an angry face while interacting with a child. Polite or 
situational smiles are routinely posed in everyday social interactions and can be 
recognized with less effort even without additional information.  
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4.4.1 Method  
 
4.4.1.1 Participants  
Twenty-seven undergraduate Psychology students at Hull University (UK) took part 
in the experiment. All participants were recruited applying the same restrictions as in 
Experiment 11. 
After applying exclusion criteria (see data reduction below), the data of twenty-
three participants were included in the analysis (age, M = 19.6 years, SD = 1.9 
years; 18 females, 5 males). None of the participants took part in any of the other 
experiments.  
 
4.4.1.2 Stimuli  
Pictures depicting genuine and fake happy facial expressions of the same four 
actors were used (see Figure 4.2).  
A preliminary test was conducted with 45 participants (30 females, 15 males; 
age: M = 21.3, SD = 2.2) to assess whether they could distinguish between the 
static genuine and fake smiles presented on a black background for 500 ms. The 
total number of trials was 48 (4 actors X 2 expressions X 6 repetitions), randomized 
in one block. The task was to press key ‘Z’ for genuine and key ‘M’ for fake on a 
keyboard (the two keys were labeled as ‘G’ and ‘F’ respectively to avoid confusion). 
Participants detected genuine and fake smiles above chance. The mean of correct 
responses with genuine expressions was .72, SD = .13 which was significantly 
different from .50 (t(44) = 11.70, p < .0001, one sample t-test). A similar result was 
obtained for the mean of correct responses with fake expressions: .75, SD = .17 
(t(44) = 9.71, p < .0001). 
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Creation of the video-sequences was as in Experiment 11. The Anger-to-
neutral videos where not included at this stage as the fake angry expressions are 
less known and they may be more difficult to detect without additional contextual 
information. An example of the stimulus presentation is illustrated in Figure 4.6. In 
order to enable participants to better detect the type of smile (genuine or fake) 
depicted in the first frame of the video-clip, the duration of the first frame was set to 
600 ms.  This choice was constrained by the ‘overshoot’ paradigm. It was previously 
reported that a change of the first frame duration up to 600 ms would not modulate 
the bias, though it cannot be excluded that longer durations might give rise to 
adaptation and aftereffects (Experiment 3, Chapter 2). Moreover, the minimum 
amount of time required to ensure the detection of false smiles is unknown; most 
studies used real-time video recordings of the whole expression (onset-apex-offset; 
see Ekman & Friesen, 1982), or very long exposures (8 s; Surakka & Hietanen, 
1998). The entire duration of the video-clips was 1170 ms (first frame 600 ms, last 
frame 300 ms and 9 interpolated frames 270 ms).  
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Figure 4.6. Schematic illustration of the stimulus presentations in Experiment 12. 
Joy-to-neutral videos started with a facial expression of intense genuine joy (600 
ms), which gradually morphed into a neutral expression. 
 
4.4.1.3 Experimental procedure 
First, participants calibrated the static neutral expression of each actor, which were 
presented for 600 ms (8 trials: 4 actors X 2 repetitions). After the calibration phase, 
participants started the experimental session.  
 First, 8 practice trials were completed (4 actors X 2 expressions, genuine and 
fake), followed by 48 randomized experimental trials (4 actors X 2 expressions X 6 
repetitions). Each trial consisted of a fixation cross displayed for 500 ms followed by 
the video-clips (1170 ms). Participants were prompted to rate the last neutral 
expression of the sequence using the same scale. Participants were instructed to 
respond within 3 seconds. The duration of the entire experiment was 20 minutes. All 
other aspects of the procedure were identical to Experiment 11. 
 
4.4.1.4 Data reduction and analysis 
Trials in which the RTs fell below 250 ms or above 3000 ms were removed (5.2% of 
total number of trials). Participants were excluded if more than 25% of the RT values 
were outside the above range (n = 2). The +2.5 SD rule to the mean difference 
ratings excluded two participants. The calibration scores for the neutral expression 
of each actor are shown in Figure 4.7. All statistical analyses were performed on the 
calibrated scores. 
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Figure 4.7. Calibration scores in Experiment 12. Ratings on the 5-point scale 
(vertical axis) for the static neutral expression. Scores are shown for each of the 4 
actors (their initials are indicated on the horizontal axis). Error bars indicate +1SD. 
 
 
4.4.2 Results  
 
The results are illustrated in Figure 4.8. The mean ratings for the neutral 
expressions at the end of the genuine sequences (M = 2.80, SD = 0.49) and at the 
end of the fake ones (M = 2.85, SD = 0.36) did not differ from each other, paired 
sample t-test (t(22) = -6.94, p = .495). 
One sample t-tests revealed that the ratings of the neutral faces at the end of 
the Joy-to-neutral videos in both the genuine and fake conditions just did not differ 
significantly from 3.00 (genuine: t(22) = -1.94, p = .065; fake: t(22) = -2.03, p = .055).  
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Figure 4.8. Results of Experiment 12. (A) Scores for the neutral expressions at the 
end of the Joy-to-neutral (horizontal axis) in the genuine and fake conditions. Error 
bars indicate SEM. (B) Ratings for each of the four actors with genuine and fake 
Joy-to-neutral videos are shown to illustrate the consistency across actors. 
 
 
4.4.3 Discussion 
 
In Experiment 12 video-clips of unfelt smiling expressions, which showed a gradual 
decrease in the emotion intensity, were used to test their effect on the overshoot 
response bias. In this experiment participants did not know that half of video-clips 
depicted fake smiles and the other half were genuine. Nevertheless, it was 
interesting to test whether they would pick up on the fakeness by themselves. As the 
results showed no difference between the genuine and fake conditions, there is no 
way to tell from this experiment whether they did or did not pick up on the fakeness. 
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It could be that the participants did not realize some expressions were faked, or it 
could be that they did realize it but that the fakeness had no effect. However, 
debriefing of participants suggested that they had no idea that some expressions 
were faked. 
It should be noted that the absence of the Anger-to-neutral condition may have 
affected the results, in that it made of an overshoot bias for more difficult to verify. 
Normally the difference between the Joy-to-neutral and Anger-to-neutral conditions 
is the crucial measure, but in Experiment 2 it was only possible to rely on the 
difference with respect to the value ‘3.00’ in one-sample t-tests. This inevitably 
introduces some error. 
In Experiment 12 the first frame (full-blow expression) of the video-clip was 
presented for 600 ms, however, in Experiment 12 participants may have found more 
difficult to realize implicitly the difference between genuine and fake smiles 
embedded in the dynamic offset (the gradual extinction of the expression). 
Participants may have realized that the two video-clips were displaying different 
kinds of smiles, but this does not mean they understood these smiles were 
specifically genuine or fake (this was confirmed by debriefing participants).  
It should be considered though that faked smiles do not necessarily need to be 
negative. People pose smiles in their every-day life. Especially polite or situational 
smiles are displayed automatically during interpersonal interactions (Eibl-Eibesfeld, 
1972). Thus, even if these smiles are not linked to joy, they still may produce a 
positive reaction in the observer. Overall the fake smile has a strong adaptive 
function that is to facilitate interpersonal interactions. The fake smile is also 
considered a powerful tool to impress people positively.  
 
 
Chapter 4 
Emotional anticipation with fake facial expressions 
 
 
200 
 
4.5 Experiment 13 
 
In Experiment 13, the labels ‘fake’ and genuine’ were added to the facial 
expressions to make sure the participants knew what kind of expression (fake or 
genuine) they were looking at. Further, the Anger-to-neutral videos were included as 
that would allow to examine the difference between ratings obtained in the Joy-to-
neutral and Anger-to-neutral, instead of using the one-sample t test with test value 
3.00. 
Two main predictions were put forward.  The first prediction was that 
participants would evaluate the neutral expression at the end of the fake videos 
simply as neutral, as they knew the mental state of the actors at the start of the clips 
was not associated to any particular emotion. In this case there would be no 
response bias.  
The second hypothesis followed a different reasoning. It was reported that 
some specific facial expressions (especially expressions of joy) are judged as more 
trustworthy (Krumhuber et al., 2007; Naumann, Vazire, Rentfrow, & Gosling 2009; 
Oosterhof & Todorov, 2009). Moreover, there is evidence suggesting that people 
who show genuine smiles are liked more (Young & Beier, 1977; Palmer & Simmons, 
1995). Thus, it was reasonable to expect that when an actor is faking an expression 
and the observer knows that this is the case, the actor may be perceived 
‘negatively’. This negative attribution in turn (top-down) would affect the evaluation 
of the emotional signal (happy or angry), which means an overshoot with fake joy-
sequences and an ‘undershoot’ with fake anger-sequences. The label “genuine” has 
a positive connotation and hence positive attributions may be made to the agent 
(again irrespective of the joy or anger emotion).  
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4.5.1 Method  
 
4.5.1.1 Participants  
Twenty-eight undergraduate Psychology students at Hull University (UK) took part in 
the experiment. All participants were recruited applying the same criteria as in 
Experiment 11 and 12.  
After applying exclusion criteria (see data reduction below), the data of twenty-
one participants were included in the analysis (age, M = 20.1 years, SD = 1.8 years; 
15 females, 6 males). None of the participants took part in any of the other 
experiments.  
 
4.5.1.2 Stimuli  
Pictures depicting genuine and fake happy and angry facial expressions of the same 
four actors were used (Figure 4.2). Stimuli were created applying the same 
procedures as in Experiment 11 and 12. However, in the current experiment video-
sequences consisted of both genuine and faked happy and angry expressions 
(Figure 4.9). Moreover, a red word (‘genuine’ or ‘fake’) was superimposed on the 
face midway up the nose. This massage appeared as soon as the video started but 
it was removed from the last neutral frame. The entire duration of the video-clips 
was 1170 ms (first frame 600 ms, last frame 300 ms and 9 interpolated frames 270 
ms).  
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Figure 4.9. Schematic illustration of the stimulus presentations in Experiment 13. 
Genuine and fake Joy-to-neutral videos started with a facial expression of intense 
joy (600 ms), which gradually morphed into a neutral expression (top panel). 
Genuine and fake Anger-to-neutral videos started with a facial expression of intense 
anger (600 ms), which gradually morphed into a neutral expression (bottom panel). 
 
4.5.1.3 Experimental procedure 
As in Experiments 11 and 12, participants first made the calibration. They rated the 
neutral expression of each actor presented for 600 ms (8 trials: 4 actors X 2 
repetitions). Next participants started the experimental session. In this phase 
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participants were told that they would watch genuine and fake happy and angry 
expressions depicted by each actor. In order to make participants familiar with the 
differences between the two expressions the fake and genuine expressions of each 
actor were shown side by side (15 s). Participants were asked to watch carefully at 
the differences between the two types of expressions for each actor. After this 
‘observation’ phase, the experiment started. Participants were instructed that half of 
the videos would depict posed, unfelt smiling and frowning expressions which are 
not linked to any emotional valence in particular. The other half of the videos would 
instead display genuine emotional expressions, thus linked to a positive (happy) or 
negative (angry) state of mind. First, 16 randomized practice trials, 4 actors X 2 
perceptual histories (joy and anger) X 2 expressions (genuine and ‘fake’), were 
presented, followed by 64 randomized experimental trials (4 actors X 2 perceptual 
histories X 2 expressions X 4 repetitions). The duration of the entire experiment was 
30 minutes. 
  
4.5.1.4 Data reduction and analysis 
Exclusion criteria were the same as for Experiment 11 and 12. Trials in which the 
RTs fell below 250 ms or above 3000 ms were removed (8.1% of total number of 
trials). 
Participants were excluded if more than 25% of the RT values fell outside the 
above range (n = 4) and if they exceeded the +2.5 SD rule to the mean difference 
ratings (n = 3). The calibration scores for the neutral expression of each actor are 
illustrated in Figure 4.10. All statistical analyses were performed on the calibrated 
scores. 
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Figure 4.10. Calibration scores in Experiment 13. Ratings on the 5-point scale 
(vertical axis) for the neutral expression presented in isolation. Scores are shown for 
each of the four actors Error bars indicate +1SD. 
 
 
4.5.2 Results  
 
The results are shown in Figure 4.11. A 2X2 repeated measures ANOVA with 
Perceptual history (joy vs. anger) and Expression (genuine vs. fake) as within 
subjects factors showed a strong significant main effect for Perceptual history (F(1, 
20)  = 41.44, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .674), which reflected the usual overshoot effect: the 
expression in the last neutral frame was perceived as more angry in the joy videos 
(M = 2.74, SD = 0.55) than in the anger videos (M = 3.43, SD = 0.45). There was no 
main effect for Expression (F(1, 20)  = 1.13, p = .301, ηp
2 = .053). The two-way 
interaction History by Expression was also not significant (F(1, 20)  = .222, p = .643, 
ηp
2 = .011). In the genuine condition neutral faces were perceived as more angry in 
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the Joy-to-neutral videos (M = 2.70, SD = .56) than in the Anger-to-neutral videos (M 
= 3.42, SD = .37), (t(20) = -6.21, p < .0001), and each differed significantly from 3.00 
(joy: t(20) = -2.42, p =.025; anger: t(20) = 5.16, p < .0001). In the fake condition, 
neutral faces were perceived as more angry in the Joy-to-neutral videos (M = 2.77, 
SD = .54) than in the Anger-to-neutral videos (M = 3.44, SD = .52; t(20) = -5.34, p < 
.0001). However, only the evaluation of the neutral expression at the end of the 
Anger-to-neutral videos differed significantly from 3.00 (t(20) = 3.85, p = .001), while 
it approached significance for the  Joy-to-neutral sequences (t(20) = -1.94, p = .067). 
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Figure 4.11. Results of Experiment 13. (A) Scores for the neutral expressions at the 
end of the genuine Joy-to-neutral and Anger-to-neutral sequences (horizontal axis). 
Error bars indicate SEM. (B) Ratings for each of the four actors with genuine Joy-to-
neutral and Anger-to-neutral videos (left side) and with fake Joy-to-neutral and 
Anger-to-neutral videos (right side) are shown to illustrate the consistency across 
actors. 
Chapter 4 
Emotional anticipation with fake facial expressions 
 
 
207 
 
4.5.3 Discussion of Experiment 13 & General Discussion of Chapter 4 
 
Experiment 13 was conducted to examine whether the overshoot would be affected 
by videos of the same actors expressing genuine/fake smiling and frowning 
expressions, while participants were informed about whether the expressions were 
fake or genuine. This manipulation was done to make sure the participants knew 
which expression was fake and which was genuine.  
An overshoot bias was found with both genuine and fake Joy-to-neutral and 
Anger-to-neutral videos. Moreover, the amount of overshoot did not differ between 
the two conditions. Assuming that the observers took account of the information 
provided, then our hypotheses about the influences of the fake emotions have to be 
rejected.  
 
One possible explanation for the lack of a difference between the fake and 
genuine conditions is that participants simply did not pay attention to the labels “ 
genuine” and “fake”, as the labels were in no way necessary to perform the task (i.e. 
evaluate the last facial expressions). Some participants indeed indicated in the 
debriefing that they basically had ignored the labels. However, if it is assumed that 
most participants did take the labels into account, then another possibility for the 
lack of a difference between fake and genuine is that the fake expressions did not 
evoke an ‘experience’ of fakeness in the participant. The SIMS model (Niedenthal et 
al., 2010) claims that such an experience is crucial in order to perceive the 
expression as fake. Theories on embodiment of facial expressions put forward by 
e.g. Gallese (Gallese, 2007) and others (Carr et al., 2003; Goldman, 2006; Jabbi et 
al., 2007; Niedenthal, 2007; Pitcher et al., 2008, Wicker et al., 2003) also claim that 
such an ‘experience’ is essential for the understanding of the observed emotion. The 
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reason why the experience of fakeness may not have been induced in the observers 
may be that the distinctive temporal components of faked expressions were lacking. 
That is, according to the literature one of the most distinctive characteristic of fake 
smiles is that they posses more irregular actions, phases, pauses, and stepwise 
intensity changes than spontaneous smiles which have slower onsets and offsets 
(from the peak of the expression to the neutral expression or baseline) durations 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1982; Hess & Kleck, 1990; Krumhuber et al., 2007; Schmidt et 
al., 2006; Weiss, Blum, & Gleberman, 1987). As in our experiment the offset was not 
manipulated and the transition to neutral was smooth, which could have rendered 
the fake smiles and frowns less realistic, the visual input provided by the video-clips 
may have activated the same motor response in the observer for the fake and 
genuine videos, thus resulting in the overshoot bias in both the conditions. 
Therefore, in future experiments using this paradigm, a recognition task for the 
joy and anger offsets is needed, especially because the current stimuli were not 
created using the FACS system (Ekman & Friesen, 1976). This would clarify 
whether the offset of the expressions was appropriate or whether the temporal and 
dynamic components of the fake expressions should be taken into account to make 
it more realistic.  Further, real-time recordings of the offset of genuine and fake 
expressions could be used, in line with the reviewed literature on deceptive facial 
expressions. If the role of the dynamic component of the video-clips would turn out 
to be crucial, then this would strongly boost the claim that embodied simulation 
plays a crucial role in understanding the meaning of facial expressions (Goldman & 
Sripada 2005; Gallese, 2006a, 2006b). Importantly, it would also suggest that ‘motor 
resonance’ may serve emotional anticipation, which allows people to anticipate how 
the emotional state of the other person would develop in the immediate future 
(Palumbo & Jellema, under review). This mechanism is extremely relevant to 
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navigate in the social world and face the complexity of social interaction and 
interpersonal communication in very different environments and domains.  
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Humans make extensive use of socially relevant information in everyday 
interpersonal relations. Successful social interactions mainly depend on the ability to 
explain those signals in terms of epistemic mental states (Baron-Cohen, 1995). 
Understanding and anticipating intentions, beliefs, emotions, desires and 
motivations, which govern other people’s behaviour, is a key mechanism of social 
cognition.  
Mental state attributions may derive from the visual analysis of a variety of 
social signals. This largely bottom-up perceptual evaluation provides a mechanistic 
description of social cues, which is seen as an essential step towards the 
comprehension of others’ mental/emotional states (Jellema & Perrett, 2002a, 2002b; 
2005; Balkemore & Decety, 2001). However, the process instantiated by the 
detection and description of social cues leading up to ‘mentalizing’ involve also a 
feedback (top-down) route. Interestingly, recent work has suggested that 
interpretations of other people’s intentions based on explicit information can exert a 
top-down influence, which is strong enough to affect basic low-level visual 
processes, such as adaptation, which were typically considered to be immune from 
such top-down processes (Teufel et al., 2009). This gave rise to the concept of 
‘perceptual mentalizing’ (Teufel et al., 2010), which emphasizes the bidirectional 
relation between perceptual analysis and higher order cognitive function. 
Importantly, it has been reported that such top-down influences may also proceed in 
an implicit, automatic manner, without the use of explicit information (Hudson et al., 
2009). 
The general aim of this thesis was to investigate how the perceptual processing of 
social cues may interact with mental attributions, which are generated implicitly and 
involuntarily on the basis of the immediately preceding perceptual history of those 
social cues. The first objective was to assess whether involuntary and automatic 
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mental/emotional attributions, during observation of dynamic facial expressions, may 
lead to an anticipation of the most likely future emotional state of the agent, which in 
turn (top-down) would influence the evaluation of those expressions. Specifically, 
the aim was to clarify the nature of the so called ‘overshoot effect’, a perceptual 
distortion occurring in the evaluation of happy and angry facial expression offsets 
(Jellema et al., 2011). In Jellema et al. (2011) video-clips of happy and angry facial 
expressions that gradually morphed into a neutral expression were presented. 
Participants evaluated this last neutral expression by using a 5-point scale ranging 
from slightly angry via neutral to slightly happy. Results showed that the last neutral 
expression in the joy offsets was judged as slightly angry, while the identical neutral 
expression at the end of the anger offsets was rated as slightly happy (overshoot 
bias). Thus, the evaluation of the last neutral frame of the videos was affected by the 
specific perceptual history (Joy-to-neutral or Anger-to-neutral). Importantly, when the 
video-clips where used as task-irrelevant distracters in an affective priming 
paradigm (Jellema et al., 2011), it was shown that the response bias could not have 
been caused by a cognitive response strategy (i.e. selection of the emotion opposite 
to the start-emotion). Rather, the affective priming study suggested that the Joy-to-
neutral and Anger-to-neutral sequences induced negative and positive affects in the 
observer, respectively. Thus, a speculative interpretation of these findings was that 
the perceptual history witnessed immediately prior the last neutral to-be-evaluated 
frame may have triggered an anticipation of the forthcoming affective state of mind 
of the agent. This hypothetical mechanism was referred to as ‘emotional 
anticipation’ (cf. Goldman, 2006), which in turn could have biased the perception of 
the neutral expression in the direction of the anticipated state of mind. In everyday 
life people continuously need to understand and predict the reasons underlying 
others’ actions in order to react appropriately. According to some theoretical 
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positions the valence of stimuli, e.g. ‘good’ or ‘bad’, is detected at early stages and it 
triggers the motivational systems of approach and avoidance (Bargh, 1997; Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990). From an evolutionary perspective, approach and 
avoidance responses are adaptive in that they contribute to the survival of the 
individual. Adopting this perspective, a decrease of the intensity of a smile can be 
associated to a dangerous signal which can activate an avoidance reaction; while a 
decrease of the intensity in the anger expression may activate an approach 
response. The ability to anticipate changes in someone else’s affective state is 
fundamental to adjust one’s own behavior.  In some cases it can also serve 
manipulatory purposes (Weiner & Handel, 1985; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). In 
Jellema et al. (2011) no attempts were made to clarify the role of emotional 
anticipation in explaining the overshoot response bias and to rule out other plausible 
interpretations. In fact, a variety of low-level visual processes may offer good 
explanations for the presence of this perceptual response bias. These processes 
include contrast/context effects (Russell & Fehr, 1987; Suzuki & Cavanagh, 1998; 
Tanaka-Matsumi et al., 1995; Thayer, 1980), adaptation (Fox & Barton, 2007; Hsu & 
Young, 2004; Leopold et al., 2001; Rutherford et al., 2008; Webster et al., 2004), 
extrapolation of the geometrical features in the face (U shape in a smile) and RM on 
an underlying positive-to-negative valence dimension (Yoshikawa & Sato, 2008).  
 
The focus of the studies presented in Chapter 2 was to disentangle the 
contributions of these basic bottom-up perceptual processes and the contribution of 
top-down emotional anticipation, to the generation of the overshoot bias during the 
observation of relatively fast offsets of joy and anger facial expressions. To this end, 
six experiments were conducted with typically-developed (TD) individuals. 
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In Experiment 1 the end-point of the joy and anger videos was varied (between 
neutral, 10% joy and10% anger expressions). This manipulation allowed assessing 
the presence of the overshoot bias also when the last expression belonged to the 
same emotional category as that of the starting expression. It was found that in 
these cases the overshoot bias did occur, overcoming a 20% difference in emotional 
intensity. 
In Experiment 2 the identity of the actors was changed immediately before 
displaying the last neutral frame. Two versions of this Identity-change manipulation 
were applied. In the instant Identity-change condition the identity of the actor was 
changed in the very last neutral frame of the videos, whereas in the smooth version 
the identity change was realized through a gradual morphing between the two 
identities. In both cases the degree of emotional contrast between the first and last 
frames was unaltered. The overshoot bias was completely removed in the Instant 
identity-change condition and was significantly reduced in the smooth identity-
change (the latter result was probably due to participants not detecting the identity 
transition due to morphing between identities). 
The overall result suggested that sequential contrast/context effects (see 
Thayer, 1980) probably did not play a major role in bringing about the response 
bias. Furthermore, an explanation in terms of an extrapolation on an underlying 
positive-to-negative valence dimension (RM) was unlikely as this underlying 
dimension was not affected by the identity-change manipulation. Experiment 2 
seems to also rule out the role of visual adaptation as the change in identity would 
not have removed any aftereffects (Fox & Barton, 2007; Ellamil et al., 2008). 
In Experiment 3 a Loop condition was introduced, in which the first frame 
depicted a neutral expression, which subsequently morphed into an expression of 
either joy or anger, after which it morphed back into the same neutral expression. 
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The results again did not support a contribution from sequential contrast effects and 
RM. The last neutral frame of the Neutral-to-joy-to-neutral sequence was judged as 
slightly happy, while the identical last neutral frame of the Neutral-to-anger-to-
neutral was judged as slightly angry (i.e. an ‘undershoot’ response bias). A likely 
explanation for this finding is that the brief smile in the Neutral-to-joy-to-neutral 
videos indicated a positive social signal, and the brief frown depicted in the Neutral-
to-anger-to-neutral sequence a negative social signal. The video-clips appeared 
therefore to display a daily social interaction where the observer may have attributed 
a positive disposition to the agent in the Neutral-to-joy-to-neutral condition and a 
negative disposition in the Neutral-to-anger-to-neutral condition. The finding argued 
against sequential contrast effects because in case of a sequential contrast effect 
one would expect the last neutral expression to be evaluated as neutral and not 
obtain a response bias. It also excluded RM effects on the underlying positive-
negative valence dimension as an explanation as this should have resulted in an 
overshoot bias.    
A possible contribution of RM effects on dynamic facial expressions was further 
discredited by Experiment 4. A manipulation of the speed of the video-clips did not 
affect the overshoot bias, contrary to the study by Yoshikawa & Sato (2008) who 
reported that RM effects induced by their video-clips depicting neutral-to-emotion 
dynamic expressions were modulated by the speed of the videos.  
In Experiment 5 the insertion of a 400 ms long mask immediately before the 
last, neutral expression did not affect the overshoot bias. This indicated that the 
overshoot bias did not depend on the uninterrupted flow of motion present in the 
video clip (cf. Enns et al., 2010).  
Finally, the contribution of adaptation was specifically examined in Experiment 
6. This experiment showed that the overshoot was not modulated by doubling or 
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even tripling the duration of the first frame (from 200 ms to 600 ms) of the videos 
(Jellema et al., 2011). Taken together the findings reported in Chapter 2 suggest 
that the overshoot bias cannot be considered to be a result of bottom-up visual basic 
processes. Alternatively, the direction of the bias is congruent with the emotional 
anticipation hypothesis, which would explain the overshoot as the consequence of 
top-down attributional processes. 
One could ask why an agent displaying a joyful facial expression that 
subsequently (gradually) changes into a neutral expression would be perceived as 
adopting a ‘negative’ state of mind. Why is the agent not seen as adopting simply a 
neutral state of mind? There are at least two lines of research that indicate that 
emotion-to-neutral sequences induce an emotional valence in the observer (which in 
turn may be attributed to the agent). The first line of research involves affective 
priming paradigms (Jellema et al., 2009). In these studies happy/angry-to-neutral 
sequences were used as distractors, while positive or negative words superimposed 
on the last (neutral) frame of the videos are used as targets. It was found that 
negative words were faster detected than positive words in the Joy-to-neutral 
condition, whereas positive words were faster detected in Anger-to-neutral 
condition. This strongly suggests that the sequences evoke specific affective 
valences in the observers.  
The second line of research involves imaging of brain activity during presention 
of joy and anger offsets (Mühlberger et al., 2011). This study suggested that the joy 
offset was perceived as a threat signal, inducing an avoidance reaction and the 
attribution of a negative emotional state to the agent. In contrast, the anger-to-
neutral offset could have assumed a reward valence, thus generating approach-like 
behaviour and the attribution of a positive state of mind to the agent. The findings 
presented in Chapter 2 allow to reject explanations for the overshoot phenomenon 
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in terms of basic perceptual processes and are compatible with the emotional 
anticipation hypothesis.  
 
In Chapter 3 four experiments aimed at testing the same emotional anticipation 
tasks on individuals with Asperger’s syndrome (AS) and a control group of TD 
individuals, matched for age, gender and intellectual abilities. Individuals with AS, 
although they manifest many intact cognitive functions, show specific difficulties in 
spontaneous emotion reading and in the intuitive understanding of other people’s 
behaviour (Jellema et al., 2009; Kuchine et al., 2011; Kuzmanovic et al., 2011; 
Senju et al., 2009). Therefore, the study of individuals with AS might shed light on 
the explanation of the overshoot bias in terms of emotional anticipation. If individuals 
with AS are indeed compromised in emotional anticipation than one would expect 
not to find a perceptual distortion with this clinical population. However, previous 
studies suggested that anticipatory skills concerning other people’s behaviour may 
be present in AS individuals, although it was suggested that this could be derived 
from a purely mechanistic analysis of social signals (Hudson et al., 2011), without 
involving  the agent’s underlying psychological states.  
In Experiment 7, AS individuals showed the same response bias as the one 
found for the TD participants (Experiment 1, Chapter 2). The last expression of the 
Joy and Anger videos was evaluated as slightly angry and slightly happy, 
respectively. This occurred even when the last frame belonged to the same emotion 
category as the start emotion. This finding left open two possibilities: (1) the 
individuals with AS are not impaired in emotional anticipation, and (2) they are 
impaired in emotional anticipation but apply compensatory mechanisms. Such 
compensatory mechanisms could in principle have relied on low-level visual 
processes like contrast effects, RM on facial features and RM on positive-negative 
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valance dimension. In order to test whether (any of) those mechanisms were 
involved in producing the perceptual bias, three manipulations adopted in Chapter 2 
were also applied in the studies of Chapter 3: instant Identity change (IC, 
Experiment 8), insertion of a Mask (Experiment 9) and the Loop sequence 
(Experiment 10).  
In Experiment 8 remarkably, the Identity change manipulation did not remove 
the overshoot bias in the AS group. In the control TD group, the Identity change did 
remove the overshoot bias, similarly to the findings of Experiment 2. Importantly, the 
presence of the response bias in this condition in the AS group was not related to a 
failure to detect the Identity-change, as the same extent of overshoot was found in  
trials where the gender of the two identities was the same compared to trials which 
involved a gender shift. The results obtained with AS individuals suggested that their 
overshoot bias was probably not generated by emotional anticipation (as emotional 
anticipation would have predicted no response bias in the Identity change condition), 
but by alternative mechanisms, such as contrast effects or extrapolation (RM).  
In Experiment 9 TD and AS participants both showed an overshoot effect when 
a 400 ms mask, inserted just before the last neutral frame was displayed, 
interrupted the flow of the motion. This suggested that the hypothesized low-level 
perceptual mechanism causing the overshoot response bias in the AS group was 
not dependent on the continuous flow of motion of the dynamic sequence (cf. Enns 
et al., 2010). Disruption of the flow did not affect the overshoot. Experiment 10 
tested whether contrast and RM effects might have been responsible for the 
generation of the response bias in the AS group by using the Loop condition. If 
contrast effects were responsible then the prediction was that the AS group would 
not produce any bias. On the other hand, RM would predict an overshoot. 
Interestingly, AS participants did not show significant biases in the Loop condition, 
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i.e. the last neutral frame was judged as nearly neutral. The lack of bias in the Loop 
sequence, and the presence of the overshoot in the No loop sequence, suggested 
that in AS individuals the perceptual distortion might have been due to contrast 
effects. The results of the TD individuals confirmed the findings of Experiment 3, by 
revealing an ‘undershoot’ effect in the Loop condition. 
The Identity change (Experiment 8) and the Loop (Experiment 10) conditions 
were crucial tasks as they discriminated between TD and AS participants. In the 
Identity change condition TD participants could not anticipate the emotional state of 
agent B as all they had witnessed was the immediate perceptual history pertaining 
to agent A. Thus, TD participants evaluated agent’s B expression as neutral. 
However, in AS individuals, the overshoot bias occurred even if the information 
needed to anticipate the emotional state of agent B was not available. This suggests 
that the evaluations of AS participants were not caused by emotional anticipation. 
The Loop task clarified that the perceptual distortion found in AS individuals was 
likely due to visual contrast effects. 
Overall the studies reported in Chapter 3 suggested that AS participants based 
their judgments on the visual perceptual characteristics of the displayed dynamic 
facial expressions, rather than on the associated emotional meaning, which was 
automatically captured by TD participants (Experiments 8 and 10). In line with 
previous evidence of compensatory mechanisms for action anticipation in AS 
individuals (Hudson et al., 2009), it is proposed that participants with AS solved the 
emotional anticipation task by applying mechanistic, rule-based strategies, which 
are typically adopted by AS individuals to understand non-agentive events (Jellema 
& Perrett, 2002a, 2002b; 2007). Such strategies, based on refined cognitive skills, 
might compensate for their impairment in emotion-reading and possibly for the lack 
of social understanding.  
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In Chapter 4, another attempt was made to establish the role of emotional 
anticipation in causing the overshoot bias in TD individuals involving deceptive facial 
expressions of emotions. The rationale of this study was that if the overshoot effect 
was indeed generated by the ability to involuntarily anticipate how the emotional 
state of the agent would develop in the immediate future on the basis of the 
immediate perceptual history, then the introduction of a discrepancy between the 
facial expression and the underlying emotional state of mind should affect the 
response bias. That is, if the perceptual history include untruly emotional 
expressions. To this end a new set of stimuli was created in collaboration with 
professional actors who displayed genuine and fake happy and angry facial 
expressions.  Once the presence of the typical overshoot response bias with the 
genuine expressions depicted by the new actors was confirmed (Experiment 11), 
two additional experiments were conducted to test whether the ‘fakeness’ could 
disrupt the response bias. According to the emotional anticipation hypothesis, a 
reduction of the overshoot bias should be found for the fake Joy-to-neutral video-
clips as compared to the genuine ones, because the agent’s emotional state did not 
start as really happy. It was therefore hypothesized that participants would judge the 
neutral expressions at the end of the fake video-clips as (nearly) neutral. In 
Experiment 12 the fake and genuine Joy-to-neutral sequences produced equal 
overshoot biases. However, this perceptual bias was less strong in both conditions. 
One possibility is that the lack of contrast with the Anger-to-neutral sequences may 
have affected the results, in that it made of an overshoot bias more difficult to verify.  
As it was possible that the participants simply had not recognized that some of the 
expressions were fake, in Experiment 13, where Anger-to-neutral vides were also 
employed, labels superimposed on the faces indicated whether the expression was 
fake or genuine.   
Chapter 5 
General discussion  
 
 
221 
 
This also allowed examining the role of explicit knowledge on the evaluations of 
those expressions. A similar overshoot bias was found in the genuine and fake 
conditions (for both joy and anger perceptual histories), meaning that apparently, 
explicit knowledge did not influence their perceptual evaluations. However, it cannot 
be excluded that participants simply did not take account of the information 
provided. The fake expressions were realized taking care of the differences in the 
facial features between fake and genuine expressions (asymmetry of the mouth, 
lack of Duchenne markers). It is possible, however, that these differences were too 
subtle, also because of a lack of proper dynamicity (Ekman et al., 1982; Hess & 
Kleck, 1990; Krumhuber et al., 2007; Schmidt et al., 2006) in the fake video-clips.  
However, the decision to present the video-clips with the same temporal and 
dynamic properties as in the previous studies (Chapters 2 and 3) was motivated by 
the necessity to exclude explanations for the overshoot based on purely basic visual 
processes.   
 
 
5.1 Emotional anticipation as an implicit mechanism of social understanding 
 
The results reported in this thesis suggest that TD individuals are equipped with an 
automatic and mandatory mechanism, which allows them to predict and anticipate 
how the emotional state of other individuals may change according to immediately 
preceding events. This mechanism is extremely important to navigate in the social 
world. People who lack the ability to generate expectations about how another 
person may react when confronted with a particular emotional event can find it 
extremely difficult to interact socially. This would include difficulties in cooperating 
with others, and in sharing intentions and motivations. Individuals with AS can 
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process social cues, and describe social situations, in mere mechanistic terms 
without necessarily grasping the mental states associated to others’ actions or the 
emotional meaning beyond their facial expressions (Senju et al., 2009; Jellema et 
al., 2009). This may suggest that they can have expectations about how a certain 
situation may develop in the immediate future, but they would find it difficult to 
understand its psychological implications. As such they would lack the ability to 
react appropriately and promptly when it is needed. Even though individuals with AS 
can use their cognitive skills to compensate social impairments, on the other hand 
such compensation may be not sufficient to repair their social fragility. 
 
In the last three decades the scientific debate focused mainly on assessing how 
social understanding is realized. Traditionally, having a Theory of Mind (Baron 
Cohen, 1995) refers to the explicit or implicit adoption (Fodor, 1968; see also Stich & 
Nichols, 1992) of a flexible and updated theoretical module, or ‘folk psychology’, of 
stored symbolic representations and concepts that enables inferences about covert 
mental states from the observation of overt behaviour. One of the challenging 
questions is whether interpretations and predictions about others’ mental states 
underlying social behaviour is instantiated by high-level cognitive functions (Csibra, 
2007; Jacob, 2008), generating representations of the psychological meaning of 
actions. Alternatively, it has been proposed that people can grasp, at least for 
observed simple actions that are part of one’s own experiential repertoire, the 
associated mental contents by embodied simulation (e.g. Gallese, 2007). According 
to Gallese’s account, perceived actions, emotions and sensations of others are 
mapped onto the observer’s motor system, thus triggering internal, prelinguistic 
representations of the body states that correspond to those actions. This would 
result in an ‘as if’ state in the observer, as if the observer was performing a similar 
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action or feeling a similar emotion as the perceived agent. This is a less 
sophisticated, mandatory and reflexive pathway, based on a direct matching module 
served by the mirroring mechanism (Gallese et al., 1996; Gallese & Goldman, 1998; 
Rizzolatti et al., 2001; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). 
The concept of emotional anticipation fits within models of embodied cognition 
of facial expression (Carr et al., 2003; Goldman, 2006; Jabbi et al., 2007; 
Niedenthal, 2007; Niedenthal et al., 2010; Pitcher et al., 2008, Wicker et al., 2003), 
which emphasize the prominent role played by one’s own motor experience while 
observing emotional facial expressions. 
The results presented in this thesis suggest that emotional anticipation may not 
involve the mediation of a ToM, based on mental state concepts or reasoning. 
Rather, it is speculated that the results may be better explained in terms of a low-
level mindreading mechanism (Goldman, 2006; Goldman & Sripada, 2005), 
underpinned by embodied simulation (Gallese, 2007). Specifically, a simulation of 
the agent’s dynamic facial expression activate motor schema that will give rise to the 
emotional state the observer would arrive at if the observer would experience the 
same dynamic facial expression. This may have triggered an internal anticipation of 
how the emotional state of the agent would have developed in the immediate future, 
which in turn influenced the perception of the facial expressions in question. 
This is in line with the perceptual mentalizing model proposed by Teufel et al. 
(2010), the anticipation of how the emotional state of the agent would have 
developed if the video-clip would have continued beyond the stopping point 
influences the perceptual evaluation of the last neutral frame of the sequence. 
However, in contrast to Teufel’s model, where explicit information offered to 
participants influenced perception, in the model presented in this thesis the 
information was provided implicitly within the immediate perceptual history (the 
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video-clips) and emotional anticipation was implicitly and automatically generated by 
this perceptual history. These results are corroborated by previous studies that 
showed how the perceptual history implicitly provides information about the agent’s 
behavioural intentions, which is ‘picked up’ by the observer and influences 
perception (Hudson et al., 2009, Hudson & Jellema, 2011). 
Thus, here the distinction between top-down inferential processes, which 
includes a mentalistic analysis of social events and bottom-up perceptual processes 
that lead to a mechanistic description of the social event is revisited, taking into 
consideration the possible involvement of the mirror mechanisms. The study 
presented in Chapter 2 opens up the possibility that embodied simulation may serve 
as an intermediate step between a purely mechanistic visual analysis of the social 
stimuli and high-level theorizing about others’ emotional states based on the 
perceptual analysis of those social cues, contextual information and knowledge 
(Palumbo and Jellema, under review). 
The data reported in Chapter 3 from individuals with AS supports the 
hypothesis of emotional anticipation with TD individuals and suggest the use of 
compensatory, rule-based strategies adopted by AS people to cope with social 
situations. These findings are also in line with the ‘broken mirror’ hypothesis, which 
suggests that an impairment of the mirroring mechanism causes a  lack of emphatic 
reactions, which then affects the judgements of facial expressions (Williams et al., 
2001; Dapretto et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2004). However, direct evidence supporting 
the hypothesis of a direct matching pathway underpinning emotional anticipation 
(and its dysfunction) is not yet provided and further investigations are necessary. 
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The study using fake facial expressions (Chapter 4) tried to provide additional 
insights about the mechanism of emotional anticipation and focused on one issue in 
particular: What if the emotional expression and the emotional state of mind are not 
congruent? Normally, when a person smiles she is happy and when she frowns she 
is angry. In these cases the facial expression and the emotional state of mind go 
hand in hand. However, in the case of faked smiles and faked frowns there is a 
discrepancy between the facial expression and state of mind. In Chapter 4 the 
emotional anticipation hypothesis was tested by exploiting this discrepancy. Does an 
overshoot response bias occur if the emotional state of mind did not change much, 
while the expression did change? Emotional anticipation would predict a reduced or 
absent overshoot bias. Do people understand the ‘why’ of an expression by a 
bottom-up motor resonance? The idea is that the visual information about the 
observed expression is first analyzed by the superior temporal sulcus (STS) and 
then passed on to the parietal mirror neuron areas and from there to the mirror 
areas in the premotor cortex. Thus, the meaning beyond the physical features of the 
expression may be processed within the motor system.  
In Chapter 4 the visual information contained in the fake and genuine offsets 
was very similar. If the perceptual evaluation of the video-clips resulted in a 
simulation of those expressions, then it is possible that the outcome of this 
simulation mechanism was the same for both genuine and fake expressions. In 
other words, the underpinning emotions/intentions were not simulated correctly 
because of a lack of adequate visual input to the observer’s motor system. This, in 
turn, could have affected emotional anticipation and generated the overshoot bias in 
both the fake and genuine videos. It is important to note that in Experiment 3 
participants were aware of the kind (fake vs. genuine) of video-clips they were 
watching, but it seems that explicit knowledge did not modulate the responses.  
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The action ‘reconstruction model’ (Csibra, 2007) suggests that a hypothesized goal 
of an action is produced prior the generation of the action’s template in the 
observer’s motor system. Thus, “action understanding may proceed, rather than 
follow, action mirroring” (Csibra, 2007, p. 443). However, the results of the ‘fake’ 
experiments suggest that explicit knowledge did not affect the evaluations. Possibly, 
the motor simulations induced by the fake and genuine expressions were simply too 
similar, making it impossible for the observer’s mirror mechanism to discriminate 
between them. Therefore, the overshoot bias reported here, being the product of 
involuntary anticipation based on motor simulation was the same in both conditions, 
despite explicit information indicating otherwise. This would mean that motor 
resonance is an automatic and mandatory mechanism for producing an involuntary 
anticipation of the affective states of other people, which overrides explicit 
knowledge. This is in line with research carried out by Maringer et al. (2011), who 
reported that only when the automatic mimicking (i.e. simulation) of the facial 
expression was inhibited (by holding a pen in the mouth) the context, stereotypes 
and beliefs were taken into account in the evaluation of the meaning of smiles. 
However, at the moment this is just a speculative interpretation of the results 
presented in this thesis. 
 
The current debate in Theory of Mind leaves open some fundamental questions 
about the role of the direct matching account in implicit mentalizing processes. (1) 
Does a mirroring mechanism provide a direct tool to discriminate between different 
kinds of mental states when these are displayed by similar behavioural acts? (2) As 
mental states (e.g. intentions, beliefs and motivations) tend to be more complex than 
emotional states, is it possible that the kind of role played by simulation and 
mentalizing routes may depend on this complexity? (3) Can a simulation account be 
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sufficient to explain the ability to anticipate what is beyond people’s emotional facial 
signals? (4) What is the role of motor representations and embodied simulation in 
social understanding and in the involuntary attribution of emotional/mental states to 
others? Does embodied simulation form a crucial stage in the formation and the use 
of affective state concepts?  
  
 
5.2 Outlook for future research 
 
Even though the nature of the experiments presented in this thesis did not allow to 
provide a definitive confirmation of a top-down account involving motor simulation as 
explanation for the overshoot response bias, the experiments did manage to 
exclude alternative candidates involving basic visual processes (Chapter 2). This 
conclusion was supported by the differences between TD individuals and the AS 
group found in the Identity change and Loop tasks (Chapter 3). Future investigations 
could elaborate on the studies presented in this thesis in the following ways.  
 
(1)  The emotional anticipation hypothesis could be tested with additional facial 
expressions. In the current experiments, angry and happy expressions were chosen 
because both are approach-oriented (cf. Davidson & Hughdahl, 1995) and are fairly 
similar in terms of arousal, but occupy opposite positions on the valance dimension 
(Russel, 1980; Russel & Bullock, 1985). However, in principle the ability to attribute 
an affective state to the agent and form expectations about how that state may 
change over time based on the immediate perceptual history and/or contextual 
information can also be applied to other emotional displays, which include different 
facial expressions but also emotional body postures.  
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(2)  It is known from an affective priming study (Jellema et al., 2011) that the 
neutral frame at the end of Joy-to-neutral clips is associated with a negative 
affective valence, and likewise that the neutral frame at the end of Anger-to-neutral 
clips is associated with a positive affective valence. This is suggestive of embodied 
simulation, which can be further assessed using EMG. Specifically, it would be 
relevant to test whether observation of the Joy-to-neutral video clips would induce 
an initial activity in the EMG of the observer’s ‘smiling’ muscles (Zygomaticus 
Major), followed by activity in the ‘frowning’ muscles (Corrugator Supercilii) at the 
end of the clip during (and following) presentation of the neutral expression. This 
would be surprising as in these video-clips there is no angry facial expression at all. 
Similarly, it would be relevant to see whether observation of the Anger-to-neutral 
video clips would induce an initial activity in the EMG of the observer’s ‘frowning’ 
muscles, followed by activity in the ‘smiling’ muscles at the end of the clip. Again, 
that would be surprising as in these video-clips there is no happy facial expression 
at all. If these hypotheses are confirmed then that would indicate embodied 
simulation as the underlying mechanism for the perceptual overshoot bias. 
Experiment 14 (Appendix) made a start with this line of investigation, but more 
participants (both TD and AS) will have to be tested before firm conclusions can be 
drawn. 
  
(3)  The video-clips for the fake condition lacked the appropriate dynamicity that 
makes an expression being implicitly recognized as faked (Ekman et al., 1982; Hess 
& Kleck, 1990; Krumhuber et al., 2007; Schmidt et al., 2006). However, at the 
present no information is provided in the literature about the temporal dynamicity of 
the offsets of faked angry expression and further investigations are necessary. 
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Moreover, in the study presented in Chapter 4 only four actors were used thus 
introducing more variability and familiarity effects, as compared to the studies in 
Chapters 2 and 3 where eight actors from the Ekman and Friesen (1976) validated 
set were chosen. Ideally, a large set of identities should be used.  
 
(4)  At the present the SIMS model (Niedenthal et al., 2010) exclusively applies 
to smiling expressions. Nothing is known about negative facial displays. The study 
reported in Chapter 4 represents the first attempt to investigate pretended angry 
expressions. If the simulation model can account for the immediate understanding of 
the meaning of smiles, then this should be also the case for negative facial affects. 
Further experiments could incorporate real-time video-recordings.  
 
(5)  A new study may also involve EMG responses of the observer’s facial 
muscles while watching genuine and fake smiles. This would clarify whether 
different facial units would be mimicked during the observation of a fake smile as 
compared to a genuine one. In the case of ‘direct’ matching motor resonance the 
activation of congruent facial muscles is expected. Use of the EMG technique during 
the ‘emotional anticipation’ task with fake and genuine Joy-to-neutral videos would 
allow to test the role played by ‘direct matching’ in anticipating the emotional state of 
mind the agent is going to have in the immediate future.  
 
(6)  Further, more compelling, evidence about the possible involvement of 
mirror mechanism in emotional anticipation might be obtained by using the current 
video-clips in fMRI studies. Similar anger and happy offset stimuli as used in this 
thesis, but depicted by schematic figures (made with Poser software), were 
presented by Mühlberger et al. (2011) in an fMRI study. They reported that the offset 
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of happy and the onset of angry expressions both signal a threat and lead to an 
avoidance reaction, as they activated the typical avoidance areas: the lateral 
orbitofrontal cortex, the left amygdala and the right insula. The onset of happy and 
offset of angry expressions signal a reward and induce an approach reaction, as 
they activated the typical approach area: left dorsal striatum. However, these 
authors did not focus their analysis on the mirror neurons areas. Such a focus could 
be applied in future fMRI studies to further test the motor simulation hypothesis. 
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A1.1 Experiment 14 
 
A1.1.1 Background 
In the last decade several studies showed that the mere observation of facial 
expressions produces rapid and inconscious responses in the observer’s facial 
muscles. For example, facial expressions of negative and positive affect produce 
rapid specific facial EMG responses over Corrugator Supercilii (the ‘frowning’ 
muscle) and the Zygomatic Major (the ‘smiling’ muscle), respectively (Dimberg & 
Thunberg 1998; Dimberg et al., 2000; Larsen et al., 2003). It has been suggested 
that these motor responses to the sight of facial expressions may reflect activity in 
mirror mechanisms enabling an immediate grasp of the emotional state of mind of 
mind of the agent through embodied simulation (Gallese et al., 2004).   
In this thesis it was reported that Joy-to-neutral and Anger-to-neutral video-clips 
generate a perceptual distortion for the last neutral frame of the sequence, which is 
consistenly rated as slightly angry and slightly happy, respectively. A possible 
interpretation of this ‘overshoot’ effect is that Joy/Anger-to-neutral perceptual 
histories gave rise to ‘emotional anticipation’: i.e. the involuntary anticipation of how 
the emotional state of the other would develop in the immediate future (Chapter 2 
and 3; Palumbo & Jellema, under review). It has also been suggested that a sudden 
change from a full-blown happy expression into a neutral expression may constitute 
a negative signal (i.e. threat), which would trigger an avoidance reaction in the 
observer.  Similarly, a change from a full-blown angry expression into a neutral 
expression would be processed as a positive signal (i.e. reward/approach reaction 
(Mühlberger et al., 2011). It has been hypothesized that the Joy-to-neutral video 
sequence would lead the observer to involuntarily anticipate that the agent’s 
immediate future emotional state will move into a negative affective state, and, 
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similarly, that the Anger-to-neutral video sequence would lead the observer to 
involuntarily anticipate that the agent’s future emotional state will move into a 
negative affective state (Jellema et al., 2011).    
This interpretation was supported by the findings reported in Chapters 2 and 3, 
which suggested that TD observers reacted to the agent’s emotional state rather 
than to the literal facial characteristics. This internal ‘matching’ reaction of the 
observer to the emotional/affective state of the actor could have possibly triggered 
an anticipatory mechanism enabling the observer to implicitly predict the agent’s 
future emotional state. Such a mechanism would be vital for intersubjective 
understanding.  
The role played by the motor experience of the observer in the perception of 
facial expressions is in line with theories of embodied cognition (Gallese, 2007). 
Thus, a simulation of the agents’ dynamic facial expression activates (reflexively) 
motor schema, which run a ‘simulation’ of the observed behavior telling the observer 
what she/he would feel if she/he would have exhibited that behavior. This 
experience is then attributed to the agent, coloring the visual perception of the 
agent.  An alternative model claims that the meaning and/or goal of the observed 
action is first deciphered in areas outside the mirror mechanism areas, and only 
then (after the goal computations have been performed) fed to the mirror 
mechanisms (Csibra, 2007). In this view, the mirror neuron activity reflects the 
anticipated action rather than the observed action. However, according to both these 
models (Csibra, 2007; Gallese, 2007), anticipation of the agent’s emotional state of 
mind should be accompanied by activation in corresponding muscles. 
 
We recorded EMG activity from TD individuals while they passively observed 
the video clips (Experiment 14). Specifically, we tested whether the EMG activity of 
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the observer at the end of Joy-to-neutral video clips (i.e. video-clips lacking the 
typical features of an angry facial expression) would increase in the ‘frowning’ 
muscles (Corrugator Supercilii). Similarly, we tested whether EMG activity would 
increase in the ‘smiling’ muscle (Zygomaticus Major) at the end of Anger-to-neutral 
video-clips (i.e. video-clips lacking the typical feature of a happy facial expression). 
Thus, the aim of EMG experiment was to examine whether our previous behavioural 
findings are in line with an embodied simulation account of emotional anticipation. 
This experiment should, however, be considered as preliminary, because, due to 
frequent artifacts in EMG traces, not enough participants could be included in the 
analysis to allow drawing firm conclusions.  
 
 
A1.1.2 Method 
A1.1.2.1 Participants 
The current pilot study was conducted at the Department of Neuroscience, Institute 
of Physiology, in the Faculty of Medicine and Surgery, University of Parma, Italy. 
Fifteen TD students of Italian nationality with normal or corrected-to-normal vision, 
naïve to the aim of the experiment, took part in the study on voluntary basis, and 
provided written consent prior to the experiment. After applying exclusion criteria 
(see data reduction below) eleven individuals (mean age = 29.5; SD = 4.2; 5 
females and 6 males) were included in the final sample. The study received ethical 
approval by the Department of Neuroscience of Parma University. 
 
A1.1.2.2 Stimuli  
Joy-to-neutral and Anger-to-neutral videos similar to those in the control conditions 
of the experiments in Chapter 2 were employed (all clips ended in a neutral 
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expression) Previous EMG studies with static pictures of happy and angry facial 
expressions showed that distinct facial reactions during the first second of exposure 
are most clear-cut during the period 500–1000 ms after stimulus onset (Dimberg & 
Thunberg, 1998).  In the current study the duration of the first and last frames of the 
video-sequence was adjusted so as to capture maximal muscle activation. Thus, the 
first frame (100% happy or angry expression) lasted 700 ms, while the last frame 
(the neutral to-be-evaluated expression) remained on the screen for 1000 ms. The 
duration of the morphed sequence was 270 ms (9 x 30 ms), the same as in 
Experiment 1 (see Figure A1). The total duration of the stimuli presentation was 
1970 ms. 
 
 
 
Figure A1. Schematic illustration of the stimulus presentations in Experiment 14. 
Joy-to-neutral videos started with a facial expression of intense joy (100%), which 
gradually morphed into a neutral expression (top panel). Anger-to-neutral videos 
started with a facial expression of intense anger (100%), which gradually morphed 
into a neutral expression (bottom panel). 
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A1.1.2.3 Experimental procedure 
Participants were individually tested in a sound-attenuated room. All gave written 
consent for taking part in the study. In order to lower electrode impedance (< 10 
kOhm), participants underwent a light scrubbing of the facial areas with alcohol. 
Bipolar Ag/AgCl (.25 cm diameter) electrodes were first covered with a layer of 
electrolytic gel and then placed over the Corrugator Supercilii and Zygomaticus 
Major in the direction of the muscle’s fiber orientation on both sides (left and right) of 
the face (see Figure A2). The inter-electrode spacing was approximately 1 cm. The 
ground electrode was placed over the forehead. Correct placement of the electrodes 
was confirmed by checking the EMG in response to deliberate smiles and frowns 
produced by the participant. 
 
 
 
Figure A2. Illustration of the recording positions of the surface electrodes over the 
Corrugator Supercilii and the Zygomaticus Major. 
 
Participants were seated at a viewing distance of 100 cm from a PC screen (21-
inch monitor, 1600 x 1200 pixels, 76 Hz). The stimuli were presented using E-Prime 
(v. 1.2; Psychology Software Tools, Inc.).  
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The experiment started with a calibration phase, in which participants rated the 
static neutral expression of each actor presented for 600 ms using the same 5-point 
scale (ranging from slightly angry, via neutral, to slightly happy) as in Experiment  1. 
After the calibration participants were presented with 8 practice trials, followed by 64 
experimental trials randomly intermixed (8 actors x 2 perceptual histories x 4 
repetitions). Each trial started with a fixation cross presented for 700 ms, followed by 
the video-clip. As soon as the video-clip ended, participants were prompted to 
evaluate the last neutral frame of the sequence on the same 5-point scale as used 
in the calibration phase. Further procedures and apparatus were as in Experiment 1. 
EMG signals were recorded continuously during the experimental trials and 
amplified 1000 times (CED amplifiers: Cambridge Electronic Device, Cambridge, 
UK). The sampling rate was set at a frequency of 2.5 kHz. Online low-pass filtering 
was applied with a cut-off at 500Hz in order to eliminate aliasing artifacts before A/D 
conversion. A 50-Hz notch filter was also applied to reduce environmental electrical 
noise.  
 
A1.1.2.4 Data reduction and analysis 
 Behavioural data  
Trials in which the RTs fell below 250 ms or above 3000 ms were considered 
outliers and were removed (3.2%). Participants were excluded if more than 25% of 
the RT values were outside the 250 – 3000 ms range (n = 1). The +2.5 SD rule 
applied to the difference between the mean ratings for the Joy-to-neutral and Anger-
to-neutral videos did not exclude any participants. However, three more participants 
were excluded because they pressed the key corresponding to ‘slightly angry’ on the 
scale (1 = slightly angry) on more than 90% of the total trials. 
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The calibration scores were used to adjust the scores in the experimental trials. 
That is, a calibration factor of [3.00 minus the calibration score] was added to the 
raw scores. For illustrative purposes the calibration scores for the neutral expression 
of each actor are shown (n = 11) in Figure A3. The calibration procedure allowed 
performing one-sample t tests with test value 3.00 for each perceptual history. All 
statistical analyses were performed on the calibrated scores.  
 
   
 
Figure A3. Calibration scores in Experiment 14. Ratings on the 5-point scale 
(vertical axis) for the neutral expressions of the 8 actors presented in the calibration 
phase. Error bars indicate +1SD. 
 
EMG data  
EMG data were processed offline applying a high-pass filter with a cut-off at 30Hz, 
and were fully-rectified (Spike 2; Cambridge Electronic Design Ltd, Cambridge, UK). 
The EMG activity was also inspected for eventual artefacts occurring during the 
fixation cross (700 ms), the first 100% happy or angry frame (700 ms) and the last 
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neutral frame (1000 ms). Artifacts were removed manually (Signal 3; Cambridge 
Electronic Design Ltd, Cambridge, UK).  
Further computations and data analysis were performed in MATLAB 5.3 (1994-
2012, The MathWorks, Inc). First, trials which were rejected according to the RTs 
cut-off (3.2%; see section A1.2.4.1) were also excluded from the EMG data analysis. 
Three periods of interest were identified:  the fixation cross, which was used as 
baseline (700 ms; phase 1), the first 100% happy or angry frame (700 ms; phase 2) 
and the last neutral frame (1000 ms; phase 3). Only the last 500 ms of each phase 
were taken into account, resulting in three 500 ms bins: ‘bin 1’ (baseline), ‘bin 2’ 
(100% happy or angry first frame) and ‘bin 3’ (last neutral frame), as illustrated in 
Figure A4. In this explorative study the statistical analyses were performed on a 
subset of 9 participants from the total sample of 15 participants. For the 6 excluded 
participants the EMG was too noisy and contained too many artifacts. For the Joy-
to-neutral videos, it was predicted to find an increase of the activity in the left and 
right Corrugator in bin 3 as compared to bin 2.   For the Anger-to-neutral videos, it 
was predicted to find an increase of the activity in the left and right Zygomaticus 
Major in bin 3 as compared to bin 2.   
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Figure A4. Illustration of the presentation sequence with the three 500 ms bins 
corresponding to the baseline (bin 1), first frame 100% emotion (bin 2) and last 
neutral frame (bin 3). 
 
A1.1.3 Results 
 
A1.1.3.1 Behavioural data 
The results are shown in Figure A5. The typical overshoot response bias was found: 
the last neutral frame was perceived as more angry in the joy-videos (M = 2.70, SD 
= .31) as compared to the anger-videos (M = 3.37, SD = .29). The mean ratings in 
the joy-videos and anger-videos differed significantly from each other (t(10) = -10.3, 
p < .0001) and each differed significantly from 3.00 (joy-video: t(10) = -3.2, p = .009; 
anger-video: t(10) = 4.19, p = .002; two-tailed). 
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Figure A5. Results for the behavioural task of Experiment 14. (A) Scores for the 
neutral expressions at the end of the Joy-to-neutral and Anger-to-neutral 
sequences. Error bars indicate SEM. (B) Ratings for each of the eight actors with 
Joy-to-neutral and Anger-to-neutral videos are shown to illustrate the consistency 
across actors. 
 
A.1.1.3.2 EMG data 
The results are shown in Figure A6. Paired-samples t-tests in the Joy-to-neutral 
condition reported a trend for an increase in activity in the right Corrugator for the 
last neutral expression (bin 3; M = .51, SD = .63) relative to the maximally happy 
expression (bin 2; M = -.12, SD = .64) (t(8) = 1.96, p = .086; two-tailed). In the left 
Corrugator, there was no difference in activity between bins 2 and 3 (t(8) = 1.35, p = 
.214; two-tailed).  
In the Anger-to-neutral condition, paired sample t-tests showed significant 
increases in activity in both the left Zygomaticus in bin 3 (M = .80, SD = .31) 
compared to bin 2 (M = .00, SD = .77) t(8) = 3.55, p = .008  and in the right 
Zygomaticus (bin 3, M = .42, SD = .33 ; bin 2, M = -.18, SD = .35; t(8) = 5.07, p = 
.001; two-tailed).  
 
Additional one sample t-tests also revealed that the Corrugator activity during  
the maximally happy frame (bin 2) and the Zygomaticus activity in the maximally 
angry frame (bin 2), did not significantly differ from the activity during the baseline 
(bin 1) (left Corrugator: t(8) = .79, p = .451; right Corrugator: t(8) = .55, p = .599; left 
Zygomaticus: t(8) = .02, p = .983; right Zygomaticus: t(8) = 1.54, p = .163; two-
tailed). This result excludes the possibility that the increase in activity observed in 
the Corrugator during the last neutral frame of the videos (bin 3) as compared to 
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bin2, in the Joy-to-neutral condition, actually reflected a rebounce from an inhibition, 
i.e. an inhibition in response to the maximally happy expression (bin 2).   
Similarly,  the result excludes the possibility that the increase in activity 
observed in the Zygomaticus during the last neutral frame of the videos (bin 3) as 
compared to bin2, in the Anger-to-neutral condition, actually reflected a rebounce 
from inhibition in response to the maximally angry expression (bin 2).  
 
Finally, one sample t-tests in the Joy-to-neutral condition showed a trend for an 
increase in activity in the right Corrugator for the last neutral expression (bin 3) 
relative to the baseline (bin 1) (t(8) = 2.46, p = .039). In the left Corrugator there was 
no difference in the activity between bin 3 and bin 1 t(8) = -.06, p = .954; two-tailed).  
In the Anger-to-neutral condition, one sample t-tests revealed a significant 
increase in activity in both the left and the right Zygomaticus in bin 3 compared to 
bin 1 (left Zygomaticus: t(8) = 7.67, p < .0001; right Zygomaticus:  t(8) = 3.81, p = 
.005; two-tailed).  
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Figure A6. Results for the EMG activity of Experiment 14. (A) Increase of activity in 
the Corrugator Supercilii during the last neutral expressions (bin 3) of the Joy-to-
neutral sequence (x axis). (B) Increase of activity in the Zygomaticus Major during 
the last neutral expression (bin 3) of the Anger-to-neutral sequence (x axis). The 
EMG activity is expressed as percentage of bin 1 (y axis). Error bars indicate SEM. 
 
Appendix 
EMG responses to Joy/Anger-to-neutral videos: a preliminary study 
 
 
 
XIV 
 
A1.1.4 Discussion 
The main purpose of employing the EMG technique in combination with the 
emotional anticipation task was to investigate the role played by embodied 
mechanisms of motor resonance in understanding and anticipating others’ emotions 
from dynamic facial displays. Therefore, the specific objective of this study was to 
test whether the perceptual distortion, as found for the neutral expression at the end 
of Joy/Anger-to-neutral videos, would be associated with a congruent response in 
the observer’s facial reactions.  
 It was found that the overshoot response bias in the Joy-to-neutral condition 
was associated with an increased activity in the right Corrugator, while the 
overshoot bias in the Anger-to-neutral condition came along with an increased 
activity in the right and left Zygomaticus. Overall, at least in this selected  sample of 
9 (out of 15) participants, the observed trend seems to be in line with embodied 
simulation models, both the ‘direct matching’ model of action/emotion mirroring 
(Gallese, 2007; Rizzolatti et al., 2001) and the ‘reconstructive matching’ model 
(Csibra, 2007). However, as the current data represent a selected, small, sample of 
participants, these results should be taken with caution, and as yet no firm 
conclusions can be drawn from it.  
This pilot study contained several methodological limitations. Some 
modifications of the paradigm may improve the clearness of the EMG signal. For 
instance, the two types of video-clips (Joy and Anger) could be presented in two 
separated blocks. This might prevent possible interferences with ongoing activity, 
especially because the speed of the video-sequences was relatively high. At the 
moment almost all EMG studies using facial expressions adopted static 
presentations lasting several seconds (Dimberg, 1982). Moreover, it would be 
desirable to introduce an intertrial interval of several seconds. This would facilitate 
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the relaxation of the muscle’s fibers before starting with a new trial, which may 
improve the reliability of the baseline.  
 These preliminary findings seem to be a starting point for further investigations. 
The study needs to be replicated after applying the above methodological 
improvements on a much larger sample of participants. Further, it would be 
interesting to employ the EMG technique also with ‘fake’ Joy/Anger-to-neutral videos 
(see Chapter 4). One would expect to find smaller muscle activation when the 
observer is presented with ‘fake’ Joy/Anger-to-neutral sequences as compared to 
videos of genuine expressions. If this prediction would be confirmed then it would 
not only help to clarify the results obtained so far with the ‘fake’ manipulation, but it 
may also suggest that embodied simulation based on ‘direct matching’ mirroring is 
an integral part of the emphatic process enabling our immediate understanding of 
others’ facial expressions. 
 
 
